THE COMMAND OF 'rift . SEA.? Ma. CoinErr has now completed
the 'admirable history of the rise Of England as a maritime Power which he began, with the volumes on Drake and the Tudor Navy,,published two years ago. His third volume takes UP the story at the, close of Drake's life in 196, and brings it down to the end of the great war with Spain at the accession of the peace-loving James I. The_ growth of the Navy was then at an end for a time; a period of decline followed, during 'Which the Dutch went ahead of us, and it was only the gePlue_cf Wii:ke-7-88 *4. pointed out some time .ago-.-tbnt, restorif the maritime supreniacy which Drake gave us, but which had well- nigh slipped out of our hands again, _for Want of * The..suczosire. sat Dssiow BY Julian 5. Corbett. lett4op Longmans ant de: E215.1
attentien. In this, as in his preceding volumes, Mr. Corbett einpllasises the very interesting fact that the rise of England to the first place among sea-Powers was coincident with the second period in the history of the world's naval warfare. From the earliest times there were two distinct types of ship on the waters : the long-ship and the round-ship. The former was, in classic and media3val times, the man-of-war, the latter the merchantman. As long as sea-fights were chiefly confined to the Mediterranean, the trireme or galley remained the tactical unit. From the battle of Salamis to the battle of Lepanto naval tactics were dependent on the use of the oar, which gave the galley free movement almost com- parable to that of the modern steamship, but deprived it of the power of keeping the sea for any length of time. The Norse rovers, indeed, had shown how a modified long- ship could dare the winds and waves as well as fight, but it was the galley pure and simple that counted in civilised naval warfare. English seamen never shone in this period, partly by reason of the lack of slaves for motive-power, and partly because the English genius was always at its best in bid weather, when the galleys were snug in harbour. With the age of the great discoveries the field of battle was trans- ferred to the Atlantic, where the galley was useless. The second era in naval warfare came in when the round-ship, or merchantman, depending wholly on its sails for propulsion and malueuvring power, was developed into the heavily armed galleon, which Drake's genius proved to be a more perfect engine of war than the galley, even on the chosen waters of the latter. The ship was then first regarded as a gun-platform, and modern naval tactics were devised on lines that they kept almost unchanged till the introduction of steam brought in the third era, and gave us a battleship which combined the free movement of the galley with the sea endurance of the galleon. Our Fleet has had no chance of showing its true fighting powers since this third era has come in. It is all the more interesting to read Mr. Corbett's account, now completed, of the way in which the Elizabethan sea-dogs grasped the new order of things, and gave England that predominance on the sea which she still retains.
This is the main feature of Mr. Corbett's admirable history. In the present volume he describes the very last appearance of the galleys, handled in most brilliant fashion by Frederic° Spinola, the brother of the famous Marquis, whose valour and genius only served to illus- trate what Drake had proved when he dashed into Cadiz and gave the venomous Spanish galleys a taste of English gunnery that sickened them for good. It is impos- sible to do. more than glance at the numerous minor sub- jects of interest that are here treated. The volume contains, for , instance, the story of Essex's meteoric career and his daahing attack on Cadiz, of the Islands Voyage in 1597, of Cumberland's raid on Puerto Rico, of the three Armadas which the obstinate Philip II. insisted on fitting out for "the adventure of England," even after the terrible lesson of 1588, and. of the effect that the new sea-power had on the invasion of Ireland and the progress of the war on the Continent. Among the chief lessons of this interesting and little-known chapter of our naval history we may draw special attention to three,—the moral effect of sea-power, the need of taking the offensive in order to defend our shores, and the importance of an adequate army in order to derive the full benefit from the most overwhelmingly powerful fleet. Many instances of all these are to be read in Mr. Corbett's pages, which we com- mend heartily to all who care about our Fleet and our fame.
As to the first, we need only quote a suggestive remark on Mountjoy's Irish campaign:—" It is perhaps impossible for those who sit at home at ease to realise what it means to troops, as they are plunged further and further into what for them is a savage and untrodden country, to see the familiar flag still floating at their elbow, and to find, however far they
move, the tapering spars, and the trim rows of guns still
linking them with home." As to the second point, that was -the great lesson of the war with Spain, as it was of the Napoleonic Wars. Coast defence is very well for the weaker party to consider ; but the command of the sea is the best, if not the only, security for us against invasion. The modern
doctrine of the "fleet in being" was slowly hammered out by the Government; to Drake and his mighty compeers it came by intuition. When Leveson returned to London in 1602, after his brilliant Irish victory, he found the old panic of invasion still in force. He had no doubt as to the plan of defence. Then, as now, the sole defensible frontier of England was the enemy's coast. "It is," he said, "more honourable for the Queen and safe for the State to maintain a fleet upon the coast of Spain than to stand upon the defensive at home." This maxim, which has been that of all our great Admirals from Drake to Nelson, is not always so well remembered as it should be by the theorists and panic-mongers who deplore our lack of submarine boats and complain that in case of war the Channel Squadron will not lurk off the mouth of the Thames to intercept raiders. Lastly, we may quote Mr. Corbett's remarks on the still prevalent fallacy that a navy can win campaigns without the aid of an adequate army. Again and again Mr. Corbett shows how the triumphs of the Elizabethan Navy, which scarcely ever met with a reverse, were nullified by the lack of troops to back them up. The following passage sums up the general principles of the Spanish War so well that we must give it at some length :—
•
" What was wanting was an army, and England had none fit for the work. The strength which the command of the sea gave was fully understood. They knew the power of offence which it meant. But they had not yet advanced to the knowledge that to enjoy the vantage ground of the sea you must have an army as mobile, as well organised, and as highly trained as your navy.
Without a mobile military force capable of seconding the navy, it was impossible to carry the war further. Indeed, for the past ten years England had been losing ground. . . . . . The struggle degenerated into that most hopeless of hostilities, an inadequate commercial blockade, and a war on sea-borne trade.
How vicious is such a form of warfare NM one of the first lessons the war should have taught us. The attempt to destroy Spanish commerce was an undoubted failure. True, she was greatly hampered by its interruption, and crippled beyond hope of successfully resuming the offensive. But the interrup- tion was never complete enough to bring her to her knees.
As it was, the end of the war saw Spain far more powerful on the sea than when she began. We had taught her the lesson of naval power, and she had learnt it according to her lights. We had not learnt ours. It is doubtful whether we have learnt it yet. We know what Nelson did at Trafalgar, and forget that its real importance was what it afterwards enabled Welling- ton to do. We speak glibly of sea-power,' and forget that its true value lies in its influence on the operations of armies. For a defensive war a navy may suffice alone ; but how fruitless, how costly and long drawn out a war must be, that for want of an adequate army is condemned to the defensive, is the great lesson we have to learn in the failure of Drake's successors."
We need hardly point out the direct bearing of this on the most modern military and national problems. Mr. Corbett has conceived his book in a philosophic spirit, which makes it a worthy shelf-mate to the works of Captain Mahan, who practically takes up the story of our Navy where Mr. Corbett pauses; for the first half of the seventeenth century was a barren period, which hardly furnishes material for more than such an introductory chapter as William James prefixed to his well-known annals of the Navy. We are sure that all true Englishmen will be grateful to Mr. Corbett for the work which he has completed with so masterly a touch and so enthusiastic a pen.
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