19 OCTOBER 2002, Page 60

Nasty questions that need asking

Alan Judd

WHY TERRORISM WORKS by Alan M. Dershowitz Yale, 177.95, pp. 271, ISBN 0300097662

Prominent in any contemporary dictionary of received opinion should be the assumption that all terrorism has 'root causes' that render violence 'understandable' because the aggrieved have no alternative'. It comes with all the shock and invigoration of a cold bath to find someone arguing against this contemporary shibboleth.

Alan Dershowitz believes that the assumption of 'root causes' smacks more of

after-the-fact political justification than inductive scientific inquiry ... To focus on such factors as poverty, illiteracy and disenfranchisement ... is to fail to explain why so many groups with far greater grievances and disabilities have never resorted to terrorism.

In fact, the 'root cause' of much terrorism is its own success — terrorists generally terrorise only when they think it might work. If murder is rewarded with concessions, then murder is encouraged. Kurds and Armenians suffer more repression and dispossession than the Palestinians, but their attempts at terrorism have not been rewarded, so there are few.

Unlike those of the Palestinians, argues Dershowitz. They are his paradigm of successful terrorism, having persuaded the world of the justice of their cause and the 'inevitability' of a murderous response, while ignoring alternatives such as nonviolent protest and rejecting a deal giving them nearly all they wanted. Since 1968 particularly, says Dershowitz, European governments — notably France, Germany and Italy — have appeased and rewarded Palestinian terrorism. His 19-page table of terrorist acts and resulting concessions makes grim, and rather shameful, reading.

Of course, there is an agenda here: Dershowitz, professor of law at Harvard Law School, is frank about his Jewish sympathies and has himself been the victim of Palestinian protests and threats. He does not see Arafat (who shares the cover of this book with Osama bin Laden) as a rightful recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize; rather, he should be arraigned for the torture and murder of two American diplomats. At the same time, Dershowitz is a noted civil lib

erties lawyer who has himself defended terrorists.

The events of 9/11, he says, were 'mass murder for its own sake, based on religious zealotry ... apocalyptic terrorism'. Whatever the varying causes al-Qaeda claims to represent, there is in reality no 'root cause' to be ameliorated. So what should we do? We should not, he argues, adopt the oppressive measures of tyrannies — that is a price too high — but we should consider certain awkward and expensive measures and we should ask ourselves nasty questions in advance of having to answer them.

Enforcing international co-operation, with more effective security procedures and better intelligence-gathering will do more to protect us than further restrictions on free speech or the introduction of draconian laws, though we do need to ensure that lawyers cannot make it too hard for the state to protect its citizens. All terrorism must be met with a stone wall: no concessions, no prisoner releases, no deals. The only possible deterrent to organisations such as al-Qaeda is the threat of 'massive incapacitation' of the organisers and of any that help them. It might sometimes pay to announce retributive measures in advance of the events that would provoke them.

Among the nasty questions is that of torture: are there any circumstances in which it could be justified? What if there were known to be a small nuclear device hidden in London, due to detonate later today, and the person you know to have planted it is detained at Heathrow, refusing to talk? If you still rule out torture, fine, says Dershowitz; but if there's the slightest chance you might temporise in such appalling circumstances, it's better to prepare some legal means of authorisation and control than permit an informal, nod-and-wink interrogation culture. Address the question now, calmly and openly, rather than furtively and hurriedly, under pressure of events. Ditto the assumption that it's better ten guilty men go free than one innocent man be convicted. Commendable, but what if you have good reason to believe that each of the ten will go on to commit mass murder?

Dershowitz concludes with two final thoughts: firstly, whether we are over-or under-reacting to 9/11 depends on whether it happens again; if it doesn't, we'll be accused of over-reacting: if it proves to be the first of a series, history will say we under-reacted. We'll be lumbered with one judgment or the other. Which do we want?

Secondly, our security and intelligence measures must be radically rethought, with an injection of thinking and people not traditionally involved in those areas. Yet we mustn't jettison the values we hold dear. We need to start thinking outside the boxes that failed us, but without becoming like those who attacked us,' Quite so, but where now? The issues raised in this provocative and thoughtful book are as good a start as any.