The Chinese Turmoil R EVOLUTIONS have a way of devouring their
children, but never so quickly as in China. The Western public has barely had time to familiarize itself with the name of a seemingly powerful Chinese general or politician when he is overthrown or retires from the scene. In the past few days we have heard of the disappearance of Mr. Eugene Chen, who, as Foreign Minister of the Southern Government at Hankow, used to menace the Powers in the name of China. The Russian military adviser, General Galen, who is credited with the victories of the South over the North, is said, rather doubtfully, to have followed Borodin, who went to Mongolia. Now General Chiang Kai-shek, who commanded the Southern armies and who set up his own government at Nanking and occupied the native city of Shanghai, has suddenly resigned and left for some safe retreat. To the European reader, knowing nothing of the complexities of Chinese politics, it had looked as if Chiang might long remain as War-lord of Southern China, if indeed he did not occupy Peking itself, as seemed very likely six weeks ago. Yet Chiang, in the twinkling of an eye, has lost his power, following upon heavy defeats in Shantung, and he now counts for no more than Wu Pei-fu and many. other extinct volcanoes of the civil war. Chang Tso-lin, the War-lord of Manchuria, still retains his position in the North, but this apparent exception to the rule must have an explanation in the shape of foreign support. Japan is too directly interested in the security of Manchuria to let Chinese Vacillation and treachery have free play there. Moreover, Manchuria is distinct from China and subject to special treaties which enable Japan to exercise some control. Elsewhere the turmoil increases daily. Vast natural forces have been unloosed since the dynasty fell sixteen years ago, and no man or group of men now seems able to guide or cheek them for more than a few weeks or Months. It took a Napoleon to restore peace to a France with thirty million people. A greater than Napoleon is needed to control a China with four hundred millions.
It is not very profitable for us in the West to speculate upon what the next shaking of the Chinese kaleidoscope May bring into view. But we may safely assume that provincial jealousies play a very large part in the incessant changes that are reported. Even before the Empire fell it was apparent that the provincial governors were becoming more independent of Peking and more reluctant to contribute to the Imperial Treasury. In the long years of war under a nominal and shadowy Republic, the governors, who are now military chiefs or Tuchuns, have developed into virtually autonomous potentates, like Feng in Shensi, and the " model " Yen of Shansi, who play for their own hands. The Southern armies, in their advance frOm Canton northward to the Yangtse, appar- ently submerged the autonomy of the provinces which they overran, but, when the military locust-swarm had passed, the provincial authorities resumed their old sway. It is said that Chiang's fall is largely due to the jealousy of his subordinate generals from Kwang-si, who disliked him because he came from Ningpo in Che-kiang. The province, it would seem, counts for far more than the nation to the average Chinese, whatever Chinese propagandists may say when they write in Western newspapers.
Again, it is perfectly clear that the Chinese generals commanding armies in this interminable civil war are mainly concerned to amass wealth, so that they may pay their troops, bribe opponents into submission, and keep a reasonable percentage for themselves. They are doing on a large scale what the Condottieri did on a small scale in mediaeval Italy under Sir John Hawkwood and other noted leaders. When they fail to raise contributions from the banks and the merchants, they find their troops deserting to the other side, for the Chinaman, high or low, regards war from a business standpoint. Now the wealthiest part of China is the Yangtse valley, and all foreign trade to and from the Yangtse passes through Shanghai. Therefore it must be the first object of any rising star in the Chinese military firmament to secure Shanghai—the native city, that is—and make as much profit out of it as he can. Chiang Kai-shek must have amassed millions in this way during the last few months, as his Nanking Government, in complete disregard of all treaties and agreements, has been raising the tariffs and the shipping duties and levying tribute in various ways on the mercantile community, native and foreign. His successors will doubtless try to do the same, and the magnitude of the prize will tempt many to seek it. We may infer, then, that the Yangtse trade, perhaps for years to come, will be sorely hampered by constant interference from Chinese war-lords, until Chinese public opinion somehow restrains them.
The outlook for China and for Western trade with China is distinctly unfavourable. But there is nothing that the Powers can do, save to maintain a strict neutrality as between Chinese factions and to watch for the oppor- tunity of negotiating with any government that really represents China or the greater part of China. It is fair to say that foreign residents in Northern China have hitherto been free from molestation, whereas many foreigners have been murdered, violently assaulted or robbed in the districts controlled by the Southern armies; and there has been no redress for the victims. Yet it would be folly to take sides in the civil war and to assume that, if Chang Tso-lin could conquer the South, he would establish- a better or more friendly Government than the Kuomingtang party would do if it were to overrun the North and establish its Government at Peking. All that- the Powers want is to see order restored in China so that trade can be resumed and foreigners can go about their business in peace. When the time arrives, Great Britain will assuredly be ready to negotiate for a revision of the treaties made under the late Empire. But, as China is in a state of chaos, there is no central authority to negoti- ate with, and the treaty question must wait.
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