The conflict of evidence is most perplexing. It turns, of
course, in a great measure upon the very delicate and difficult question whether we ought or ought not to count not only the Austrian but also the Italian Dreadnoughts' as coming within the category of a reasonably likely combination against us. On this point it appears to us that the path of prudence is not to give ourselves the benefit of the doubt but to assume that the worse may happen. Unquestionably a very friendly spirit exists between Italy and this country. Still, the fact remains that Italy is bound in the clearest possible way to the Triple Alliance, and this means that the German, Austrian, and Italian fleets would act together according to theirtreaty obliga- tions. History unquestionably shows that States have often been obliged to go to war contrary to their national instincts and aspirations. Spain was not really hostile to Britain in 1805. Yet the Spanish fleet opposed our fleet at Trafalgar owing to the coercive power of Napoleon. We do not want to have Italy against us, but we must remember that Italy's power to resist the pressure that may be brought upon her to act with her allies will largely depend upon our own strength at sea. If we command the sea, we need have little doubt as to Italy's action. She will have a perfectly good excuse for keeping out of a naval war. If, on the other band, Italy holds the naval balance, the pressure put upon her by her allies—allies who can coerce her by land action—may be more than she will be able to resist. If we have enough capital ships we may appear to have more than enough. If, on the other hand, we have not just enough we may find we have too few to keep on our side those who at heart desire to be our friends.
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