PRINCE BISMARCK IN THE CONFERENCE.
THE Conference drags on wearily, making no real step in advance, until one-half the world believes its proceedings to be a comedy, played to gain time, and the other half re- gards a war as ultimately impossible. For ourselves, we be- lieve that the Turks are still immovable, and would prefer war to any serious concession whatever ; and that the Conference only delays an ultimatum because time, in a winter like this, with rain falling everywhere except where it is wanted, is of comparatively little importance. The world, however, must still wait for the result, and in the meantime an incident has occurred which may prove to be of considerable importance. Prince Bismarck has intervened. According to reports singularly consistent, and arriving from many quarters at once, the German Chancellor has expressed his annoyance at the con- cessions made by the Conference, and has directed the German Representative, Baron Werther, to reject all modifications of the Diplomatists' programme, and to in- sist that the will of Europe, having been diplomatic- ally formulated, shall be obeyed by Turkey. This new attitude of Berlin has evidently greatly perplexed all the Delegates, and at least three explanations may be offered for its adoption :-1. It is quite conceivable that Prince Bis- marck is merely carrying out the first principles of his usual diplomacy, namely, to make it invariably effective. He is known to despise as well as dislike the Ottoman Government, and it may very well be that he feels humiliated by the obvious contempt of the Porte for European representations and menaces, and is inclined to show the Turks that there is one Power in Europe which says what it means, and will make its will executive in spite of their menaced wrath or resistance. Russia is apparently half-hearted, England uses all means except coercion, and Prince. Bismarck, therefore, stands forward in the position which gratifies his eountrymen,—that of the only effective Christian power. The German Chancellor is not above the ambition of posing as ultimate master, and certainly if he succeeds and the Turks yield, will have secured a diplomatic triumph of a very striking kind. If, on the other hand, he fails, he may have the means, through the Roumanian Government and the Hellenic people, of proving himself the most dangerous enemy the Turks could have provoked to action, more dangerous by far than they believe Russia to be. In this view, Germany would be :taking up the gauntlet which Russia and England are afraid to touch, and earning the gratitude either of the South Slays, or, and much more probably, of the Hellenic population of Turkey. Prince Bismarck has both in Bucharest and Athens powerful instruments ready to his hands,1 and besides, a fleet whoseefficiency he may be willing to demon- , strate to the world. With the German Fleet off the Piraeus, and Greece, Thessaly, and Epirus in arms under German officer., Midhat Pasha would feel that remonstrances from Ber-
lin had very effective meaning. The Greek people need nothing but an ally and a certainty that England will not attack them to spring at once to war, and Prince Bismarck can, if he pleases, afford them both, without wasting German soldiers.
2. It is quite conceivable that Prince Bismarck merely desires to increase the chances of war between Russia and Turkey. He may know that the Turks absolutely will not make concessions, and may fear that Russia will, and may therefore do his utmost to make it impossible for the Czar to recede without visibly abandoning claims which a disinterested Power declares to be well founded. This is the view gener- ally accepted in this country, and it is supported by the very obvious fact, constantly insisted on in our columns, that war between Turkey and Russia is the clear Interest of Germany. If Russia loses, she must make terms with Berlin ; and if Russia succeeds, she will, it is held, ulti- mately incur the wrath of England. Under those circum- stances, no alliance between Russia and France would be possible, and the only direct German danger would for a long period be removed. This view is a comprehensible one, and the only solid argument against it is that in exerting such pressure on Turkey, Prince Bismarck may strengthen the accord between Great Britain and Russia, which it can in no case be his interest to promote. He makes both Lord Salis- bury and General Ignatieff seem to succeed in a great effort at conjoint action—a new method of producing the disunion which, on the Machiavellian theory of his policy, he desires.
3. It is quite possible that Prince Bismarck is merely backing Russia. The Court of St. Petersburg has very much to offer to the Court of Berlin, and if sincerely alarmed or even annoyed by the condition of its army, may have offered terms which have brought Prince Bismarck unhesitatingly to its aide, with a promise to prevent Austria, on certain conditions, from intervening. For example, an offer that Prince Charles shall reign to the Balkans, Russia contenting herself, in the event of victory, with Asiatic acquisitions, would be most acceptable to Berlin, and may have been made, without a single member of the Confer- ence knowing anything about it. In that case, Turkey must either yield, and yield promptly and completely, within the eight hours, or forty-eight hours said in the telegrams from Pera published in the Telegraph, to be contemplated by Baron Werther as the utmost limit of delay ; or must enter on war, with a certainty that she cannot ultimately succeed. Even Lord Beaconsfield will not fight Germany and Russia for her sake, and she must either give way, or rush upon her fate with open eyes. If Prince Bismarck really desires peace, this may be his line, but we are unable to see how peace could be advantageous either to his policy or to German interests. Peace means that Russia shall remain as strong as ever, with a new claim on the gratitude and obedience of all South Slays.
The probabilities, in our judgment, lie between the first and third of these solutions, the third being slightly the most probable of all, because the German Chancellor would have;the least difficulty in pressing it upon his Emperor. It involves no quarrel with his nephew, no new land campaign, unless Austria acts with amazing rashness, and an internal situation in •which the Liberals will unhesitatingly support the authority of Govern- ment against the Socialists.
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