14 OCTOBER 1916, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

WHAT GERMANY IS REALLY AFTER. THE United States Government find themselves in a position of great and increasing difficulty owing to the sudden outbreak of German submarine activity on their coasts. We do not want to say anything that will add to the embarrassment felt at Washington, and we can fully sympa- thize with the bewilderment experienced by the State Depart- ment, for not only has the new German wider-sea campaign come as a surprise, but they are clearly at a loss to under- stand what it means. Or rather we may say of them as Tacitus said of the Roman Senate, after they had heard a dark and threatening speech from Tiberius full of equivoques and obscurity : "The Senators dreaded nothing so much as to seem to understand him." The President and his Adminis- tration most sincerely want peace, and are willing to make almost any sacrifices to get through the war without recourse to hostilities ; but they are haunted, and considering all things it is little to be wondered at, by the thought : "Can it really be possible that the Germans mean to force war upon us even at the eleventh hour, and that the policy of walking carefully and gently to avoid offending the criminal lunatic across the Atlantic is going to prove of no avail ? Are we going to be placed in such a position that patience, and diplomatic discretion, and the holding of an even balance between the Allies and the enemy will not save us from the evil and, as we hold, the disgrace of war " In effect, the Washington Government are asking themselves : "What is Germany's game ? What is she trying to do ? Is there no way in which we can meet her demands without loss of national honour, or without forfeiting our neutral position and without giving the Allies the right to say that we are taking sides against them ? Surely it cannot be that the Germans are really indifferent whether they do or do not come into conflict with the United States of America ! "

In our opinion, there is a perfectly easy answer to these doubts and questions, though, as we have said, it is only natural, in view of all the circumstances, which are in no sort of way discreditable, that the Americans should shrink from facing the conclusion that Germany may be trying to force them into war. The first thing that the Americans have to take note of, however unpleasant, and to act upon, is the result of the long struggle between the German Foreign Office, with its policy of not pushing things too far in the case of America, and the policy of the Admiralty and Admiral von Tirpitz. The latter policy is one of ruthless, remorseless, relent- less warfare on the sea, in which the only thought shall be how best to wreck, ruin, and destroy all shipping and sea-borne trade intended for Great Britain, and it has won. Hencefor- ward there are to be no thoughts or misgivings as to the effect of submarine activity upon neutrals. Germany, as they say in Texas, has taken the bridle off. "Whenever you see a trading vessel, sink her. Apologize to the neutrals as much as you like afterwards, but sink her. Sink ! Sink ! Sink what- ever is going to or coming from, or may some day come from or go to, the British Islands." That is to be the German naval order of the day. The Germans have got a new supply of submarines, and they are going to use them regardless of American feelings. After all, from the German point of view, which is one of Real- politik, and is wholly uninfluenced by moral considerations, or even by the thought of the public opinion of the world, such cynical disregard of American opinion is not unreasonable or unnatural. Why should Germany care ? She wants to win the war, and she thinks that there still remains one card which may win it, or at any rate prevent her losing irreparably. That card is the submarine, and therefore she will play it. From the German point of view there are practically no "contra-indications " to submarine frightfulness. Come what may, America not only will not, but cannot, give material help to Germany. There is nothing to be got out of her as an active ally or as a friendly neutral. Again, the Germans argue, with a great show of reason, that American official enmity cannot injure them. Britain, they know, is not going to let the war stop for want of money, and though American help in this respect might be pleasant to the Allies, it could not affect the war in the least. Finally, the Germans are fully persuaded that the material power of America, either by land or sea, is not worth thinking about. America could not raise or maintain an army under eight or nine months at the very least, and no German wants to look beyond that period. Once again, then, says Berlin, why worry about Washington I If America says this is in reality forcing wax upon her, the Germans will no doubt be quite willing to admit the plea. Force is always their remedy. But though the unlimited use of the submarine is now, we feel certain,. Gerniarly's settled policy, one may gather from things said not only in Berlin, but in the subsidized German Press of America, that one little loophole has been left for the United States. The Germans will not force America to drink the dose of Realpolitik prepared for her if the United States Government will undertake and perform a certain function at the behest of Germany. That function is to propose terms of peace regardless of whether the Allies do or do not want them proposed. The Germans want the United States to say that the war has reached a point where it is dangerous for neutrals. Germany is being pressed so hard that she is in effect being driven mad, and her maddened springs of uncontrollable rage may cause universal ruin. Therefore America, as the chief neutral, cannot any longer pretend to be indifferent on the physical issue. As it is evident that the Allies cannot kill the tiger, or at any rate kill it quickly, America is to tell them that they must give up hunting it. If they refuse, then America is to regard them as playing an unfriendly part, and so on and so on. This is the part that the Germans have, with their usual thoroughness and laboured ingenuity, cast for America. If she will agree to play it, the Germans will hold their hand as to the extra dose of unlimited submarine frightfulness. It is true, of course, that, as a matter of fact, Germany has never really been hampered, as she alleges, in her use of her submarines by respect for American feeling. She has let ruthless- ness be her rule all along, though no doubt there has been a certain amount of verbal acquiescence in the demand made by America in the final Lusitania ' Note. What has really held back Germany has been an inadequate supply of sub- marines. Now she thinks that difficulty has been got over. However, there has hitherto been enough apparent yielding to America to give Germany the power of threatening, a power which she dearly loves to employ. "You can stop this war if you like to exert yourself. If you don't, look out for the hatchet of Germany, for she means to hack her way through to victory. It doesn't matter whether you or any- body else stand in her way. She will strike you as readily as if you had been her enemy from the beginning. Now you are warned and can take your choice." That, in a nutshell, is Germany's message to America. That is what Germany means.

Americans will no doubt ask how it has come about that the American Government have suddenly found themselves in a position so difficult, nay, so dangerous. How is it that Germany has been able to get near enough to them to seize them by the throat, and to treat with such scant ceremony a Power whom Europe has hitherto been accustomed to treat with the utmost deference and consideration ? The answer, we believe, is to be found in the failure of the American Government at the beginning of the war to frame any true mental picture of what was happening. It was convenient to indulge in the conventional view that there were faults on both sides and merits on both sides, and that there was not the slightest reason why the United States should not remain friendly with both sets of belligerents, for both had claims upon her consideration, &c., &c., &c. Not merely had the quarrel nothing to do with her, but she did not even profess to understand it. But in reality, as Mr. Roosevelt and a very large number of the best and ablest men in America saw from the beginning, this idea that the war was an ordinary war, with merits on both sides, was one impossible to maintain if the facts were faced. The result is the mess and muddle in which Washington now finds itself.

One word we must add. We are as anxious now as we ever were that America should keep out of the war. We should hate beyond words, as we believe would the vast majority of Englishmen, to see America dragged into a quarrel which we fully realize is not hers. He is a base and dishonourable man who, when he is in a tight place, wants to drag in a friend. The impulse of the man of honour is to keep his friend out. He is not only too proud to ask for help, but too proud not to dislike the idea of any help which would involve a friend who has no business in the quarrel. This, whatever the Germans may _say. or Americans may imagine, is, we are certain, the wish not only of Britain but of the whole Empire.