A great deal is being said just now to show
that Italy's action will not make her less loyal and less useful to the Triple Alliance than before. It is natural that this view slould be taken in Berlin, but we cannot help thinking that it will be found to be a delusion. Italy has just moved that her power in Tripoli is solely due to her command of the sea as against Turkey. But with 40,000 of her best troops in Tripoli—she will want in all probability the greater bulk of these for the next year or two to secure her conquest—Italy, if she were to become engaged in hostilities with a group of Powers like the Triple Entente which commands the sea, would soon find that her position had become almost exactly like that now occupied by Turkey. In other words, Italy's commitments in North Africa will make it physically im- possible for her to remain in the Triple Alliance except in mime. Suppose war—whi.1 Heaven forbid !—were still to arise over the Morocco Question, Italy would have to tell Germany that she must remain neutral unless Germany could guarantee to her free passage between Italy and Tripoli, which, of course, is just what Germany would be quite unable to do. Italy, we may be sure, was never very anxious to get involved in any war in which the French and British fleets would be against her. She would now have an excuse for neutrality, which no one could possibly declare unreasonable. That is the essential e2w fact of the European situation, and it is one happily which makes for peace.
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