AMERICA AND THE PACIFIC
By ERWIN D. CAN RAM
BY the sudden transfer of the American Fleet to the Pacific, the United States accepted more dearly and more vigorously than for years past a large share of respon- sibility in Asia. The Fleet transfer was for one purpose : to counter a possible initiative by Japan in eastern Asia. American naval officers estimate that with the Fleet based no farther west than Honolulu, they would be able to threaten seriously, if not to cut, Japanese lines of communica- tion to the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Certainly, at the least, the American Navy is a serious deterrent to Japanese expansion far to the south. The transfer of the Fleet was thus of greatest importance to Great Britain and its many interests in Australasia.
For some time past, there has been a conflict not only within the State Department but within its Far Eastern Division. Some officials believed that virtually all attention should be concentrated on the European crisis, and Asia left for later attention. Others felt that for the United States Europe should be the side-show. They favoured a strict delimitation of interest between Britain and France, and the United States. Views of neither side have prevailed, and attention is being paid to both continents, although on the whole and despite American interests, Asia still is more nearly the side-show than the main performance. Yet public opinion has always allowed American Governments to go much farther in Asiatic policy than they were permitted to intervene in Europe. The immense paper commitments of the Nine Power Treaty followed swiftly after the isolationist Senate's rejection of the League of Nations. Yet in the present crisis the Administration has not sought to take advantage of what it might do in Asia. While economic sanctions of a sort have been applied to Germany, and fre- quent speeches, messages and diplomatic &marches are fired at Nazi policy, President Roosevelt has said and done rela- tively little about Japan's aggression.
Possibly the Fleet transfer marked a change from this policy, a new emphasis on the Far East. On April 27th Senator Key Pittman, often an Administration spokesman, introduced a Bill to permit a complete and sweeping embargo against American exports to Japan. Application of such an embargo would cut the economic life-line that has run from the United States to Japan, and would presumably cause an early crisis in the Far East—perhaps force Japan to make the attack on the Dutch East Indies and Malaya which the Navy was sent to the Pacific to prevent! Or, if the Navy is really a deterrent, perhaps Japan's position would become difficult and some kind of armistice could be worked out in China.
The American Asiatic policy is a dual one. First comes our insistence upon treaty rights and guarantees, our adher- Washington. ence to the- old agreements which we hope to see restored one day in the ultimate revision and pacification. By frequent Notes to Japan, our treaty rights are kept " on the record." Second comes our active policy. We have refrained from applying the Neutrality Act to the Sino-Japanese war be- cause it was judged to be detrimental to China. We have loaned the Chinese Government 25,000,000 dollars, and are making regular silver-purchases which give China a small but useful supply of foreign exchange. Numerous American war commodities find their way to China. American Chinese have made substantial contributions to their home- . land. We are still in the Philippines, with no change scheduled before 1945, and the Administration is trying to postpone that. We have a commercial airline with stepping- stones all across the Pacific, and the Administration has tried —and may ultimately be authorised—to transform Guam into a naval base. We are soon to begin construction of a third, enlarged set of locks in the Panama Canal. Our naval expansion goes on rapidly. And, most important of all, our Fleet is concentrated in the Pacific.
The inter-relation of American and Japanese policy is obvious. European preoccupations of Frantz and Britain preceded Japan's seizure of Hainan. But the next step, seizure of the Spratly Islands, halfway down the China Sea from Hainan to Malaya, followed the American Congress's negative vote on Guam. japan is thus well along the road to rubber, oil, and tin. The only strong deterrent remaining is the American Fleet. It is hard to imagine Congress de- claring war over Malaya ; indeed, it is impossible unless many other factors were involved ; but the fact remains that the United States possesses the physical force capable of threatening Japanese aggression there, and Tokyo must make its own calculations of the state of American public opinion.
In Japan's long-range estimates, the value of the American market must certainly have been taken into account. And Japanese men-in-the-street put a strikingly high value on the good opinion of the United States. This was amazingly shown in mid-April when the U.S. cruiser ' Astoria ' brought back to Yokohama the ashes of Hirosi Saito, former Ambas- sador to the United States. Japanese popular opinion mis- understood and over-estimated the nature of this act of courtesy, and in the words of Hugh Byas, the New York Times able correspondent in Tokyo: " Japanese officialdom, under the tactful but inflexible guidance of American Ambassador Grew, had great difficulty in preventing popular emotion from swelling into a national demonstration. In the last analysis the emotion that is stirring the Japanese people is relief. The public has read into a simple act of inter- national courtesy a sign that American good-will is not irre- trievably forfeited. The newspapers now understand that this solemn courtesy should not be magnified into a political gesture, but the ' Astoria' mission has released a flood of sympathetic gratitude which reveals that the populace is more sensitive than had been supposed to America's opinion."
This extraordinary susceptibility doubtless does not extend to the realists who control Japan's policy, but it is bound to be a factor in their calculations. Moreover, if there is any likelihood at all and at any time of a Hitler-Stalin agreement, Japan might be the partial victim. Furthermore, the war in China is not going well at all. Chinese counter- attacks in April halted expected Japanese advances at several widely separated spots. The drain on Japan's resources con- tinues, now coupled with the threat—however remote—of an American embargo. Japan is, therefore, by no means in an easy position. In such circumstances, American pres- sure may have more effect than is actually justified. How- ever, as in all discussions of Washington policy, there are inconsistent factors. Senator Pittman's embargo Bill is unlikely to pass, although it has some chance. And the Administration's effort to legislate an economic plan for retaining a foothold in the Philippines beyond 1945 is certain to fail of passage at this session.
President Roosevelt's unwillingness to press a stronger Asiatic policy is undoubtedly caused by fear of being left alone to confront a free-handed Japan with the Axis Powers going ahead unchecked in Europe. Thus, the stronger is British and French policy in Europe, the stronger will be American policy in the Far East. If the European anti- aggressors seem to have the situation in hand, the United States can concentrate more attention on Asia. In all the circumstances, japan apparently hesitates to enter into a binding agreement with the Axis. Her new Ambassador to the United States has been making conciliatory speeches. There are the faint rumblings of change in the whole Asiatic situation. Probably the United States will continue its pressures. Certainly we will continue to give such assist- ance to China as is possible. And now that the war in Spain is over, the words of a Chinese soldier to Ambas- sador Johnson become truer than ever. The soldier said: " We hear much of this war between the democracies and the dictatorships. But where is the fighting? I will tell you. Here in China. We are fighting the war for the democracies."
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