16 NOVEMBER 1912, Page 21

SERVIA AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. T HE news, as we write, points to

a compromise being reached in the controversy between Servia and Austria-Hungary. That is in every sense satisfactory, but we are bound to say that we have never felt any great anxiety as to the peace of Europe being broken and a general conflagration caused by this matter. Our reasons for optimism are perhaps worth setting down, for in our opinion an understanding of them is essential to a correct estimate of the present European situation. Austria-Hungary will not force matters to the point of war unless she can carry the Triple Alliance with her, unless, that is to say, she is whole-heartedly backed up by Germany. But it is the traditional and also the thoroughly sound and wise policy of Germany never to fight unless she believes she can fight at an advantage. As Bismarck confessed in one of his conversations, he made three wars, but in every case lie did not take action until he was certain, as far as any- thing human can be certain, that he would win. If then the Triple Alliance fights as an Alliance it will fight, as we have said, at the moment of greatest and not of least advantage. Push this principle a step further and we see that it means that Germany will not be so mad as to bring on or permit a war with the Triple Entente at a moment when the Triple Entente must become a, quadruple Entente owing to the inclusion of the Balkan Allies. Their armies number some 600,000 fighting men, and are not merely ready to mobilize, but actually in the field and already tempered by the furnace of war, and, what is more, of triumphant war.

If the Triple Alliance were to provoke a general war in order to crush Servia, nothing could keep the Balkan Alliance from joining the Powers which were helping one of its members. The Turkish war, if not quite ended, would soon be ended by the use of the command of the sea, -which belongs to the Triple Entente. The Balkan armies would at once be able to face about and begin an attack upon Austria-Hungary, helped again, and enormously helped, by sea power. Whether they would be a match or not for the Austrian field army remains to be seen, but at any rate they would have the power to prevent Austria- Hungary from rendering help to Germany in her war with two fronts. Austria-Hungary would have enough, and more than enough, to do to hold the Balkan States in check when they were assisted by a Franco-British fleet in the Adriatic guarding their flank and threatening Bosnia and Dalmatia. But though these considerations are so strangely ignored in England, and even, apparently, in France, we do not doubt that they are quite clear in Berlin and even in Vienna, though that is a region somewhat impenetrable to ideas. To repeat, if the Triple Alliance were to fight now it would fight at the very serious dis- advantage occasioned by the addition of half a million fighting men to the Triple Entente. Therefore, however much Austria-Hungary may bluff and grumble, the Triple Alliance will not choose—assuming, of course, that no wave of insanity seizes upon its members—the present moment for making war.

But though we do not believe that in the last resort Austria-Hungary will be allowed by Germany, who in this matter will certainly be backed by Italy, to bring on a war, it would be by no means to the interests of Servia or of her Allies, whom of course she must consult, to trade upon this fact and to push Austria-Hungary too far. If the Servian statesmen are wise they will put a great deal of water in their wine—the heady wine of victory. It will in the end pay them very much better to be moderate and to come to a reasonable understanding with their northern neighbour. They may go on dreaming of a great Serb Empire, part of which is now in Austrian hands, but they will not bring it nearer by prematurely provoking Austro- Hungarian antagonism, as they must provoke it if they push their claims prematurely and too zealously. For ourselves we are convinced that Servia, looking at the matter solely in her own interests and not merely in the interests of peace or of Europe, would be pushing her claims too far by vetoing the establishment of an independent Albania, and by refusing to let the question of an Adriatic port be a matter for negotiation and an item in the general settle- ment rather than an isolated question. To begin with Albania. We are sure that the appropriation of Albania, either in part or in whole, by Servia is altogether beyond her resources. To say this is not to minimize Servia'a military ability or strength. We should say the same of Bulgaria or even of Austria-Hungary herself. A deso- late region of mountain, crag, and forest like Albania is capable of holding out for many years against any Power, no matter how strong, which tries to tame it. Even if the tamer were ultimately successful, it must cost him untold gold and be a perpetual drain in men as well as in money. With Servia's demand for a, seaport all reasonable men must be in full sympathy, and with her demand, not only for access to the sea by means of a treaty port, but through the possession and full incorporation of a port of her very own. We confess, however, that if we were Servians we should much prefer to see our country elongated so as to touch a point upon the 2Egean—which we cannot believe is impossible—to seeing her seeking access to the Adriatic where, as we said last week, she must be under the fire of Austro-Hungarian warships, and where she would have the Albanians on her flank keeping her in perpetual hot water. If her access to the sea is in the .tEgean, that access will be among friends. If it is on the Adriatic, it will be among enemies. That may not be the only consideration, but it is clearly one of no small importance. We do not, of course, say that this solves the matter, or that in a general settlement it might not prove quite possible to arrange that Servia should have an outlet on the Adriatic. All we want to do at the moment is to point out that access to the Adriatic is not necessarily the blue rose which Servians, or some of them, appear just now to imagine it. If then, as seems to be likely, within a few days Servia has either made terms with Austria-Hungary or else has agreed to let her claims to an Adriatic port stand over for a general settlement, we feel sure she will have acted wisely. She has, we believe, a great future and a great part to play in South-Eastern Europe, but she must not spoil it by premature action. Finally, she must remember two things : (1) that the establishment of an independent Albania need not necessarily be a permanent arrangement, and (2) that many things may happen in Austria-Hungary, especially if the Hungarians treat the Croats and the South Slays generally as they have been treating them of late.