THE PLEBISCITE IN VICTORIA.
TN spite of the evil associations which have gathered round .1 the word in France, there is plainly something in the notion of a plebiscite that takes a strong hold of democratic communities. The contents of the Constitutional Reform Bill which has been introduced into the Victorian Assembly bring out this fact with exceptional clearness. When Mr. Berry and Mr. Pearson were in England, they cannot have failed to perceive that everybody whose opinion had any political significance was sincerely anxious that the dead-lock
between the two Houses in Victoria should somehow be got rid of ; and that everybody whose opinion had any political significance was opposed to its being got rid of in the way originally proposed by Mr. Berry. Mr. Berry himself declared that, provided the power at present possessed by a Chamber representing a very small section of the community of placing a veto on the wishes of a Chamber representing all the rest of the community, were abolished, he did not greatly care in what way the result was attained. It seemed likely, therefore, that when he carried back his English experience to the colony, some modification either of the Constitution or of the power of the Council would be devised which would not go against the very strong and general dislike which the English public entertain towards the principle of a plebiscite. Instead of this, the obnoxious proposal reappears in its in-
tegrity. The Reform Bill provides that any measure passed in the Assembly during two consecutive sessions, and twice rejected by the Council, shall be submitted by the Governor in Council to a popular vote, and the decision of the majority of the people shall be final, subject to the Governor's assent. The last provision is, of course, purely formal ; at least it can only be intended to meet cases in which the majority is so small as to raise a doubt whether it is more than accidental. Except in such a case, the Governor would not be likely to put himself in opposition to BO unmistakable a manifestation of public opinion as would be afforded by the votes of the Assembly and of the people taken together. It is evident that the democrats of Victoria must love the notion of a plebiscite for its own sake, because this same Bill provides for a change in the constitution of the Council which will probably render recourse to a plebiscite unnecessary, while the arrangements made for a plebiscite might easily be modified, so as to give equally effectual security for the ultimate success of any measures really desired by the popular House. Mr. Berry's Reform Bill proposes that the Council shall be nominated by the Governor, instead of, as at present, elected by a limited constituency. As the seats in the Council fall vacant, they will thus be filled either by persons chosen by the Governor, on his own motion—in which case they will certainly not be likely to provoke a conflict with the Assembly in which the Council must in the end be defeated ; or by persons chosen by the Governor, on the advice of his Ministers,—in which case they will be in agreement with the party for the time being predominant in the Assembly. Either way, therefore, Mr. Berry's object will be secured as soon as time has worked the necessary changes in the present com- position of the Council. Supposing, however, that this were not thought a sufficient security for the absolute authority of the Assembly in the last resort, it would • have been easy to provide that after a Bill had passed the Assembly in three successive sessions, with a dis- solution intervening between the second and third, it should not be necessary again to submit it to the Council. In what would this scheme be inferior to that proposed by Mr. Berry ? It would answer precisely the same end, for a Bill which would be passed by a plebiscite would equally be passed by an Assembly elected for the specific purpose of over-riding the opposition of the Council on the particular point involved. It would not be a more violent assertion of popular power, for either way the Council would know that after it had twice rejected a Bill, its power of dealing with it was over, unless the electors had by that time come round to its opinion. So far as we can see, there can be no reason for preferring a plebiscite to such an arrangement as this, except the fact that it is a plebiscite. This is a very disturbing reflection for those who believe in Parliamentary Government. It is useless to conceal from our- selves that a plebiscite and Parliamentary Government are, in the long-run, incompatible ideas: Parliament cannot play a secondary part without ceasing to be Parliament.
People sometimes speak as though the essence of Parliamentary Government were the transaction of business by elected bodies. In that case, Parliamentary Government might exist under a pure despotism, provided that local affairs were managed by assemblies freely elected by the citizens. Probably in France under the Empire there was more Parliamentary Government in this sense than there is in Englan i, not to mention the existence of an elective Chamber armed with large powers of legislation, within certain limits. But it is precisely in the absence of limits that the essence of Parliamentary Govern- ment consists. There must be no power above Parliament, or rather, no power actually exercised by living persons. Parlia- mentary Government may co-exist with a written Constitution, which can only be altered by some special machinery ; and a plebiscite invoked for this purpose only, though it would be objectionable on other grounds, would not be inconsistent with Parliamentary Government. But Mr. Berry's Reform Bill makes a plebiscite part of the ordinary machinery of legislation. When- ever the two Houses differ on any matter of sufficient import- ance to make the Assembly interested in carrying its point, a plebiscite will be resorted to. Consequently, it is with a plebiscite that all the greater measures will be associated in the minds of the electors. They will perpetually be looking forward to a time when, instead of having to choose represen- tatives to manage their affairs for them, they will be called upon to manage their affairs for themselves, in some particu- lar too important to be left to those who ordinarily manage them. It is impossible that this attitude of mind should not in time bring about a very much lower estimate of Parlia- mentary Government than exists in England. In pro- portion as the minds of a people are turned away from Parliament, the authority and reputation of Par- liament suffer. They suffer in Germany, because in prac- tice, whatever he may be in theory, Prince Bismarck is above Parliament. They suffer in the United States, because the interest of electing a single President is greater than the interest of electing the Members of Congress. They suffered in France under the Second Empire, because Napoleon III. knew the value of a plebiscite, and the Chambers could never flourish under that overpowering shadow. What has hap- pened in Germany, in France, in the United States, will happen in its degree in Victoria, if this Reform Bill becomes law. A greater instrument than Parliament will always be lurking in the background, and by the side of that greater instrument, government by Parliament will seem a poor and secondary affair.
We are not in the secrets of the Victorian Democrats, and we cannot profess to know why they should have set them- selves with so much determination to bring about such a result. It may be that they are dissatisfied with the recent develop- ments of Parliamentary Government at home. It may seem strange that the community which invented the "stone wall" and the "iron hand" should be disgusted with the milder forms of obstruction that have been resorted to at Westmin- ster, but children do not always admire their own vices when they are reproduced in their parents, and a`.son may feel that his father ought to be ashamed of himself for doing what has caused the son no shame whatever. It may be that there are vague revolutionary ideas afloat in Victoria which appear more capable of realisation if every man in the colony can be asked to say "yes" or " no" to them, than if they have, at last as well as at first, to be submitted to a deliberative assembly. Whatever be the explanation, we have no doubt as to the result. If the Victorian Constitution is remodelled on the basis of Mr. Berry's Reform Bill, it will be a heavy blow to Parliamentary Government in the colony. The form will remain, but the spirit will have fled. Considering how large a population will be concerned in the future history of Victoria, and how imitative other colonies have sometimes shown themselves, this is a calamity to be most deeply regretted.
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