Weakness in Java
The situation in Java requires handling with more firmness and decision than has yet been revealed either by the British or the Dutch authorities. On the military side the Dutch cannot be blamed, for they have no considerable military force available, though it .s generally felt in Batavia that they should have stated their policy more clearly, and taken more active steps to get in touch with responsible Indonesians. In regard to the second, it is possible that the contacts effected by Colonel Raden Wirdjojoatmodjo may prove helpful. ro far as the British are concerned, it is surely obvious that they cannot shed responsibility. These troubles created by hot- headed Indonesian nationalists took a violent form before the Japanese had been disarmed. The process of liberation can hardly be said to have seriously begun. The unruly nationalist forces have been able to assert themselves merely because there was an administrative vacuum in Java, due to the collapse of the Japanese before any Allied authority was there to take charge. To hand over an area so inadequately liberated to the Dutch before they have the means af controlling the situation, and to wash our hands of responsibility would be a gross neglect of duty. It s for the liberating Allied forces to take over and maintain order pending the arrival of adequate Dutch forces. Then it will become their concern. But in the mean- time, during what is virtually an interregnum, there ought to be no hesitation whatever in sending sufficient forces from Singapore to restore order.
