LORD BALFOUR'S DOUBTS.
DURING the now forgotten conflict between the House of Commons and the late Mr. Bradlaugh, "the Christian member
for Northampton," Mr. Labouchere referred to an early work by Mr. Balfour as embodying very similar views to which the House took exception in his colleague. Such a statement, to borrow Johnson's phrase, might do a man harm at election time ; and probably the author of A Defence of Philosophic Doubt did not altogether relish " Labby's " freakish humour. But he still devotes the leisure of a busy life to philosophy, which, like the Athenians, he cultivates without prejudice to more practical interests ; and these Gifford lectures are as lucid, as much to the point, and as repressive of premature enthusiasms as his former treatises ; the same line of thought runs through all. Only in this country could a statesman of Lord Balfour's distinction occupy himself with such discus- sions; and even here it is probable that only a Scotsman would do so. The atmosphere of the book is chilly ; the lecturer has none of the perfervidum ingenium of his fellow- countrymen. It is difficult indeed to find an objection which he has not anticipated ; he says much that ought to be said and remembered ; and he says it in a polished literary style.
But, though his works are a distinct asset to English specula- tion, the assent with which we read them is cold. He is possessed, it has been said, by the philosophy of Conservatism. But it is a twentieth-century Conservatism—watered down like post-War whisky, and rather uninspiring ; the glow and colour of Burke are not there. The point of Labouehere's gibe was that of Pitt's comment on the Analogy—that it raised more doubts than it solved. In both cases there was something in the objection. But there was not much. Theism and Thought, in particular, is more open to Tulloch's criticism on the Grammar of Assent ; the object of both works is to find non-rational motives for belief :—
" There are high authorities to whom this whole method of dealing with a great subject is frankly repulsive. Two among my recent colleagues on the Gifford Foundation, both of them philosophers of the greatest distinction, have condemned it. Its critical method they could perhaps have forgiven • its constructive intention they would, I believe, have approved. The error attributed to me consists. I gather, in the effort to combine the two. I am charged with endeavouring to rest faith upon scepticism, and seeking foun- dations for belief among the quicksands of philosophic doubt. This procedure they treat as a perilous attempt to disparage reason in the interests of religion—an enterprise which they justly regard as equally injurious to the credit of both."
The answer is twofold. If the facts are as the writer states, he is not responsible for them : while, "if reason be on trial, it also presides over the court. In its own cause, it is at once defendant, plaintiff, advocate, and judge. How, then, can it suffer wrong ? " The reader must estimate the worth of the plea.
The subject of the lectures is the value of our familiar beliefs ; the thesis that "Theism, in some form or other, we must regard as an essential support of our familiar creed ' ; neither to be tossed aside as an irrelevant superstition, nor respectfully buried in an edifying footnote. If intellectual values are to be retained, the reality of spiritual guidance thus becomes the most important of our fundamental assumptions." The author has lived to see this conclusion, which he has done so much to recommend, obtain genexal recognition. Naturalism, like Giant Pagan, "has been dead many a day " : perhaps superstition is now a greater danger. "The decline of ancient prejudice," admits Gibbon, "exposes a considerable portion of human kind to a painfal and dangerous situation. A state of scepticism and suspense may amuse a few inquisitive minds. But so urgent on the vulgar is the necessity of believing that the fall of any system of mythology will soon probably be succeeded by the introduction of some other mode of super- stition." Giant Pope is still alive ; he is less "crazy and stiff in his joints" than the author of the Pilgrim's Progress believed ; and he may appear in more than one form.
ALFRED FAWKES.
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