14 DECEMBER 1901, Page 15

THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

[To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."] Sta,—In discussing "The Foundations of Our Foreign Policy" in your issue of December 7th you question whether there is any objection to our allowing Russia to obtain forti- fied ports in the Persian Gulf. You consider that their possession by Russia would not menace India on that flank. In this I certainly agree with you. There is small probability that Russia would ever be in a position to use her Persian Gulf ports to embark troops for an oversea enterprise against India. But you say that the only use Russia can have for Northern Persia is as a step to the sea by way of Southern Persia, and in this connection I make bold to remind you that Russia in possession of North and South Persia means Russia in possession of Khorasan and Sistan,—that is, of the only districts which from their position, proximity, and resources are suitable as a base for an advance to India by a route clear of the southern border of Afghanistan. Sistan and Khorasan (but it is especially the former that concerns us) may not at present be productive and wealthy, but once in Russian possession their immense resources of unlimited water and rich soil will speedily convert them into granaries in which the organisation for an advance to India. may be prepared at leisure and in secrecy. Afghanistan as it now exists provides a sufficient outpost against Russian aggression, and violation of its frontiers will be a signal for us to gird up our loins. But the outpost line does not extend to the sea, and between the Southern Afghan border and the sea lies a line of advance feasible for an army drawing its supplies from Sistan. It is my humble opinion that if we allow Russia to come down to the Persian Gulf, we should stipulate for and obtain Possession of Sistan and part of South-East Khorasan in return. These we should hold as provinces of Baluchistan. Local levies and a small regular garrison would suffice to create a " buffer " province which Russia would have to attack and possess before she could contemplate a further advance to India by this, the now sole open route, and this would give us the time and warning which above all we shall need for the defence of India. I do not profess that the above are original thoughts. The importance of Sistan is recognised by all students of these questions, and I only write now in case any of no forget it.—I am, Sir, &c.,

SKIPPER.