The League of Nations
After Eight Years
[January 10th was the eighth birthday of the League. Lord Cecil's retrospect is interesting, and his forecast must excite attention, though the Spectator does not wholly share his views. We trust that the findings of the rapporteur of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament on guarantees of security will obtain the widest publicity.—En. Spectator.] EIGHT years ago the Council of the League of Nations met for the first time at Paris. Important personalities gathered round the table, but it is safe to say that very few of them believed in the importance or even the continued existence of the League. Indeed, it was the fashion at that time—
particularly in the United States—to prophesy its immediate decease. Scarcely half a year passed without some triumphant declaration that the League was dying or dead. Nevertheless it has not only survived, it has done an immense amount of international work which, by the admission of everyone, has been of great value. Mistakes have no doubt been made in its name. That is inevitable. But its chief danger is not that sometimes it will act wrongly, but that it may allow itself to be immobilized by the Chancelleries of Europe. For every human institution must either grow or decay. It can never stand still. The activities which were sufficient to deal with the difficulties of yesterday must expand if they are also to solve the problems of to-morrow.
So far the League has scarcely tackled its most momentous tasks. It has improved international intercourse, it has struck some effective blows at grave social evils, it has rescued some hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children from captivity or starvation, it has done something to restore the economic situation in Europe, it has succoured States floundering in a financial morass, it has procured the settlement of a certain number of international disputes, and, in one or two cases, has prevented what seemed to be imminent hostilities.
These are no mean achievements, but they come very far short of the object for which the League was brought into existence. For the chief end of the League is to destroy war. Unless and until that is accomplished its other work must be of relatively slight importance.
Now war is one of the oldest human institutions. To put an end to it means the reversal of a mass of understandings and assumptions, the destruction of a number of moral and intellectual—not to speak of material—vested interests. It has behind it a literature of its own. Poets and philosophers, novelists and historians, have combined to sing its praises, partly because it was the sport of kings, partly because of the heroism of those who have taken part in it, and partly because in the absence of some other means of obtaining international justice a State had no resource but war to secure its honour and existence against the fraud and violence of its neighbours. Even so, and making all allowance for the splendid qualities it has called forth, it may well be doubted whether any other single cause has inflicted on the human race one-tenth of the suffering which has accrued to it from war, with its accompaniments of dishonesty, lust, and cruelty. The task of the League then is to destroy war—a task of enormous difficulty. It certainly cannot be accomplished at a single stroke or in a few years. It will need all our energies, all our courage, and all our faith. The first step is to get rid of the notion that it is lawful for one nation to make war on another at its own will and pleasure. That step has been taken so far as all members of the League of Nations are concerned. It is implied in the Covenant and has been definitely expressed more than once in resolutions of the Assembly to the effect that "aggressive war is an inter- national crime." Those resolutions only bind members of the League. If President Coolidge's proposal that war as an "instrument of national policy should be removed is to be construed as in substance a proposal to extend to the United States a proposition of international morality already accepted by the members of the League, it is much to be welcomed. But mere rentinciation of "war as an instrument - of national policy will be by itself of little effect.
ft is impossible to condemn 'wars really undertaken -in -
self-defence. Nntinnc cannot be expected to agree to submit
to invasion. Yet the difficulties of defining aggressive wax are great. In the late War every Government professed to be fighting in self-defence. To prevent war the same steps must be taken by nations—in some rudimentary form at least— as were long ago taken in the case of civilized individuals; Private violence must be forbidden even to redress wrongs, courts where justice can be obtained and violence condemned
must be established to protect the law-abiding, and there must be brought into existence something like an international police force, or if that be impracticable, an international posse comitatus—that institution by which our ancient Constitution laid upon all good citizens the duty to assist the sheriff in suppressing any breach of the peace.
Above all, weapons of violence, armaments, in the hands of nations, must be reduced and limited to those necessary for self-defence and the enforcement of international obliga- tions. A scheme with this purpose is now being elaborated by the so-called Preparatory Commission of the League, and a perusal of the verbatim report of its last Session at Geneva is in many respects encouraging. It is the record of a businesslike body—a body which cordially endorsed Lord Cushendun's well-timed appeal for definite action. Partly in consequence of that appeal three Tapporteurs have been appointed to prepare proposals for arbitration, guarantees of security, and the explanation or precision of the Covenant. That is all to the good. But there is one danger against which it is of the utmost importance that the Government should be prepared. There are not wanting those who believe that the whole of these proceedings with regard to security and arbitration are designed only to evade actual limitation of armaments. Critics of this school think that the idea is to bring forward some suggested scheme of security which is not acceptable to all the Powers concerned. When it fails it will then be said that disarmament is impossible without security, and since security is refused disarmament must also be dropped. We may confidently believe that our Government would not countenance any such manoeuvre for a moment. But they must take great care not even to appear to connive at it. Lord Cushendun has asked very properly for a definite scheme of security. When it appears he must not be instructed to turn it down lock, stock, and barrel. That is what the British Government did in the case of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. They did it again in the case of the Protocol. In both cases a proposal for which the British Representative was largely responsible was summarily rejected by the Home Government. If it happens a third time in the case of these new proposals when they are made, it will be at least plausible to fasten on the British Government the responsibility for stopping international disarmament. That would in itself be serious enough, for our national prestige depends at least as much upon character as upon strength. But apart from the effect such an event would have on our national position, its direct consequence must be of the utmost gravity.
We and other Powers are under perfectly plain and explicit
obligations to our late enemies and especially to the Germans to proceed with a general reduction and limitation of arma- ments. It was on the faith of these promises that the Germans, as they allege, agreed to their own disarmament( Whether or not the two obligations are verbally dependent - on one another, it is obvious that it will be impossible to insist on the maintenance of German disarmament except in return for a general and serious step in that direction by the other great European Powers. Count Bernstorff has recently pointed this out at Geneva and no one has traversed his contention. It is clear, therefore, that if the present policy at Geneva fails the Germans will claim to re-arm. That
means the end of international disarmament and almost certainly the abrogation of those advances towards European good will so laboriously achieved at Locarno and elsewhere. It would be, indeed, a terrible responsibility for us if it could be said with any truth that our action had contributed to such an overwhelming disaster.
CECIL,
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