The hand of Moscow?
Jolyon Howorth
The Rise of the French Communist Party Edward Mortimer (Faber £30)
Michel Rocard, France's embattled agriculture minister, argued in 1978 that the French Communist Party (PCF) `serves no useful function whatsoever.' Publishers would hardly agree since well over a hundred books have appeared on the topic in the last ten years. Why would anybody write yet another history of 'the Party'?
Is Annie Kriegel correct in seeing the PCF as in some sense an 'unnatural' development of French political culture, the result of fortuitous, accidental historical circumstances? What role does the PCF play in the French political system? How does it maintain its hold over labour and how does it view other social actors? Final- ly, what is the precise nature of its relations with Moscow?
Edward Mortimer's book is a solid piece of craftsmanship, which retells the story of the Party's first quarter century with style and remarkable accuracy (despite the author's propensity for taking sides on sen- sitive and controversial issues about which he has no more convincing evidence than anybody else). It will prove a rewarding in- troduction to the subject for the uninitiated who are able to bear the cost without flin- ching. In that sense, it is a good and useful book. But it contains very little that has not been said already. Nor indeed could it, for the truth about the PCF remains the closest secret in the Western world, and Mortimer relies almost exclusively on standard secon- dary sources. Indeed, as his book was first drafted over ten years ago, much of the im- portant new work of the past decade is not even referred to.
By implication, his starting point takes up the 'Kriegel debate' by positing a `problem' to which the PCF offered a 'solu- tion'. The problem, according to Mortimer, was that neither the old, pre-1914 Socialist Party (SRO), nor the labour movement (CGT) genuinely reflected the aspirations of the French working-class. Those organisations, he argued, failed both to prevent war in 1914 and to transform it into revolution once it broke out. All eyes therefore began to turn to Moscow. But this approach itself has many problems.
Recent writers have stressed the na- tionalism of the French working masses on the eve of 1914, as well as the unique and rich quality of the Jaures version of social democracy, which was by no means boring- ly 'reformist' or incorrigibly `parliamen- tarist.' The French left derives from two equally authentic components, legitimised by history: republican practice and revolu- tionary objectives. Under Jaures, these two components were creatively continued. Under Bolshevik pressure, in 1920, they were torn asunder and nobody has ever really succeeded in putting them back together again. When Mortimer argues (p.97) that the PCF can justly claim to be `the party of the working-class', what he really means is that they claimed a mono- poly on one aspect of working-class politics: class-struggle as the means to revolution. But the other aspect — republican progress through institutional democracy — they either ignored, during their class-against- class periods, or disputed with the Socialists, during their Popular Front peliods. Communism is a 'natural' product ofTrench history, but it is only one part of a complex equation.
As to the role the PCF plays in French political life, which Mortimer offers as his main subject of inquiry, the result is disap- pointing. The book is heavily 'top-down,' long chapters guiding us through the im- mense small world of inner-party intrigue, in which the dramatis personae flit furtively between Paris and Moscow, dropping poison in each other's tea. A hopeful- sounding chapter on 'The Party and the Nation' addresses the issue of the PCF's impact on France as a whole. What we ac- tually see is the gradual impact of the nation on the Party, as the leaders began to realise that blind anti-militarism and crude in- dustrial sectarianism were not what the workers wanted. Through increased par- ticipation in electoral politics, the PCF also came to understand the rules of the democratic game. In short, at the time of the Popular Front, it became clear that the political culture of the left called for both revolution and reform, for both a long- term socialist project and a short-term 'We're throwing a Molotov cocktail party for you.' The Spectator 12 May 1984 republican strategy. Since-1936, the PCPs role in French political life has involved an endless quest to produce a more convincing synthesis than that of the socialists. Unfor- tunately, since Mortimer's book ends in 1947 (the final chapter, which brings the story up to 1981, being no more than a very sketchy epilogue), he does not give himself the opportunity to take up a position in the recent debate about where the PCF fits in on the French Left.
This is a pity, for on the third major con- troversy — relations between the Party and its social base — Mortimer's intimate knowledge of the PCF could have allowed for an interesting analysis. He notes that in- dustrial relations in France are, naturelle" ment, fired with ideological passion and revolutionary culture. It is this element which has allowed the PCF to keep its lines of communication to the workers unscrambled. Mortimer hints that the essence of syndicalism is to do with men- talities, patterns of behaviour and political processes but, alas, he fails to develop this approach, preferring to analyse member- ship statistics. The problem here is that the French left (and to a large extent French politics as a whole) has never been, membership-oriented. What the parties an,°, the unions have relied on have been a 010 number of devoted cadres and massive elec- toral moments. indHuissttroiarilaossupphoartve at critical recently elaborated the notion of the ,quast, syndicalist' to categorise the millions 01 French workers -who, while never joining the union, remain in tune and can ", counted on for solidarity when push come; to shove. This would have been a meta - more fruitful area for critical interpretre tion. So would some assessment of t PCF's current dilemma: as the old bluer; collar social base begins to wane, how ea_ the Party succeed in making overtures to workers? management and whitecollar Finally, what of the PCF's alleged alleg subservience to Moscow? On this one, M0 timer sails a cautious tack, avoiding t".3 `Moscow-centrism of excessive `Moscow-centris Inau He the Charybdis of 'national autonomy. argues quite reasonably that there is boto_L' Russian and a French motive behind nittIcto“ of the Party's activity. He is quite 'tat+ stress that the Popular Front arose PP"'
or
ly out of domestic necessities, hot ere timer's view of a relatively sincereay Eurocommunism in the early 19705 well be misleading. Philippe Robriet,:`as massive Histoire Interieure du PCF: a a revitalised a crucial debate, awing 3,000-page case for detecting la ilia ve. Moscou behind the Party's slightest msotc. On the other hand, Irwin Wall hastIr gested that most of the PCF's Pos history can be explained in terms Ofprie. French political situation. Mortimer fis....,,rc bably as familiar with the details o wrs'o'n history as anybody in Britain. His vie rove this ongoing controversy could P*- do soiogt discover r heIrntmhis. book, however, we
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