THE NAVY ESTIMATES.
111HE Government are to be congratulated on the manner in which they have dealt this year with the Navy Estimates. The Estimates begin with the following statement : "These Estimates have been prepared on the assumption that the existing programmes of other Naval Powers will not be increased. In the event of such increase it will be necessary to present Supplementary Estimates both for men and money." This means that the Govern- ment, in view of the declarations and programmes of Foreign Powers, have come to the conclusion that certain moderate additions to our fleet are all that is necessary to maintain that command of the sea which is essential to our existence as an independent nation. If, however, the existing balance of naval force is altered by any Power increasing its naval strength beyond the increases already undertaken, announced, or agreed on in principle, then we shall at once increase our ship-building programme and our naval preparations generally to the extent required to redress the balance. Here is a plain statement of principle plainly laid down for all our neighbours to see and under- stand. We make no perilous attempt to interfere with their ship-building programmes or with the increase of their naval armaments. We merely point out that if they make new bids for naval supremacy, we must and shall outbid them. The game may be a game of beggar-my-neighbour, but wo must play it, and we believe that we can play it longest, not because we imagine ourselves to be richer, or stronger, or more patriotic than our neighbours, but because of a certain plain fact. That fact is that our taxpayers realize that if we lose command of the sea all is lost. We cannot feed our population or provide for the industrial needs of our country unless free access to our shores is secured to us absolutely. Other nations—though no doubt the free passage of the sea is very important to them—do not pre- tend to urge that it is vital. They could live, and even thrive, though not perhaps as well as they do now, if their oversea trade were interfered with. We must in that ease perish of suffocation. Therefore they do not feel as we feel the need of spending our last penny upon our Navy. Accordingly we need not be afraid in the last resort of their saying, "Two can play at the game of spending their last penny on ships." They have other means of security, and also they have more vital objects for expenditure in the matter of national defence.
Translated into the language of the plain man, the Estimates mean, we take it, that if Germany makes this year a new departure in the matter of ship-building, and goes beyond her fixed naval programme, we shall build two keels for one. If, that is, the German Government go to the Reichstag and ask for an additional three Dread- noughts for this year, we shall lay down six additional Dreadnoughts, and we shall make a corresponding increase in the personnel of our fleets to man those extra Dread- noughts. That is the only safe plan, and it is one that we believe the country will endorse, for during the past three years it has undergone a very striking educative process in the matter of naval supremacy. People are at last beginning thoroughly to appreciate what they knew so well a hundred years ago, that the "great ditch," as Cromwell called it, is no defence whatever to us unless we command it with a floating force superior to all others. If the "great ditch " is out of our control it becomes not a hindrance but the greatest possible help to would-be invaders. Those who have sea power find invasion of a sea-surrounded country easier, not more difficult, than in the case of a land frontier. And for this plain reason. If you have command of the sea and invade a sea-surrounded country, you can choose your ground as you will, and are not open to any form of counter-attack in your own realm. The Italian invasion of Tripoli well exemplifies what we mean. If Italy had had a. land frontier marching with Tripoli she would not only have had to think of attacking the Turks, but would have been liable to attack by them. As it is, and because she possesses, so far as Turkey is concerned, the complete command of the sea, she need not trouble her head for ono moment about her own country. It is absolutely secure. No doubt a force invading from the sea may be stopped inland, as the Italians have been stopped, but this war also illustrates the fact that so far as a landing is concerned defence is impossible. In spite of the extra- ordinary bravery and willingness to expose themselves shown by the Turks and the Arabs, they have not been able in a single instance to prevent the Italians throwing their troops upon the shore. We believe indeed that we are accurate in saying that no Power ever has been or ever will be prevented from accomplishing the work of landing. The invaders may be destroyed after their landing, but in the case of an attempt to land the odds are always ten to one in favour of the invader. The task was not difficult in old days, but modern artillery fire has made it infinitely easier. Naval guns can so pre- pare the piece of shore with their fire that nothing can live upon it, and under cover of this fire the boats may land in security. The story of how Abercromby landed at Aboukir and how the Allies entered the Crimea has been retold in the Italian landings in Tripoli. Before we leave the subject of naval defence we desire once more to call the attention of the Government and all who care for the national safety to a point which has been repeatedly urged in these columns—the need for a national guarantee against the capture by the enemy of food or any other merchandise consigned to this country under our own or any foreign flag, and of cargoes and ships despatched under our flag from this country. To put the matter shortly, it is not enough for our Govern- inent to prevent our shores being invaded or to make it impossible for the enemy to blockade our coasts. We must go a step further and make not only our own traders but the traders of the whole world realize that it will be quite as safe for them when we are at war as when we are at peace to send food and other goods here or to send out exports from this country. If the merchants and shippers feel that during war they are running the pecuniary risks involved in the capture of ships and cargoes they will be timid about running those risks, or, rather, the running of those risks will make it necessary for them to insure at rates which will prove so heavy a burden on their undertakings that they will feel obliged greatly to restrict them. Even though the chances of capture are not very great, they will be sufficient, since traders are timid, to make them lay up their shipping or to defer their voyages till better times. But this timidity on the part of shippers and importers may prove a most terrible evil here owing to the resultant rise in the price of food and of raw material. That being so, our Government must do everything they can to secure the safety of oversea trading. They can only do so partially through naval power. They can do it absolutely if in addition to the possession of naval power they will guarantee every shipper and every merchant who is trading with this country against loss through war risks. To put the matter in a practical form, they can do it by endorsing every bond fide policy of marine insurance with a Govern- ment insurance against capture or destruction by the Ring's enemies. If the Government say to all traders : "It is true that war has broken out and that war means risks. But those risks shall be ours, not yours. There- fore you can go ahead with your business in war time exactly as if the conditions were peace conditions. As far as your trade is concerned there is no war."
if the Government take this line, there need be no panic when or just before war breaks out, no rise of prices, and so no losses to the community. The cost, no doubt, may in the first two months of a naval war be considerable, but it will be nothing compared to the loss by panic and the rise of prices which will take place if no national guarantee is given. In fact, we venture to say that there will be no war expenditure for which better value will be obtained. But in order to secure the true benefit of such a national assumption of war risks to prevent panic and a rise of prices, it is necessary that the Government should act in peace time and not after war is declared, or in the deadly interval between the end of true peace and the first shot. The Government, as part of their preparations intended to prevent war and the evil consequences of war, ought to pass an Act at once on the lines we have indicated. If they do so, they will have greatly increased our national resources in the matter of defence. If they neglect to do so, they will have made a capital error in the economics of war.
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