22 MARCH 1963, Page 4

Multinato

IHE purpose of this week's meeting of the NATO Council as seen from London was to draw up proposals for the establishment of a multinational nuclear force, so that a definite plan will be ready for presentation to the Council of Ministers when it meets in May in Ottawa. Whether this was also the purpose of the meeting as seen from the Quai d'Orsay or the Elysde remains to be seen. On the face of it, the multi- national force, even though France has not turned it down in so many words, is hardly com- patible with President de Gaulle's conception of the role to be played by the force de frappe. And the multilateral force with mixed crews pro- posed for the future is likely to be even less wel- come. Whatever may be said about maintaining the unity of the Atlantic alliance in the sphere of defence, the importance of both the multi- national and the multilateral force is primarily political. Both of them are attempts to give some satisfaction to European demands for a greater say in the use of NATO's nuclear power, and to that extent their purpose is also to offer an alternative to President de Gaulle's conception of the alliance. If they come into existence, then they will provide a centre of attraction through which other members of the alliance (and, in particular, Germany) can be drawn out of the Gaullist orbit. In these circumstances the British intention of pushing ahead with plans for the multinational force is bound to be unwelcome in Paris. But French diplomacy may well find itself in a dilemma. If it dissents from a NATO majority decision to go ahead, then France will be isolated. If it does not dissent, then it will have allowed a measure aimed at cutting France down to size to go through by default. It is little. wonder that there was no escort for Lord Home from Le Bourget. The political implications of a NATO nuclear force are sure and certain. What is far less clear is its credibility as a military pro- position, but this will have to be faced when the time conies. It is typical of the present cloud- cuckoo-land of NATO diplomacy that the multi- national and/or multilateral plan is far more effective as an idea than it seems likely to be as a reality.