TOPICS OF THE DAY.
FRANCE AND BRITAIN.
NOT th teheBlrieastisthss significant renssutltoof thteemprotesrtyra.,:lsieindnin with Germany in regard to Venezuela has been its effect upon our relations with France. Automatically, as it were, those relations have improved ; and public opinion, which influences Governments in France more perhaps than in any other country, has swung round to the belief that there is not only no real reason why we and the French should be enemies, but every reason why France and Britain should try to be mutually accommodating in the regions where they come into contact. As proof of this improved feeling, we have only to cite M. Cambon's speech at the banquet of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, a speech which was the cause of considerable comment in Russia ; the very warm way in which the French news- papers received the idea of a visit of the King to France ; and the speech made by M. Delafosse in the French Chamber on Tuesday. Speaking of this speech, the able and judicious correspondent of the Times in Paris says :—" It is evident from the altered tone of French public utterances respecting England within the past couple of months that the moral of the Venezuela affair, and of the attitude of the British nation towards Germany, has also not been lost upon politicians of all shades of opinion in this country. It is a lesson, therefore, that has been doubly taught, and it is gratifying to find that it has not been lost even on Anglophobe exponents of French opinion, whom to-day we heard and hardly recognised. African, Asiatic, and European questions can now be dis- cussed here without animus towards England. The apparent change that has come over M. Millevoye is as much to the paint in this connexion as is the interesting tenor and tone of the speech of M. Delafosse, one of the ablest speakers of whom the Right in the present Chamber can boast, and, indeed, a man whose moderate and authori- tative utterances always command respect."
Needless to say, we are not so foolishly anti-German as to suggest that an explosion of ill-feeling against Germany is good because it brings us nearer to France. We are not, of course, in any true sense anti-German at all, but merely wish to warn our Government against the dangers which threaten us from the world-policy which the Gerinans have deliberately adopted and persistently pursue. We would much rather that our Government, whose business it is, should prevent the growth of dangerous international ill-feeling "by declining to adopt lines of policy and. methods of political action which render such explosions not only inevitable, but necessary as protests and disclaimers. When, however, these do take place owing to the want of prescience in the Government, it would be foolish not to notice their significance and. to take as much advantage of them as possible. Last summer, and long before there was any talk of the Venezuelan imbroglio, we pointed out that one of the reasons why we should be very circumspect in our dealings with Germany was that any approach to Germany necessarily drew us away from France, and thus rendered our international position, not safer and easier, but more dangerous and more difficult. We also pointed out that it was obviously to the interest of the Germans to try to fasten their 'friendship upon us in as ostentatious a manner as possible, and to parade us before the world as their ally. They knew that if they could do that they would be able to•prevent any draw- ing closer of France and Britain, which is most naturally and most properly a capital aim of German diplomacy. The solicitor who expressed his " dread " that a compromise might "break out" between the parties showed exactly the spirit in which Germany regards the relations between the two Great Powers who face each other across the Channel. Germany and her world-policy may be able to slide in between France and Britain if they are apart. If they take hands or stand together in friend- ship, all hope for the accomplishment of German3es cherished scheme of Empire falls to the ground. Germany may remain a great European Empire, but cannot in that case found a vast Colonial Empire or find. her future on the ocean. Therefore," most properly from his point of view, the German Emperor, as the director of the foreign policy of his. State, has always tried to keep us and the - French apart. .It is perhaps useless to say that the German Emperor tried to :embroil us with France airing' the Fashoda crisis, as, by the nature of things, the fact can only be known to, diplomatists, Who cannot speak publicly, but that such action was taken is most certainly believed by many persons who are in a - position of exceptional knowledge in regard to foreign affairs.. At - any rate, the "public form" of the German Govern.: ment is quite sufficient to prove that Germany is always. most anxious to prevent any understanding between us and France, and realises that the best way to do.this is to' make the world think that she has an understanding . with us and is our -virtual ally. As we have said, the wisdom of this policy is " shown by the fact . that the moment France realises that Britain and Germany have not, as she was assiduously told was the case, become fast friends, and that the alleged ironclad compact between the nations is no ironclad compact at all, but merely a Ministerial faux pas for which Ministers have been smartly called to account, she is ready to show. us ' goodwill. In spite of the German assertions, in spite of the alleged alliance of the Courts on which . certain writers insist, though we suspect with very little reason, and in spite of the blundering of our Ministers and, the unconscious support given to German attempts to advertise their hold upon us when a Cabinet Minister pays an official visit to German Army ma,nceuvres and accepts a German decora- tion, France has suddenly realised that we are not as a nation in Germany's pocket,' and that we may be depended upon not to support Germany in any aggressive action towards France. The veil the Germans so cleverlycontrived to let down between us has been torn away,. and France sees us as we really are. This happy eelaireissement is for our Government to use to the best advantage. We do not for a moment suggest that they should rush into the arms of France,. or show as little discretion towards her as they did towards Germany. All we ask is that they should make a wise and prudent use of the better feeling in France. If they proceed quietly as well' as amiably, they may ulti- mately learn not a little that is of importance to this country. They may possibly discover through French' sources that Russia is not so essentially hostile, unreason- able, and impracticable as she seems when looked at entirely through German spectacles,—spectacles lent Us by their Imperial owner for the express purpose of making us understand exactly what were " Russia's aims and objects. Possibly a French pair would disclose something very different. We do not, however, recommend their use, but desire rather that our Government should look Solely with their own eyes at the international situation, and should see it steadily and see it whole.
There is yet one other point of importance to be _noted in France's disclosure of goodwill to us the moment she realised, that we had not.as a nation gone over to the Germans. It is that the essential thing, the pivot, the cardinal point, in international affairs remains what it has been for the last thirty years,—the hostility between Germany and France. We see in the most recent exhibition of French public opinion, as by a flash of lightning, that everything still turns on the French desire to get back the Provinces and on Germany's determination to retain them. Plenty has been said as to Germany's friendliness to France, and as to France having abandoned all but a Platonic affection for Alsace-Lorraine, and finally, as to animosity on this point having disappeared for good from Europe. It has not disappeared, but still remains the dominating factor: We admit, of course, that it may never lead to war, and sincerely trust that it never will, but it remains the essential fact, and, those who fail, to recognise this will never understand European politics. If we- recognise it, we shall realise that you cannot draw, near Germaq. without. estranging . France, and making. her anxious . . and suspicious; or, .agau4 that you cannot draw near France -without compelling Germany to as to her commitments, oversea,, and desirous to., do all in her. power to concentrate" her forces, to make as• feel. perturted enemies as she can, and, to keep watch only on her Euro- pean , Needless to. say, to .recognise these faets . not. , ,advocate rushing., into an alliance with Fraice. We. set Princaliee from the dread: that .we gone over to Germany, and to 'settle amicably .76.41 hO many affairs that tend to friction, but not, of course, to bind ourselves to her in any way. We do not, again, want to go to war with Germany, and would do much to avoid such a war; but it is as well that Germany should realise the consequences of provoking a war with Britain, and those consequences she will not fail to realise when she under- stands the significance of the display of feeling in France that has followed the Venezuelan imbroglio. If that follows when we are only getting out of an un- popular Alliance with Germany, what would happen if Germany actually went to war with us ? We cannot think. that Germany would, in such circumstances, succeed. in keeping the benevolent neutrality of France. But, fortu-* nately, there is no need of talking about .war with Germany. If we maintain our independence and do not lean on Germany, and also show plainly that we have no inten- tion of siding against France, Germany will be by no means in a position to make war on us, or do anything indeed but guard her own possessions. There is only one risk of war with Germany. If we were to allow Germany to parade us about Europe, Asia, and America for a year or two as her tame ally, even though in reality we were nothing of the kind, we might, no doubt, end by estranging France, the United. States, and Russia, the Powers naturally most anxious not to see us allied with Germany. But that artificial enmity having been produced, and those Powers estranged, it is conceivable that Germany might risk a war with us, or, rather, might apply to us the policy applied. to Austria, and in effect say: Either make your understanding with us a real alliance or take the consequences,—which are war.' This is the only way in which a war can come with Germany, the most dangerously situated Power on the Continent, and the Power in regard to whom all other Powers are most anxious and suspicious. Those who dread a war with Germany, and imagine that all who, like ourselves, oppose a German Alliance are working up a war with Germany, may make themselves quite easy on the matter as long as we do not slide once again into some form of alliance with Germany. As long as we main- tain our independence of Germany we have nothing to fear from her. If once we yield to her blandishments and allow ourselves to be enlisted as an ally, our position will indeed be dangerous. Let us not be afraid of the Germans, let us not be hostile, but as long as we maintain our independence let us be watchful, though in no sense aggressive. In a word, let us only fear the Germans when they come to us with the gift of an alliance, for to be allied. to them means to forfeit the goodwill of the rest of the world, or at, any rate of those nations with whom it is specially our interest to keep on friendly terms.
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