WHY LITVINOV WENT
HERE in Moscow it is rather curious to watch the London newspapers and radio try to make the best of Anglo- Soviet negotiations generally and the fall of Litvinov in par- ticular, the two things being closely connected. True, the London Press has abandoned the optimism of two or three weeks ago, when Moscow correspondents were bombarded with cables to the effect that the Russians were falling over their own feet to comply with British wishes and sign any sort of agreement to guarantee this and that. But what justified the National Broadcasting Corporation so recently as last Saturday in declaring " it is stated in Moscow that Litvinov's retirement marks no change in Soviet foreign policy "? Who stated it, to whom? It was not the Foreign Office, which was shocked into a muteness that was more than diplomatic. Nor the British Embassy, whose discretion outrivals Soviet muteness. Of course it means a sweeping change, no less than dropping overboard the collective security policy and with it dropping Litvinov into a " retire- ment " less honorific than Mr. Eden's.
It is impossible to exaggerate the effect of Munich and the events leading up to Munich and the way Russia was treated then by the Governments of Britain and France on the Kremlin's sensitive nerves. I say Kremlin because, what- ever may be thought abroad about Litvinov as the originator and director of Soviet foreign policy, everyone in Moscow knows that this, like all other branches of Soviet national life, is the Kremlin's prerogative. It is recognised here that the first Soviet step in the direction of collective security was a statement by Stalin to me in an interview on Christmas Day, 1933, that the League of Nations, despite its imper- fections, might serve as an obstacle to war. The U.S.S.R. later joined the League, and through the Kremlin's instru- ment, Litvinov, sought collective security at Geneva—until Munich, when the Kremlin savagely decided that•collective security was dead. Then came the absorption of Czecho- Slovakia, the economic ultimatum to Rumania, the seizure of Memel, the rape of Albania, and with them the overtures of the French and British Governments to the smouldering Soviet Achilles. What the latter then thought of Messrs. Chamberlain and Bonnet would shrivel the paper it was written on. But the Kremlin had no love—if possibly more respect—for Herr Hitler either, and moreover it was inclined to think, first, that aggression could be checked at any time by a bold front ; second, that if unchecked it must lead sooner or later to a war into which the U.S.S.R. might be dragged ; third, that, as Stalin said in his speech at the Communist Party Congress, the U.S.S.R. wished to do what it could to assist all victims of aggression. That speech, like all Stalin's speeches, was " a programme " speech, wherein those who ran might read the basic lines of Soviet policy.
But Stalin also said " We must not allow our country to be involved in conflicts by instigators of war who are accus- tomed to get other people to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." To whom he referred can be guessed, although his speech on March loth ante-dated the above- mentioned Franco-British overtures. Yet all things con- sidered, the Kremlin decided to give collective security one more trial, with the resolve in its own mind that if the U.S.S.R. made an agreement with the French and British it would be this time on such terms that the latter were fully committed beyond any chance of wriggling out.
Perhaps Litvinov's plea for a last attempt to carry through a policy with which he was thoroughly identified may have influenced the Kremlin's decision. At any rate, negotiations began, in a somewhat frigid atmosphere as far as Russia was concerned. As they continued Soviet suspicions diminished, or perhaps it is more correct to say, the Kremlin came to perceive that Axis aggressions and Franco-British apprehensions were driving Messrs. Chamberlain and Bonnet, albeit reluctantly, along the path which the Kremlin had chosen. Litvinov confirmed this, and M. Maisky was summoned from London.
I got a distinct impression that the Soviet Foreign Office really thought that negotiations would soon be con- cluded on terms satisfactory to the Kremlin, until the morning of Thursday, May 4th, or the previous evening, when Moscow learnt from London that the British reply was not only not an acceptance, but contained counter-proposals seemingly designed to protract negotiations. Whereupon the Kremlin suddenly decided it was fed up with shilly- shallying of the two Governments which it neither liked nor trusted, and said, " Enough of this nonsense. It isn't our war anyway, and if at any time now or later anyone tackles us we will give them two blows for one." Stalin had said that clearly, and Voroshilov echoed him on May Day. So bang went collective security, and with it the unhappy Litvinov, who had probably digged himself a pit by carrying his over-confidence to a point which the Kremlin thought misleading. So therefore—finis Litvinov, since the manner of his " retirement " as announced here left no doubt in any mind at Moscow that Litvinov was " out on his ear," as Americans pungently say. In more diplomatic language one might declare that the Kremlin had resumed its liberty of action in its relations with all parties in Europe, and had chosen the most demonstrative method of advertising the same, with perhaps a faint glimmer of hope that the shock might still at the eleventh hour bring the British and French into line. Because, coldly realist as the Kremlin's policy is, I think this country would have preferred to stand up with the British and French in an anti-aggression pact if—but only if—it was assured that the British and French would stand also.
It is erroneous, however, to assume that there will be any striking change in fundamental Soviet policy as defined by Stalin in his speech, which may amount to isolationism but calls for friendly relations if possible with all Powers, and particularly with Russia's neighbours. It need not therefore be thought that the U.S.S.R. will fall into Hitler's arms. Far from it, although it must not be forgotten that it is an obvious Soviet interest to buy German equipment and re- placement-parts (it is estimated that more than half the equipment bought abroad during the past ten years was German) in exchange for Soviet cotton and manganese, and if the harvest is good some grain. It also should be remem- bered that always in Soviet opinion " economics dominate politics."
On the whole it is a gloomy picture of the British Govern- ment's failure to understand the Kremlin's attitude and to realise that whatever they thought of Soviet needs and anxieties—and therefore of Soviet's willingness to meet the British and French more than half-way—the Kremlin thought quite differently, and would have what it wanted or nothing.
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