TOPICS OF THE DAY
THE SECURITY PACT
THOUGH the text of the documents defining the ideas of Britain and France in answer to the German proposal of a Security Pact has not yet been published, some information has leaked out. Germany, as we under- stand, proposed to make an agreement with France, and incidentally with Belgium, which would offer the strongest possible guarantees that States can give each other, that the frontiers between Germany and France and Belgium, as laid down in the Versailles Treaty, shall never be violated. Part of the guarantee, it is stated, is .to be the demolition of certain German fortresses and a general sterilization from the mili.ary point of view of the border line. Such an agreement, being fully consis- tent with British aspirations and policy, and consistent also with the spirit of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations, can be gladly endorsed by Britain. We should, without doubt or reluctance, throw all the power at our command against any Power which broke the Pact of Security, or attempted hostile acts, or moved soldiers across the frontier.
If Germany had only one frontier there would be little more to be said. But Germany has an Eastern frontier, and with that frontier as a permanent settlement she is not satisfied. Further, we are not prepared to give anything in the shape of an absolute guarantee with regard to the Eastern frontier. Here is the difficulty. France has entered into arrangements with Poland and the Powers of the Little Entente which amount to some- thing like an alliance to insure their frontiers. But how, she asks, can these promises be kept if she is required to bind herself by a pact which would prevent her using her troops to defend her minor allies. Happily, though this is a difficulty, it is not one which is insuperable. Germany, though not prepared to accept in perpetuity the existing arrangement, is willing to promise that she will not attempt to obtain any abrogation of what she considers an unfair and impossible settlement, except through pacific means, i.e., through some form of negotia- tion or arbitration. Therefore it should prove possible, and will, we believe, prove practicable, so to arrange things that Germany will not feel that the door is for ever slammed in her face. On the other hand, France will, without any insuperable obstacle, be able to maintain her understanding with the Little Entente, without insisting on what we should be bound to regard as an impossible condition, i.e., that in spite of the Security Pact with us she should be able to break the peace of the frontier and move troops across Germany in order to take military action in regard to Germany's Eastern frontier.
One of the ways, and perhaps the best way, of ensuring that Germany shall not provoke war by action on the Eastern frontier is by inducing her to enter the League of Nations and so become automatically bound not to have resort to arms--though without being precluded in the future from bringing her case before the Council of the League.
If the Security Pact can be signed and endorsed on these terms—if France, that is, can get what is as near absolute security for her frontier as is possible in the world we live in, and if at the same time new and good guarantees for peace can be obtained through Germany entering-the League—a great advance will have been made. Further, if the Dawes Scheme goes forward without friction, and France not only begins to get her reparations; but is also freed from the perilous burden (for so she must at heart regard it) of her present occupation of German territory, the stabilization of Europe will be in sight. While the conversations between France and Britain are taking place at Geneva, it is best not to say too much in regard to details. No harm, however, can be done by pointing out that what is most wanted is that the whole subject should be approached from the point of view, not of fear, jealousy, or distrust, but from the opposite angle of trust and good will. What is essential to that security which we all desire to see France obtain is that as soon as possible not only should German soil be freed from the presence of foreign soldiers, but every endeavour should be made to let Germany feel that she is once more a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, and that her return to strength and prosperity will be regarded, not as a matter of evil and danger, but as one of hope and satisfaction. The only permanent security for France will come, not from a disarmed Germany, or a weakened Germany, or a hungry and half-maddened Germany, but from a Germany in which the people are reasonably contented—a country where people do not feel that the only national object allowed them is to cherish a desire for vengeance upon those who are trying to prevent the healing of their wounds.
We are as convinced as we can be of anything that; though it would require boldness and courage, nothing could really be a better political investment for France than to show herself both generous and trusting in regard to her neighbour. After all, the mass of the German people do not want war any more than do the peasants of France. They want, of course, to rehabilitate them- selves as a great nation, but they want also to settle down and, as it were, rebuild their homeland. Though they cannot be expected to say in plain terms that they are going to forget their recent wrongs and sufferings, i.e., in the Ruhr Valley and the Rhineland, everything which tends to security for them will tend to exorcize the demon of Revenge.
In view of these considerations we cannot but express our regret at the somewhat pedantic and irritating note in regard to disarmament which, at the desire of the French, we have (though, it may be supposed, not without reluctance) agreed to forward to Germany as a joint communication. If Germany still had an effective army, huge stores of arms and a secret but effective military organization, a good deal might be said for the demand to keep to the letter of the Treaty. But no one seriously asserts that Germany has done more than violate in unimportant matters some of the minor conditions rightly imposed upon her. The Note seems to us to be strong enough to irritate German opinion and not strong enough to do any sort of good. No doubt it affords a technical excuse for our not evacuating Cologne ; but, as we most earnestly desire to evacuate at the earliest possible moment, this can hardly be regarded as an advantage. The Note, in truth, is like the act of a man who is suspicious and afraid of a surly, wounded bull in a field, and who sends in a terrier to worry the bull a little and drive him about, though without any hope or purpose of thereby placing him under stricter restraint. Instead of the policy of irritation it would, in our opinion, be much better to try to think of some way in which we could make it easier for Germany to sink her present injuries and humiliations—injuries and humiliations which she, no doubt, brought upon herself by her mad militarism and tyrannical ambitions, but which are not the less painful for that fact. At the moment there is an excellent opportunity for doing something for Germany- of this kind. Why should not the Allied Powers have the courage and generosity to say to the German people something of this sort : We shall no longer attempt to forbid the union of all the homogeneous German States. If Austria and the Tyrol desire to enter the German Reich, we shall not only do nothing to prevent that union, but shall welcome it, provided that Germany will make it clear to her Slavonic neighbours that she has no intention of using the union to injure them " ?
An amalgamation of Austria and Germany would, we feel sure, help forward the cause of peace. To put it quite frankly, the dangerous element in Germany is the Prussian or Junker element. But that element would not be strengthened, but very much diluted, by a union with so peaceful and unaggressive a people as the Tyrolese. Indeed, there seems little doubt that the Prussian militarists dislike the idea of union and dread its being proposed. That seems to us in itself a strong reason for putting it forward. In all probability, if it was put forward, a national impulse throughout Southern and Western Germany would secure its acceptance. In the gain of several millions of the best elements in the German-speaking race the people of the Reich might begin the work of forgetting their disasters, as all sane and reasonable people must desire that they should forget them. We want to live with Germany in peace, and we want to forget old feuds. That is admitted. The way to do it is not to be always pin-pricking the Germans, but to welcome them into the Commonwealth of Nations under honourable conditions—conditions which will not impair their self-respect.
J. ST. LOE STRACHEY.,
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