SIGNOR MUSSOLINI AS NATIONAL TRUSTEE.
IF what has happened in Italy had happened in Great Britain we should have to say that we were in a bad way. We should say that Constitutionalism had broken down and that that kind of revolution was in the ascendant which would make a return to Constitu- tionalism very unlikely. But it would be a cardinal mistake, though a mistake that is only too familiar, to judge other countries by our standard British measure.
The Italian temperament is not ours. Although we must acknowledge that there is a wilderness of dangers in front of Signor Mussolini and his system of Fascismo, and although Signor Mussolini and his followers have done much that we do not like, we need not for that reason cease to hope that he will bring Italy back to the path of safety and prosperity.
The feebleness of the recent Italian Governments and of all the possible fresh Governments which he swept away was intense. Some kind of purge was necessary or Italy might have fallen into a decline. All we need say of the character of the purge which Signor Mussolini has applied is that it was natural if not appropriate to the country in which it was born. The Italian has a native love for the spectacular and the exciting. When he saw Fascismo advancing by leaps and bounds he hailed Signor Mussolini as a leader of a new risorgimento, and the very insignia of the movement, the black shirts and the pennons and the Roman manner of salute, seemed to him not only gracious symbols but in them- selves things potent and worthy of all acceptation. Less theatrical ways would have captured fewer adherents.
It need not be supposed that Fascismo was even in its origin designed merely to rid the country of excesses of the Communists. As a Special Correspondent of the Times pointed out in a singularly informing article published on Friday, January 12th, Bolshevism was collapsing in Italy owing to the awful example of Russia before Signor Mussolini took the field. Some of the most exemplary punishments of the Fascisti were, of course, inflicted on the Communists, but much more than the will to destroy Communism was needed to explain the success of Fascismo. The movement is truly much more constructive than destructive. If the large part it takes in the protection of property is regarded as a negative sign in itself, it has to be added that it is a very positive sign in this respect that the need was felt to replace a succession of Governments which hardly governed. It is a remarkable fact that nearly all the Socialists who have turned their coats and have joined Fascismo were Socialists of the extreme type—most of them, in fact, were Communists. It only shows once more how extremes meet ; the man who has the temperament for anything drastic or ex- cessive will change, if he changes at all, to the other pole and seldom be found living on the land which lies between. It may be said -that there is no more difficult thing in the world than to create something solid and lasting out of the materials provided by emotion and impulse. But Signor Mussolini, it must be remembered, has shown exceptional talents for organization. To mobilize a hundred thousand men, to equip them, and always to have the necessary force in the right place at the right moment is no mean feat. Another point to the good, and it is a very important one, is that Signor Mussolini's authority, though in effect he seized it, is nevertheless based on a widespread national sanction. Ile is by no means the ordinary revolutionary leader of a small minority who is imposing his will upon the country because he happens to have the power. Fascismo draws its support from all the political parties (as is pointed out in an article in the January number of the Quarterly Review) except the Communists, the Official Socialists, and the Roman Catholic " Populars." The most compact body of its supporters is to be found among the peasants of Central Italy. They are the people who are more conscious perhaps than any others of having, in our old English phrase, "a stake in the country." Their stakes are no doubt individually small, and may even be kept in an unenlightened -way in mattresses and stockings, but in the aggregate they amount to a great deal. The strength of Fascismo, it is necessary to understand, comes from the provinces and reaches Rome only from the circumference. In France such a movement would have been arranged quite differently ; it could hardly have come about at all unless it had originated in Paris and had spread from there outwards.
But only second in importance to the peasants in Central Italy are the industrialists of the North, who also have property to be protected. If the individual stakes are there very much higher it cannot be said that the industrialists are as solid in support of Fascismo as the agriculturists. In the South the light of Fascismo, if it be a light, has not penetrated very far. The whole movement there is rather artificial and theoretical. As for the Nationalists, of whom we heard so much when Signor D'Annunzio was brandishing his sword—or was it his pistol ?—at Fiume, they are bound to support Signor Mussolini just because he is a patriot and a "Big Italy" man. That is to say, they must do so unless Signor D'Annunzio, whose plumes have been snatched from him, contrives to take the stage again in full fig. These facts justify what has been said about the breadth of the support given to Signor Mussolini. There may be even something in the rumour that the capital may be moved from Rome to Milan—a final proof, if such a thing happened, that Rome itself hardly counts politically.
Signor Mussolini holds his large following on the principle that nothing succeeds like success. Even the peasants could not be relied upon to stay by his side if many shocks were given to their sense of security or if Signor Mussolini's present popularity were shaken. They have a well-known habit of telling the casual inquirer on political subjects what they imagine that inquirer wishes to hear ; and Signor Mussolini must keep his eye open for sudden shifts in the wind. In order to win ultimately he must win all the time.
He has such an opportunity and such a responsibility as have fallen to few men in history This ex-Socialist has become nothing less than the trustee of his country's fortunes. We should indeed have to fall short of our admiration and friendliness for Italy if we did not entertain a moderate optimism about the outcome. Signor Mussolini has shown not only powers of organiza- tion but the capacity to learn. There have been reports within the past few weeks that he was trying to set up a group of European Powers, including France, Germany and Italy, in opposition to what he calls the Anglo- American bloc. We are not alarmed. To begin with, we feel pretty confident that Signor Mussolini, as indeed later reports suggest, is conscious that the partnership of Great Britain is essential in any European settlement. And even if it were not so, Anglo-American understanding, which is the basis and starting-point of our foreign policy, as we hope it always will be, would be made stronger by any opposition. In the end the opposition would fall away and Great Britain and America would not have lost, but would rather have gained. It is quite true that Signor Mussolini has made some definitely anti-British pronouncements. But he is something of a realist, as such an improviser of rapid movements must be, and he adapts his opinions to the facts without embarrassment. For example, he has very considerably modified his original scheme for developing a Mediter- ranean policy. "The Mediterranean for the Mediter- ranean Peoples" was soon seen to be a rather too exclusive and arrogant policy.
We pin our faith to Signor Mussolini's sense of respon- sibility. He would be much more wanting in imagination than we believe him to be if he did not realize the tre- mendous nature of his trusteeship. No man, however adventurous, wants the odium of failing and of ruining his country in the course of failure. The greater the speculation the greater the crash if the speculation does not "come off."
Yet another good sign is that Signor Mussolini desires an end of the constant changes of Ministry. He has given his consent to a proposal that Ministries in future should last four years. We must not be understood to approve of the manner in which it is proposed to ensure this tenure of power. In this country it would be utterly impossible. It is proposed that the life of a Government should be independent of Parliamentary support; that it should, in fact, derive its authority from above and not from below, and should take its dismissal only from the King. This would be to turn the Italian Parliament into something like the old German Reichstag, which was not much more than a debating society. Nevertheless, there is something very commendable in this aiming at more lasting Administrations than Italy has known for a long time. As Signor Mussolini himself has said, recent Governments were not Governments, but only interludes. The real difficulties of the country were not removed ; they were set aside;, and nobody was in power long enough to take any matter seriously to heart.
The Italian deficit has been estimated at £72,250,000 for 1921-22. The floating debt is £468,500,000 (or nearly half the total debt), and the loss on the railways is about £10,000,009 yearly. When Britain at the worst time of our own industrial collapse faced the possibility of insolvency, we suggested that it might become necessary to put the Government of the country into commission—to hand over the responsibility for pulling round the finances into the hands of a small body of picked financial administrators. Such expedients as we escaped have already become necessary for Italy, and Signor Mussolini is the first in the field to make a great experiment. Every friend and lover of Italy here, which means the whole nation, heartily- wishes him success. His methods are so foreign to our own that we can hardly judge them ; but we can judge by results, and we look for good results with an anxiety and a hopefulness which could be evoked among us by few other countries.
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