THE WAY 'TO BAGDAD.
Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway. By E. M. Earle, Ph.D. (Macmillan and Co. 10s. 6d. net.) BEFORE, during ancLsince the War the Bagdad Railway has had immense influence in Europe, but as yet has done little good to mankind In a world of frank, peace-loving, neighbourly, free-exchanging nations, it would by now have added enor- mously to the wealth and prosperity of two continents. Dr. Earle goes back to the days of General Chesney, and from 1888 traces the history of the concessions and intrigues down to the second Conference of Lausanne. This he believes to have been a triumph of British diplomacy, establishing many advantages for us. We are nattered but scarcely convinced. Lord Curzon's hardest struggles there were to gain points which benefited France more than us, and_ he fought with a magnanimity that seemed able to forget the intrigues of M. Franklin-Bouillon and the less than apathetic attitude of the French in discussion of British interests. Nor are we convinced by the author's belief in the disinterested patriotism of the Young Turks. He is fully entitled to his own opinion upon the Spectator's action with the Times and National Review in 1903: he believes that we were wrong in opposing the intentions of Mr. Balfour's Government : he thinks that real international co-operation would have avoided a serious cause of the War, and, if war came, a controlling interest would have been valuable in the hands of the Entente. Again, we are not convinced. Great Britain would have had no more, perhaps less, of a free hand at the Basra end, with the Turks and Germans still in possession elsewhere and unlikely to consider -Allied interests. At any rate, events have proved that the forecast of European history upon which we based our opposi- tion was correct. Still, we sympathize with the disappoint- ment of Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office when August, 1914, annulled their efforts to remove a possible cause of war by the Convention which was reached in June but never ratified. It is the author's misfortune, not his fault, that he ends with a paean upon the flowery promises of the con- cessions to Admiral Chester, of which no more is likely to be heard. When he wrote he evidently had no idea that they might be a Turkish card to play against the French at Lausanne. We do not grudge him his satisfaction in feeling that in America Turkey had at last found a politically dis- interested friend, and, though wasted, his advice to keep American concessions clear of politics is sound. With delight- ful naivete he quotes in the same chapter from an official naval report upon the United States squadron of the occupying forces who were at Constantinople from the armistice until last year. It says of Admiral Bristol : "A large part of his efforts was immediately devoted to the promotion of American business in that unsettled region. . . . The Navy not only assists our commercial firms to obtain business, but when business opportunities present themselves, American firms are notified. . . . An American destroyer has made a special trip at thirty knots to get American oil prospectors into a newly opened field" I All this, however, does not vitiate the record of facts in this book. It seems as complete as can be and is laboriously documented. Though so much is sordid, romance clings to the tale of this ancient highway of trade, and the British public will do well to learn what has happened in a matter that will inevitably be heard of again.
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