Westminster Commentary
Principles of Conservatism
By JULIAN CRITCHLEY, MP THERE cannot be a Young 'Conservative I branch in the country that has not, at one time or another, asked for a speaker from Central Office to address them on the 'Principles of Conservatism.' I find this rather disturbing, for it would seem to imply that there are such things as Conservative principles, and if that be so, that no one knows what they are. The truth is, of course, that Conservatives do not have political principles. They have prejudices guided by fact. It has been fills freedom from doctrine that has enabled it to survive.
There is great advantage in not having to apply the touchstone of a mystical 'Conserva- tism' to situations as they arise. (The Labour Party is for ever asking itself, 'Is this Socialism?) Not only does it facilitate government, but the flexibility that it gives allows for a wide range of differing opinion within the party itself. Amongst Tories, in the absence of doctrine, com- promise has been substituted for principle. For compromise is regarded both as good form and sound politics. It is the belief that the most important thing in politics is the continuance of Conservative government, and that compromise is the means whereby this aim may be achieved, that makes the Tory Party so formidable. Thus the nature of Conservatism has not changed. The party is recognisably the party of Disraeli, and of Baldwin. Nor indeed have the people who vote Conservative. There is still the traditional alliance between those who have climbed the ladder of inequality and those who would aspire to do so, a state of affairs that has bene- fited from a century of rising living standards. It is the composition of the Tory parliamentary, party that has altered, particularly since 1945.
The best example of the empirical approach is the Government's decision to seek entry into the Common Market. It was, on the one hand, a complete reversal of the Government's policy; on the other, no more than the consummation of a process of decline and adjustment that has been forced upon us .since the war. It is the empirical nature of Conservatism that has, allowed the second factor to outweigh the first.
There are some people who say that the Government should have done what it is now doing several years ago; that many opportunities have been missed. Sir Winston Churchill raised the hopes of Europeans at Zurich in 1946; only to disappoint them at Westminster in 1951. Then, there was the refusal to give our support to the European Army in 1954, and the failure to persuade the' Europeans to adopt a Free Trade Area before the Treaty of Rome. All this is true; but to believe that a Prime Minister could have taken Britain into Europe during the Fifties is to ignore the '• hallowed clichd that politics is the art of the possible. There would seem to be no time during the past decade w hen the Cabinet could have calculated that its Members of Parliament, let alone anyone else, would have been sufficiently aware of the reality of our declining power for them to agree to such a far-reaching change of policy. It was not, in all probability, until the late spring of 1960 that the Cabinet itself made up its mind. The breakdown of the Paris Summit, and all it meant in terms of prestige to the Prime Minister, was the cul- mination of a series of political defeats that may finally have forced reassessment upon the Government--notably Suez, where both France and Britain discovered that it was impossible to carry out policies that did not have American (or Russian) support; and Blue Streak, which meant the end of an attempt to possess a purely independent nuclear deterrent.
The collapse of the Free Trade Area showed that we could not dictate the pattern of integra- tion to a resurgent Europe; the 'wind of change' accelerated the process of imperial withdrawal; and the vulnerability of our economy through- out this period, reducing our influence in relation to other more prosperous countries, forced the Government to see the Common Market as an opportunity whereby our political decline might be halted, and conditions achieved whereby our economy might be permanently strengthened.
in the face of such evidence, it took as long as it did for the Cabinet to come to a conclusion, how
much more difficult for MPs, the party workers and the country as a whole to see that there was no alternative to the present policy?
Victory at Brighton has meant that opposition to the Common Market within the Conservative Party is restricted to the romantics of the Right, Who see the Commonwealth not as it is but as they would like it to be (it is amusing to note That these same people who have been entirely Without influence at home have now taken re- fuge in Katanga). The Government, it would seem, will not have great difficulty in taking the Tory Party into Europe; and if it succeeds, this Will be empiricism triumphant.
Se much, then, for the nature of the party; What of its composition? It is plain that there are many Conservatives in the House today of a kind that would not have been elected before the war—though there are still a few 'inheritors' Who come by their seats not so much as a result of competition but rather by local influence or social status. Of the remainder, the majority of Members fall into two distinct categories. The first are the successful businessmen or barristers Who enter Parliament in middle age and who were to be found in considerable numbers before the war. They have now to compete for adop- tion not with the squires but with the younger. professionals' who have served. their apprentice- ship in the party organisation.
It is this third category that may in time come to dominate the Tory Party. The 'professionals' have of course already reached office (Macleod,
Maudling); and their numbers on the. backbenches are increasing. Many of them are either first-generation public school or have a grammar school. background, though the bulk are Oxbridge. Before election they have either worked for Central Office, campaigned among the Young Conservatives, or scribbled for the Iztow Group. In every case they have assimilated, 'to some degree, the sophisticated policies con- ceived by R. A. Butler after the 1945 election and propagated by the CPC and the Bow Group. Not even the Young Conservatives have .avoided this subtle indoctrination. One can claim that ikhas become easier for the middle- class University Conservative who is without Private means, but is prepared to spend. say. five Years in area or constituency politics to become adopted as a candidate for a winnable seat than it is for his counterpart in the Labour Party. Nor, as some suppose, does this mean that he becomes more rather than less dependent on the good- will of his constituency officers. The party worker who is likely to become a chairman has also been influenced by the CPC; .his political reflexes may not be very different from those of his Member.
What will be the consequences of Woolton's Law? It has been said that the quality of Members is higher than before the war: be that as it may, the party is at least beginning to reflect more closely the kind of person who votes or it. By throwing open its ranks the party will More easily attune itself to social change. And
Will be both a stimulus, and a support for a Conservative Government, for while there may be a closer identity, of view; there will also be a greater awareness of the problems that face it. The composition of the party will surely, ii time, come to hive some effect upon its nature.'
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