THE DEBATE ON SIR FREDERICK MAURICE'S LETTER.
IN the debate on the Maurice letter Mr. Lloyd George had a sweeping and unquestioned Parliamentary success. He has had many notable Parliamentary successes at critical moments ; but, having regard to the seriousness of the latest crisis and the magnitude of the vote in favour of the Government, we are not sure that his latest success was not also his greatest. But when we have acknowledged this—a result which last week we suggested was quite likely to happen—we must go on to say that the debate leaves matters almost as they were before as to the points raised in Sir Frederick Maurice's letter. A large proportion of those who voted for the Government voted as they did for the simple reason that they did not wish to pass what Mr. Lloyd George called a Vote of Censure on the Government while there was no alternative Government ready to step into office. Some of them may have thought that Mr. Lloyd George really disposed of Sir Frederick Maurice's charges, but we can hardly believe that more than a very few did so if they troubled to look closely into Mr. Lloyd George's arguments. The fact that figures which Mr. Lloyd George had quoted previously had been supplied by Sir Frederick Maurice's own Department, and could therefore be quoted against Sir Frederick Maurice himself, was a weapon of great weight in Mr. Lloyd George's hands, and he certainly wielded it with extraordinary energy and dialectical brilliance. Yet it remains true that the substance of the Maurice letter was left unanswered. The Opposition cannot be congratu- lated on their conduct of the case. It will be remembered that Mr. Bonar Law had in the first instance announced that there must be an inquiry into the Maurice letter, since the honour of the Government was in question, and had proposed an inquiry by two Judges. When it was clear that this proposal did not please the House, Mr. Asquith tried to insist upon a Select Committee of the House. There- upon the Prime Minister instantly changed front, denied that an inquiry was necessary, and decided to dispose of the whole matter as a question of confidence in a full debate of the House. Surely what the Opposition should have done then was to say : " We think an inquiry essential. Nothing can be disposed of in the passionate and ex-parte statements of a debate. The essential evidence cannot he laid before the whole House. if the Government refuse a • Select Committee, then let us have the two Judges. The point is that we must have an inquiry and not a debate, and any sort of inquiry is better than none." If this argument had been brought forward at the right moment, we think it would have succeeded. As it is, the result is unsatisfactory all along the line. Though General Maurice's questions are not answered, the Government are " vindicated," and General Maurice's defence has never been heard, and we suppose never will be heard.
Mr. Lloyd George was tremendously effective in roving by figures that the Army in France was stronger on January 1st, 1918, than on January 1st, 1917. But General Maurice never disputed that. What he most plainly said in his letter was that the Prime Minister by comparing the strengths at those two dates had implied that our strength on the Western Front between January 1st, 1918, and March 31st, 1918 (the date of the German attack), had not been diminished. Surely it is clear to the whole world, as we pointed out last week, that the Prime Minister did mean people to run off with the idea that the Army which withstood the German offensive on March 21st had not been reduced in strength. If his words did not mean that, they meant nothing. Next, as regards the divisions in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Palestine, General Maurice in his letter said that it was misleading to describe British troops as forming " a very small proportion " of the mixed divisions. He never denied the truth of the statement that there were four white divisions. He disputed the truth of the following words which were used by Mr. LlOyd George : " The rest are either Indians or mixed with a very small proportion of British troops in those divisiona- 1 am referring to the infantry divisions." In his speech on the Maurice letter the Prime Minister proved that there were only four white divisions, which, as we have just said, General Maurice had not disputed. The account he gave of the negotiations about taking over a new piece of line from the French cannot be reconciled with what Mr. Boner Law had said. It will be remembered that on April 23rd Mr. Bonar Law denied that the extension of the British front had been dealt with by the Versailles War Council. " This particular matter," he said, " was not dealt with at all by the Versailles War Council." According to Mr. Lloyd George's explanation, the matter was definitely dealt with at Versailles ; and the ridicule he poured upon Sir Frederick Maurice for saying he was at Versailles during negotiations, although he was not in the Council Chamber when the matter was discussed, was trivial stuff. Sir Frederick Maurice, as he has himself since stated, was in the building, and no doubt was acquainted with all that was going on. Holding the high position he did, he probably had a right to see all the docu- ments, and to acquaint himself with the progress of the negotiations at every point. A Member of Parliament would similarly be justified in saying he was " at Westminster " for a particular debate although he may only have been in the Lobbies. Such facts as these justify us in saying that Mr. Lloyd George did not dispose of the charges.
But the cause for which General Maurice, with heroic self- sacrifice, as we think, ruined his professional career by a deliberate act of insubordination is something much wider and more important than is represented by such comparatively small points of evidence as we have been discussing. Let us therefore turn to this more important side of the matter. Sir Frederick Maurice's letter would not have been written if there had not been a general belief among responsible officers in the Army that the Government were putting on the Army blame that they ought to bear themselves. What not only Sir Frederick Maurice but many other highly placed soldiers were unhappy about was that the Government were giving the nation a false impression of the situation at the front. The spokesmen of the Government may be, and indeed notoriously are, extremely skilful at using the picked date and the carefully selected statistic to show that the Government are right ; but a false impression is none the less created. We suffered a critical reverse at the end of March through the crushing of the Fifth Army. That defeat was due not to any want of courage or discipline on the part of our soldiers, as the Prime Minister himself acknowledged ; nor has it been alleged, in spite of the removal of General Gough, that it was due to bad generalship. It was due in the main to the fact that we were trying to do an impossi'ele thing—to hold forty miles of front with fourteen divisions. Why, we ask, were those forty miles being held so lightly ? We were doing it because. we were compelled—because the French had asked us to do it. Of course the French were acting quite rightly and properly from their point of view. We have not a word of criticism to say on that subject. But when the. Government found themselves last autumn face to face with the dangerous necessity of taking over a long new piece of line without enough men for doing it adequately, surely it was their duty to do then promptly and decisively what they have been doing during the last six weeks. They should have brought men back from the distant theatres of the war ; they should have sent over to France the many thousands of men whom they have somehow or other been able to send lately ; they should have begun there and then the combing out of our man-power ; they should have applied Conscription to Ireland, and if necessary have raised the military age. The responsibility was on the Govern- ment and on nobody else, unless we are to believe that our Higher Command uttered no warnings on the subject. Even if an unduly optimistic account of the situation was placed before the Government by some high officers, it cannot have been placed before them by all. It was the duty of the Govern- ment to sift the opinions before them, to inquire carefully, and to act instantly upon their knowledge.
When Mr. Lloyd George spoke on April 9th he created the impression that the Army on the Western Front had suffered a reverse through some cause for which the Government could not be blamed. By inference the blame was to be laid upon the Army. Abroad the prestige of the Army was lowered. Sir Frederick Maurice in his letter intended to draw attention to this matter. To this wider and graver charge the Prime Minister gave no answer, and honestly we think that he could give none because he had none. The public are tacitly invited to think that Sir Frederick Maurice has been treated indulgently because he has been allowed to retire on retired pay without being brought before a Court- Martial. But we imagine that Sir Frederick Maurice would like nothing better than to be brought before a Court-Martial, or indeed to have any inquiry worthy of the name into his statements. As it is, he can hardly feel otherwise than that he made his great sacrifice in vain. The nation, instead of being healthily disquieted and wishing more earnestly to know the truth, has been more or less satisfied that Sir Frederick Maurice brought random charges. Now this is, in our own opinion, a very dangerous result, and is by no means the best way of " getting on with the war." Really to get on with the war we must have perfect trust and loyalty between the high-placed officers and the Government. As a result of all that has happened, do the public at all recognize the facts ? It has been stated over and over again in various newspapers, and never contradicted, that the British infantry divisions on the Western Front had been reduced before the recent German attack from twelve battalions to nine. In other words, there had been a failure to supply drafts, and the strength of the Army was reduced by one-quarter. After all that has hap- pened, and especially after the brilliant and sweeping Parlia- mentary success of Mr. Lloyd George, is the ordinary man in the least aware of this truth ? When the Germans reduced the number of battalions in each of their existing divisions they created new divisions. We did not do so. If the warnings of responsible soldiers are disregarded, and the Government then are able to prove verbally that they them- selves are beyond reproach, are satisfactory conditions pro- duced for winning the war ? It is useless to choose dates arbitrarily, such as January 1st, 1917, and January 1st, 1918. At the beginning of 1918 the Army had been weakened in strength by the Somme campaign, and it was, moreover, at that moment at what may be called " winter strength." What we really want to be told authoritatively is what the strength of the Army was three months later. It is useless, again, to say that the soldiers " agreed " to this, that, and the other. What we want to know is the quantity and character of their resistance before they felt bound to make the best of a bad job. To say that a man who loyally and patriotically tries to make the best of a bad job " agrees," or consents, or " approves " is verbally true, and yet there is a definite misleading of the public.
We ask our readers to form a judgment dispassionately on the facts. These times are much too grave for us to trouble seriously about anybody's motives, whether they be the motives of the Prime Minister or the motives of Sir Frederick Maurice. The facts are the test. Was the Army reduced in strength, and did the Government wish the nation to believe that it had not been reduced in strength ? If there was a reduction of strength, it helps us not at all to be told that the Prime Minister's motives were always excellent. We have never doubted that they were :- " Of course he eid it for the best ; What should he do it for ?
But, did he do it ? That's the test I ask to know no more."
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