2. Hugh Brogan
History may not be relevant, in the modish and suspect sense of that word, but it can often be very comforting. From the British point of view it was one of the greatest disasters in our history; and it came about largely from the shameful incompetence of our statesmen, generals and admirals. But we cannot feel too bitter about North, Burgoyne and Co. They were at least conscientious and were certainly over-parted. George III had been sure that the loss of the thirteen colonies meant the permanent ruin of Britain: "We can never continue to exist as a great and powerful nation after we have lost or renounced the sovereignty of America." He was wrong — and so may prophets of disaster ever be.
George was neither alone nor stupid in his views. He was just old-fashioned. In the seventeenth century England, struggling as usual with an unfavourable economic situation, had gradually evolved the system now known as mercantilism as a remedy. It had worked, more or less, and the North American empire was an essential part of it. Furthermore, the principles of Parliamentary monarchy, as established by the Glorious Revolution, had given the English squirearchy nearly a century of unchallenged power and prosperity. The American revolt was a challenge to both mercantilism and the constitution. So by 1775-6 British politicians were almost un• animous in holding that the colonists had gone too far. They were dangerous and must be crushed — a view that seemed justified when they allied themselves with their and our ancient enemies, France and Spain, It looked as if Britain might have to fight Russia too, and if that happened, complained Lord Sandwich, "we shall never again figure as a leading power in Europe, but think ourselves happy if we can drag on for some years a contemptible existence as a commercial state." Fortunately Russia held her hand, and after Yorktown the British were ready to acknowledge American independence. France and Spain then Proved vincible, as of old. Peace was made, and the slow jettisoning, both of mercantilism and the 1688 constitution, began. The Process was glacial; but the English had learned that they must mend their ways.
So much seems clear enough in retrospect; but one of the true lessons of the Past is that the present is always obscure. George III never knew that he was the victim of ineluctable historical change. "I Cannot depart from what I have uniformly thought to be right," he asserted, and what he thought to be right were the verities of his youth — royalty, the British constitu tion and the Protestant religion. But it is the subtlest theme of Mr Ayling's excellent hiography*which has already been gene rally praised — that in spite of George's Principles and obstinacy he did in fact shift When he had to. He had no notion of adapting: he was only aware that from time to time he had to accept loathed ministers, nr abandon long-cherished policies. He Mose Damned Rebels Michael Pearson (Heineman £3.75) *George the Third Stanley Ayling (Collins hated making these concessions, but he was statesman enough to see their necessity. So he played his part in carrying England peacefully through the dangerous waters where the French monarchy was wrecked.
Sometimes his utter honesty and his devotion to duty enabled him to transcend himself and glimpse what lay beyond temporary perplexities. When John Adams presented his credentials as the first United States minister the king, much moved, remarked: "I will be very free with you. I was the last to consent to the separation; but the separation having been made, I have always said, as I say now, that I would be the first to meet the friendship of the United States as an independent power. The moment I see such sentiments and language as yours prevail . . . let the circumstances of language, religion and blood have their natural and full effect."
All the same, George stood for the old order of things, which had to go. Mr Pearson's book t can help us to say precisely why. It is written entirely from the British standpoint (the enemy are spoken of as "the rebels" throughout) and from British sources, which gives an excellent freshness to the view. Americans, especially, brought up on patriotic cant, may benefit from looking at the War of Independence from the other side of the hill. Perhaps that is why Mr Pearson has, irritatingly, used transatlantic spelling throughout. He has other faults. He is far too kind to General Clinton, and rather startlingly gives only one short paragraph to the post-Yorktown phase of the war, His maps are maddeningly inadequate. Yet this remains a vigorous and convincing picture of the British war effort and what went wrong with it.
It was not a matter of mere incompetence in the military arts. The virtues that had won the Seven Years War and were to defeat Napoleon were much in evidence. The army and navy were excellent instruments. Nor were they handled anything like so badly as in, for example, the Crimea. The admirals bungled the war at sea, and Burgoyne was a clever dolt, but the root of the old order's failure was its inability to win consent for its policies from the people who would have to pay for them. In the early 'sixties the squirearchy, embodied in the House of Commons, refused to vote the funds needed for an enlarged empire: what was wanted instead was a cut in the land tax. And the War of Independence was finally lost when, once more, the Commons grew tired of expense and taxes.
The old order was thus repudiated in a most emphatic, if unconscious, way. But the matter could not rest there, since, willynilly, government must be financed. So a search for new methods of winning consent and raising money began and eventually issued in the income tax, a reformed House of Commons, extended suffrage and a regular party system. It is in this •sense that we can say that the defeat at Yorktown begat modern England. The bands which played "The World Turned Upside Down" as Cornwallis surrendered to Washington were truly prophetic.
Previous page
