THE WAR SURVEYED: THE NEXT STEP
By STRATEGICUS
WE are passing through what may be the most difficult phase of the war. While we were in the early stages we were living from hand to mouth, and the immediate fore- ground monopolised all our thoughts. Though the gravest possibilities could not be ruled out, our responsibilities were in a real sense less. There was rarely any question of the course of action at any moment. We were fighting for our lives; and living precariously has its liberations. But now much is changed. We have come through a severe and testing crisis. We have, as Mr. Churchill says, "turned the corner." Our resources, absolutely and relatively to those of the enemy, are Itrikingly greater; and this condition, with the extension of the war, has led to the remarkable enlargement of our opportunities. It is here that we touch upon the difficulty of the hour. With the growth of our striking force, and its strategical disposition in various points of vantage, we become subject to pressures we did not experience before. There are possibilities of action in numerous directions and seeming possibilities in a vastly greater number; and our problem is not to miss for excess of caution the golden opportunity and not to attempt from excess of daring the project that may set us back months in relative strength. In a word, we must cut our coat according to our cloth, but use the scissors with a dash of ambition.
Whatever we do, it is certain that there are other things which will persist in seeming preferable; and many of the better courses must be passed by simply because we have not the resources to pursue them to a successful issue. Yet this phase of half-sufficiency has just come upon us, and the habits of our penury may still cling to us. It is this that gives rele- vance to a letter which appeared in the Daily Telegraph a week ago. The writer, who signed himself "Miles," and appar- ently with every justification, stated that he had during the past four months "attended corps exercises, divisional exer- cises, brigade exercises and battalion exercises. With one exception, no exercise has afforded any practice in air co- operation or has given commanders an opportunity of seeing how valuable an aid this can be." Now that seems frankly an impossible situation; and the Secretary for War has by impli- cation admitted it gravity in his statement that the closest co- operation is to begin at once. One might consider the incident closed were it not for the time-lag which has hitherto prevented the adoption of this fundamental feature of modern warfare. For, of course, the soldier put his case much too mildly. It is not a question of the value of such co-operation but of its absolute necessity. • Clearly there was a time in the too recent past when every- thing turned upon the Air Force being available for attacking the enemy over our own soil and in the heart of his own country. At times, the doubt rose whether we had enough fighters; or whether we had enough bombers to cut down the enemy's power of replacement and reinforcement. It is not so long since that there was some doubt whether we could afford to indulge in the luxury of carrying the war into Germany while the issue seemed to hang so precariously over our own land. But that time has „passed; and we can now realise that the decision of the Command to push on with its invasion of Germany was well-judged; and while we do not know how far it has passed, we are at least entitled to lay it down as an un- challengeable proposition that an army not trained in the closest co-operation with the Air Force is not an army adapted to the warfare that confronts us. There will be some who may have felt the temptation to improve the occasion by insisting that this situation could never have occurred if the art* had had its own air-complement. Fortunately almost everyone now realises that it is the independence of the Air Force that has been the foundation of its triumphs; and it seems certain that history will say that, even if it did not win the war, the Air Force saved us from defeat.
But it was the fear that what this soldier has stated might be generally true of our army training that appeared to justify my two articles on "Design for Victory." We must defeat the enemy on his own line. We are doing this in the air; for it cannot have escaped notice that we are inflicting more damage on him than he upon us because we have designed and built better machines and are operating upon scientific lines while he is indulging in haphazard terror-attacks. But the same must apply to the army. We cannot challenge his num- bers; but we may challenge him in the quality of the army we place in the field, if we are careful at this moment to set about training an army of quality and not a mere roll of divi- sions, if we train perfect armoured divisions in co-operation with aeroplanes and build up a real army by looking with the utmost care to the liaison which alone differentiates the organised army from g mass of soldiery.
The same difficulty faces us in the development of actual operations. We have just effected a very workmanlike opera- tion at Gallibat. There is no need to exaggerate its import- ance, since its main role at present seems to be to compel the Italians to waste their strength on attempts at recapture. Apart from that it has, of course, heartened the Abyssinians and cheered the troops who took part in it. There are operations proceeding about Kassala. The real importance of these actions is the proof they afford of the increasing confidence of the British command born of the increasing strength of its re- sources. Some part of Graziani's advantage in securing these springboards for the launching of a feint attack has now gone. He has been forced to face the fact that the army in the Near East is now much stronger and very much more formidable.
The repercussion of this change on the outlook upon the main front in the Near East has been remarkable. The de- fection of France left Italy with a force superior in every way, except that of morale, to the British army in Egypt. But the opportunity was not taken; and the respite was seized upon to strengthen the resources of General Wavell. The prospect then facing Graziani was so much worse that the Axis Powers had to give their minds to its improvement. The Balkans seemed naturally to offer the best field for the first steps in effective diversion. The project was to seize ports and bases on the Greek mainland from which their ships and aeroplanes could operate.
Up to tha present the plan has foundered. One of the finest Italian divisions has been cut up, the Greeks stand on Italian soil and in the area of the main thrust, along the coast, there are only patrols across the Kalamas river. We have seized bases in Crete and we have carried the war at last into Italy. The great bases in the heel of the country, and Durazzo, have already suffered severely. This, however, is only the end of a phase. A new Italian Commander-in-Chief has been appointed and there are several new corps comminders. Perhaps the most significant recent action is the reported declaration that the Yugoslav Government intends to defend its neutrality against all comers. If Yugoslavia should really keep to that policy, the second phase might be even more interesting than the first. So far the fighting in the Near East seems to have been mainly an affair of outposts. There appear to be only two divisions in Sidi Barrani, and only two have been operating in Greece. But it is to be noted that each part of the Italian initiative has needed the support of some fresh attack; and now Germany is apparently attempting to secure further help again.
If all this is reassuring, it raises a question. What is to be our role? Until the small operation at Gallibat, we appear to have been the recipients of the Italian attacks. The reasons for this attitude I have already stated. It is only now that we can look a little farther, and our chief concern is how far we can look. It should be our object to deal with Italy as roughly as she has dealt with Greece, but far more effectively. We have sent fighters to that country and we can bomb any part of Italy. The news from Taranto since this article was in type is an immeasurable encouragement.
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