THE BALKAN CRISIS. T HOSE who were recently allies in the
Balkans have fairly flown at one another's throats, and the ferocity of the struggle is even greater than that of the war against Turkey. We see in a, flash how slender was the basis of union, and we have in retrospect a correspondingly greater respect for the diplomacy of M. Venezelos, which made an alliance even temporarily possible. The news from the theatre of war is so inadequate and so contradictory as we write that we shall not attempt here an analysis of the situation, much less a forecast of the course of the war. A few facts are enough for the purpose of support- ing what we desire to say as to the proper policy for the Powers to adopt. The present fighting, to begin with, was precipitated by the Bulgarians, who crossed the Servian frontier at several points. The multitude of unfamiliar names of villages which appears day by day in the newspapers is very confusing, but a relatively clear view of events may be obtained if we remember that the one natural and obvious purpose of Bulgarian strategy is to cut off the main Servian army from Servia. If the main Servian army could be severed from Belgrade, Bulgaria would at least have time to draw breath. If the Bulgarians got possession of the railway in the valley of the river Morava, even the junction of the Servians and Greeks—for the Servians would then necessarily be driven back on to the Greek army—need not be a very grave matter for the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian plan is apparently to reach Vrania—though a large Bulgarian concentration in the district of Nish, where a most im- portant railway junction lies, would perhaps serve the purpose as well—and it cannot be very long before a decisive blow has been struck.
In other regions Bulgarian successes or reverses would not be decisive unless, of course, by innumerable minor defeats the Bulgarian army suffered a fatally cumulative effect of attrition. Such a process, however, would take time, and we expect a more sudden and decisive result. The position of Bulgaria is indeed critical. She has available about 400,000 men, apart from the doubtful number of Christians and Moslems in the lately conquered Turkish territory who are said to have taken up arms in her cause. Servia has available about 270,000 men, Greece about 140,000, and Montenegro about 20,000. The Servians, Greeks, and Montenegrins "on paper" thus out- number the Bulgarians by about 30,000 men. But that is not all, for Bulgaria is indeed surrounded by enemies. The Roumanian army, always ready to relieve an exhausted combatant of some of his property, is expected to have 300,000 men under arms within a few days. If Roumania, who is now mobilizing her army, decided to take sides against Bulgaria, nothing but the word of the Powers or the restraint of the Allies themselves—a hardly recog- nizable quality—could save her from annihilation. As for the prostrate Turks, they turn restlessly and grumble forth threats, but we cannot believe them capable of seriously taking the field again at present. Their organization is shattered. They might cross the Tchatalja lines, but they could not penetrate far into Thrace. An army must have something on which to live; if it does not carry supplies with it, it must "live on the country," and neither method seems possible at the moment for a. Turkish army in Thrace. -Bulgaria is hard enough beset without having the Turks against her. What a spectacle it is ! Scarcely has the world ceased echoing the praises of the Bulgarians in the wonderful campaign in which Turkish rule in Europe was virtually brought to an end. when Bulgaria, the centre and pivot of the recent alliance, is in ostensible danger of losing even what she had before the war with Turkey.
The Bulgarians, as we said, precipitated the new war by crossing the Servian frontier at several points. This was out of keeping with the behaviour of Bulgaria in the preceding weeks, as she steadily advocated arbitration when both Servia and Greece were uttering bloodcurdling threats against her. Why has she become the aggressor ? The explanation no doubt is that she felt peace was no longer possible if she was to stand on the letter of the treaty which bound the Balkan Allies, and that war being inevit- able, the sooner she struck the better. It never occurred to her as a possible solution that she should consent to a modification of the treaty. In a superficial or pedantically literal sense Bulgaria has right on her side. She stands by the treaty ; Servia does not. But there is a. much wider sense in which we fear that Bulgaria has committed what may turn out to be a fatal error of judgment. For the fact is that when the Balkan Allies came to terms before the war with Turkey, the establishment of Albania as an independent principality was not contemplated. The new territory which was to be Servia's share in the event of a successful war with Turkey was to be carved out of Albania. Since then the Powers have ruled out Albania, and thus the potential share of Servia is not available. In these circumstances it is not a morally defensible policy to say that Servia must abide by the treaty. The foundation of the treaty no longer exists. It is not even as though Servia were a discredited companion in the field to whom Bulgaria could fairly say, "You have got as much as you deserve in any case. The Bulgarians and not the Servians bore the burden of the fight." The battle at Monastir and the march of the Servian army across very difficult country to the sea are events to the credit of the Servians which some observers place as high as any military achievements in the war. We confess, then, to much sympathy with the Servian claims. From this imbroglio a very clear and logical deduction may be drawn. The Powers by ruling out Albania threw down the apple of discord, and the responsibility lies with the Powers to settle the contro- versy. We do not see how it is possible to escape from this conclusion. The Powers cannot make an end of their duty by drawing the Albanian frontier ; they must draw the future frontiers for all the Balkan States.
It is being said that the Powers by their present inaction prove that the Concert is impotent and has little hope of being able to do anything further. "If the Powers do not intervene now to stop this horrible carnage surely it is evident that they are incapable of intervention at all ! " We do not agree with that opinion. The Powers are probably looking on in the expectation that a good deal of blood-letting will make the combatants far more tractable a few weeks hence than they are now. This is a cynical plan if you please, but it is true enough in its way. Indeed, as we contemplate the ugly and terrible bitterness of the present struggle we have to admit that it will be a task of no small difficulty to sound the "Cease fire" at once to the Balkan Christians. They are deaf and blind with the fury of battle. We shall not discuss here the nature of the frontier lines which would offer the best hopes of a lasting peace in the Balkans, but it is evident to us that Bulgaria, with her splendid conquests in the war against Turkey, would have no just ground of complaint if she were required to cede some ground to Servia,. Servia has dreamed for years of access to the Adriatic. That is not now possible, and it is just as well for Servia that it is not, for her railway would pass through the territory of enemies. But she has a most reasonable claim to access to the Egean, and if trouble is not to be unending in the Balkans the Servian railway to the Egean should not traverse Bulgarian territory. That means that Bulgaria must give up her claim to a wedge of Macedonian territory across the line of the future Servian railway. The Servian railway would run through Greek territory, of course, but there it would be in the land of friends. No doubt, the Bulgarians will complain that they are being asked to abandon their own kith and kin in that part of Macedonia. The objection need not be denied. Ethnological difficulties of this sort are inevitable in any settlement, and some of them—as few as possible, of course—must be accepted. The essential point is that as the Powers have provided the materials for the new war, the Powers must create and. impose a settlement A boundary dispute provoked the war ; a boundary settlement, approved by-the whole Concert, must end it.
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