Rhodesia: The Road to Ruin By SIR EDGAR WHITEHEAD

Tr is now just over five months since the Rho- idesian government made its unilateral declaration of independence It is just over three months since Mr Wilson told the Commonwealth representatives at Lagos that sanctions were likely to prove effective in weeks rather than in months. Surely it is time to take a completely new look at the problem.

Sanctions have failed in their purpose. The expressed object in imposing them was to bring a speedy end to the rebellion and to make moderate opinion in Rhodesia anxious to get rid of the Smith regime before worse disaster befell the country. It is now quite certain that sanctions are not going to bring a speedy end to the rebellion and that they have had the effect of rallying many former moderates to help the regime by devising means of defeating sanctions.

It is possible that if sanctions on the present scale are continued and internationally sup- ported over a prolonged period they will ulti- mately cause the collapse of the Rhodesian economy and so of the regime, but that was not the original purpose for which they were introduced. In fact, it was stated at the time that there was no intention of destroying the economy.

Sanctions are a clumsy bludgeon of a weapon. The principal sufferers are likely to be, first, in- vestors from Britain and other overseas coun- tries who have over the years helped to develop the country. How much actual Rhodesian capital is thought to be invested in such large-scate investments as the oil refinery and pipeline, the British Motor Corporation and Ford assembly plants, the Imperial Tobacco Company, British- American Tobacco and Gatlaghers processing and packing plants for tobacco exports, Dunlop's tyre factory, David Whitehead's spinning and weaving mills and a host of others? Second, all Rhodesian citizens, whether white or black, whether extremist or moderate, whether they support the regime or detest it. The black aft likely to suffer more than the white because the white are relatively so few that they can be helped by job-sharing and other devices, while the black are so numerous that it is probably beyond the resources of the regime to do much to assist them other than by returning as many non-Rhodesians as possible to Mozambique. Malawi and Zambia. thereby adding to the diffi- culties of those countries.

Last November, in London, many people were talking as though sanctions would quickly bring Rhodesia to ruin. Today the wheel has swung full circle and many people are talking as though sanctions are doing no damage to Rhodesia at all. Both views are absurd. Of course damage is being done, but I doubt whether more thin a third of the financial loss is falling on Mr Smith's supporters. Sanctions in economic war- fare are rather like indiscriminate bombing in physical warfare: the attacker does not know who is going to suffer the final effects.

Sanctions will benefit Rhodesia's principal foreign competitors in a number of markets and poy.ibly some cosmopolitan financiers who are prepared to gamble on their ability to buy cheap in the Rhodesian market and sell somewhere at a good profit. Is this the way to decide the future of Central Africa?

Sir Edgar Whitehead was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia between 1958 and 1962. There are a number of obvious and continuing dangers in the present situation. Extremist pres- sure on either side of the Zambezi or some regrettable incident could easily break the strained economic relations between Rhodesia and Zambia. The result would be a complete

or nearly complete shutdown of the Zambian copper mines. It may be possible to import oil by airlift and road over great distances. at enor-

mous cost, but not a million and a quarter tons of coal and coke a year. Some may be got from opencast workings in Zambia, though of poor quality; a little may be imported by rail through Lobito Bay, but nothing like enough to keep the mines in full production. Many of the Euro-

pean miners and railwaymen in Zambia are from South Africa and Rhodesia, and if most of the mines were to close, a heavy exodus of Euro- peans would be inevitable.

At the present time such a cessation of copper production in Zambia would have world-wide effects. An intensive drive to convert to the use of aluminium would be an immediate result and might in the long term damage the copper industry for ever. The future even of Chile might be at stake in decisions taken on the Zambezi.

Dr Salazar has forcibly expressed fears of a conflagration unless there is a speedy settlement of the Rhodesian problem. He stressed that a settlement acceptaule by London is still possible.

South Africa and Portugal will inevitably do everything in their power to see that sanctions against Rhodesia do not succeed in toppling the regime. Both of them have froth time to time been 'themselves threatened with sanctions on account of their determination to maintain white government in South Africa. If sanctions fail against the small and relatively weak economy of Rhodesia, it is unlikely that they would thereafter be tried against them.

More important. however, if Rhodesia resisted to the bitter end, and ultimately her economy collapsed, it is probable that the white population would have to move, and within a limited period an African government would take over. If this happened, the frontier between white and black would be moved from the Zambezi to the 1.impopo. The Portuguese- position in Mozam- bique would become untenable. South Africa would lose her buffer state. South-West Africa would be outflanked, especially if the new Rho- desian state co-operated closely with Bechuana- land.

Neither South Africa nor Portugal can pos- sibly want a head-on clash with Britain. but neither can afford to see the Rhodesian regime collapse. It is clearly in both their interests to see a compromise solution found as soon as possible.

There is a constant danger that the initiative over Rhodesia will pass from Britain to the United Nations if the present deadlock continues for any length of time. It is unlikely that any non-African power would be prepared or allowed to use force; and the African states have not got the necessary force to use, but the intervention of the United Nations would probably end the last possibility of a negotiated settlement and would probably _invoke mandatory sanctions. - This would plainly involve a confrontation with South Africa and Portugal.

There is a danger, too, that as the pressure mounts, the regime in Rhodesia may take some action which will forfeit any sympathy it still enjoys in Europe and North America.

All the present signs are that there will be a prolonged and bitter struggle on the Rhodesian issue. There is a real threat that it will cause a deep and bitter split in Britain itself, as hap- pened at the time of the Spanish civil war. The bipartisan policy in Westminster is ended. If British governments had five years ago been prepared to devote half the thought, cash and foreign exchange to making a real success of the 1961: Constitution which they are now spend- ing on an attempt to destroy the economy of Rhodesia, and with it that of its immediate neigh- bours, the present situation would never have arisen and a moderate government would still be in power in Salisbury.

A quick solution will not be brought about by stating five or six principles and hoping the Rhodesian regime will accept them. It is only possible if Britain is prepared to make sacrifices

for a constructive, as opposed to a destructive, policy. Both races must be assured that their vital and legitimate interests are guaranteed and protected by Britain. If the peace and progress of Central Africa is to be assured, the solution must be one that can be accepted by Zambia

and Mozambique, by Malawi and South Africa. It must be a solution which will enable Rho- desia to be governed without recourse to emer- gency powers and with the consent of the governed.

I still believe an Act of Union between Britain and Rhodesia is the only way to creative peace in Southern Africa.