THE NEW BRITISH ARMY
By MAJOR B. T. REYNOLDS
THE pressure of events is forcing the pace of military development in this country in a way that makes the soldier feel slightly giddy. At the beginning of March the suggestion that the situation demanded that the whole of the field-force divisions in this country, Regular and Terri- torial, should be ready to proceed overseas at the shortest possible notice seemed hardly likely to be taken seriously. One felt that a public fed for twenty years by popular military writers on the pleasant doctrine of limited-liability warfare could not be expected to swallow so much at a gulp. A few days later Mr. Hore-Belisha, in introducing the Army Estimates, put this very proposal forward as the con- sidered policy of the Government, and it was generally accepted—though few people at that time had any idea of how far this decision was to lead us before a couple of months were out.
Before considering the effects of the military revolution that has taken place, it will be useful to devote a few words to the external factors to which the measures taken are an answer. By basing the whole organisation and life of the State on the need of instant readiness for war the Dictator of Germany, and to a lesser extent his fellow in Italy, have succeeded in making possible a revolution in military tech- nique, and thus in obtaining an advantage over the demo- cratic countries comparable in importance to that obtained in the seventeenth century by the first States to solve the pro- blem of maintaining standing armies in time of peace. They can develop their maximum war-potential and take the field from the first day of hostilities without waiting for the cum- brous process of mobilisation. Further, Axis diplomacy has placed us in a position that we have hitherto always succeeded in avoiding. The Commonwealth is today faced by a potential menace in three vital areas and the narrow seas through which our maritime communications run be- tween them—in North-Western Europe, in the Near East, and in the Far East.
From the first it follows that, in the event of war, British troops would be required to go to the assistance of our Allies earlier than in 1914. From the second, that we could not count on being able to draw on oversea garri- sons to the same extent as before to augment a field force based on home. In the last war the first Territorials were not judged fit to take the field as divisions until February, and the first of Kitchener's armies until May, 1915. Before that we had called home five Regular British and two Indian infantry divisions, and the equivalent of four cavalry divisions (two British and two Indian), and all except the 29th Division were already in the line in France. In addi- tion, it should be remembered that there are today on the Home Establishment two regular divisions fewer than in 1914. One might say that at home we were 13 divisions worse off in 1939 than in 1914.
Returning to Mr. Hore-Belisha's proposal of a 19- division field force: this actually looked better than it really was. Four regular infantry divisions and one mobile divi- sion would have been ready to take the field reasonably quickly after mobilisation. A second Regular mobile divi- sion was in process of formation. There were nine Terri- torial infantry, three " motorised " and one mobile divisions recruited up to a peace establishment which varied between 7o per cent. of war establishment in the case of infantry to 30 per cent. in the case of some of the ancillary troops (R.A.S.C., R.A.O.C., and so on). Thanks to the financial stringency of the past there was no organised T. A. reserve, but it was estimated that there were some 120.000 men who had left the Territorials in the course of the last five years who might be regarded as fairly trained. The Regulars had been reorganised and re-equipped on the new mechanised establishment before the 1938 training season, the Terri- torials some six months later. It followed that all reservists would take a little longer than usual to settle down.
The general expectation amongst soldiers at the time was that in the event of war the tide of political pressure would run strongly in favour of sending troops overseas as soon as possible to honour our commitments. The Germans would probably attack—their doctrine and training and, it may be added, the influence of National Socialist thought are all in favour of the offensive. The Regulars could look forward to a repetition of First Ypres. The Territorials would be hurried out in support of their Regular comrades and inadequate training would produce the inevitable harvest of casualties. The recruiting offices would be besieged by eager volunteers who would, in their turn, go out as rein- forcements, again with the minimum of training. It was not a nice prospect.
At the end of March the Government made a further move, and announced that the Territorial field force divi- sions were to recruit up to their war establishment and then to raise a second line, making 26 T.A. divisions in all. This raised the existing establishment by 250,000 men. In the first three weeks of the month 37,000 men joined up. The last week showed a notable increase as the impetus of the recruiting campaign gathered way. 47,000 men joined. At this rate the full number will have come forward by the end of May. This in itself raises new problems. In 192o it was decided that the Territorial Army should serve as the basis of national expansion in the event of war, and officers and men undertook the foreign service obligation. But the organisation and the conditions of service were designed on the understanding that a period of let us say x months could be counted on between mobilisation and readiness to proceed overseas. The number of drills required of the man, and the period spent by units in camp each year, were calculated on a nice balance between the claims of military efficiency and those of employers and T.A. soldiers in their private capacity as employees and wage-earners.
The recent tremendous influx of recruits strained the capacity of the units for carrying out their " individual " training in their not very adequate drill-halls. It also made it appear inevitable that a large proportion of the two-weeks camp in the summer would be spent in " individual " training, thus allowing little time for the " collective " train- ing which alone can give commanders and staffs the oppor- tunity of learning to handle their units and formations. All this was calculated to increase the x months between mobili- sation and readiness for war, which it is essential to keep as low as possible. Also, the problem of the reserve was still unsolved and, until something was done about it, there was every likelihood that in the event of war the newly-formed second-line divisions would have to be broken up to supply reinforcements to their first line after these had taken the field. To meet some of these requirements suggestions were put forward for embodying Territorial recruits for a short period of intense training—say, three months—under Regular •instructors: this would have met the "individual training problem and, by ensuring that units had a higher proportion of trained soldiers in the ranks when they went to camp, go some way towards meeting the " collective " train- ing difficulty. It was also suggested that the period in camp should be extended to not less than a month and, even, that T.A. divisions might be embodied in rotation for a period of training. These suggestions were turned down at the time (in a speech made by Mr. Hore-Belisha at Bermondsey on March 31st) on the grounds of hardship to industry and because they would penalise patriotic employers. Then, at the end of April, came the historic conscription announcement, involving two measures, which go a long way toward meeting the needs of the situation. The Military Training Bill, with its six months' Militia service for all men of twenty, will ensure that there is a constant supply of trained soldiers, some passing into the ranks of the Terri- torials and others augmenting the Regular Army Reserve. There is no space to go into details here, but it may be taken that the militiamen will pass through a special course (different from that of the regular recruit) in which special attention will be devoted to field-craft and weapon-training : it will certainly be democratic, in the sense that all will be treated alike: and every effort will be made to further and give special instruction to those, no matter what their social origin, who have the capacity for leadership.
The other measure, which has received less attention, is in some ways even more far-reaching in effect. The Reserve and Auxiliary Forces Bill enables Reservists or Territorials to be called out for service in time of emergency without the cumbersome procedure of Proclamations and Orders in CounciL A number of Regular Reservists, officers and men, are being called out this year for training. It has been announced that a proportion of the Territorial anti-aircraft formations will probably be called up to man their guns and searchlights. It may be also that this machinery will be used for increasing the training period of the Territorial geld force divisions.
Beside these momentous decisions the announcement that the establishment of the Regular Army is to be increased by some 25,000 men, which should suffice to form two addi- tional Regular divisions, has passed almost unnoticed. On the whole it may be said that the measures taken in the last two months go a long way towards putting the British Army in a position to cope with the tasks with which it might be faced.
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