KERCH AND KHARKOV
By STRATEGICUS
THEN we attempt to discover the meaning of the two opera- :ions on the Russian front it is well to remember that lever their strength and purpose they cannot fail to affect the Ival campaign which must soon begin there. This is evident 3 consideration of the position of the two places mainly Ived. Russia cannot, for instance, be driven out of the Kerch insula without the questions of the invasion of the Caucasus Black Sea control taking on a new colour. Similarly, Germany t lose the area about Kharkov without an essential change the possibilities of an advance through the Ukraine or an attack th of Moscow. Each of these places is cardinal to the situation 'sting before the attacks opened.
The position about Kerch was built up after the brilliant attack the end of December. It was established by two landings, one Kerch and the other two days later at Feodosia. This place, h was subsequently lost, lies at the western edge of the small that creates the Kerch waist, and, just as the Kerch attack - designed to act as a diversion from Sevastopol, the Feodosia ding was planned to give the Kerch attack time to establish if. As a result, very strong positions were built up across the st of the peninsula, which is only about twelve miles wide. The man attack upon Sevastopol at once lost much of its weight, was never resumed in the same strength ; but the mere fact two such strong assaults had been delivered upon the ss suggests the importance which the Germans attach to its -session.
The recent attack on Kerch was delivered on a front of less two miles, but it was made with two great advantages. It possible to land troops behind the front line, and as the t of attack was so small it was easy to concentrate against it overwhelming number of guns and dive-bombers. There was ther advantage for the enemy. The bridgehead held by the ,ssians was only about 38 miles deep, and in that space they not the facility of manoeuvre possessed by General Mannstein, controls the whole of the Crimea outside Sevastopol. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that the enemy contrived to penetrate defence as that almost a fortnight later he had not driven Russians out of the peninsula. General Kozlov, the Russian mander, must from the beginning have laboured under the ulty of the sea-crossing at his back. Reinforcement could not ' to be difficult, and it might in case of a setback make the Ition worse by blocking the meagre communications and pre- ting movement. It is astonishing under the circumstances that troops, as I write, are still fighting in the peninsula. It has it been reported that he has attempted to relieve the pressure Kerch by fresh landings just as last December he landed at 110Sid.
The main reason for the Germans' attack is probably that they Ito initiate a new threat to the rear of the Tagenrog line, and the whole Caucasian position. If they can instal themselves the peninsula they will be able to threaten from the air almost the possible alternatives to Sevastopol up to Batum, and to that ft they will have achieved freedom of movement across the ck Sea. Indeed, it is the simple fact that with every mile can advance across the Strait they will still further threaten remaining sea-bases of the Black Sea fleet, and at the same e make their advance more powerful. At the moment they can only a small stretch of the Black Sea for sea-transport, but if Y can turn the Russians out of Sevastopol they will be able make a leap forward to that magnificent base. The clearing the Kerch peninsula, has, therefore, two advantages: it gives Germans a new platform for their attack on the Caucasus area, it destroys a position which might have offered a launching- d for an attack on their flank when they next attempt to capture astopoi. Kharkov is, however, a much more important position. It is un- ! that from the peninsula of Kerch major operations could be hen; but from Kharkov a decisive movement may develop.
The territorial importance of Moscow is that it is the nerve-ganglion of Russia. In it the communications of the country centre ; and the position of Kharkov cannot better be described than by calling it the Moscow of the Ukraine. Its railway communications with the south grip the whole coast from Kherson to Tagenrog. East, west and north of it main or subsidiary roads and railways cover the country up to Kiev and Kursk; and it is difficult to conceive of its fall without repercussions over the whole area. The Russians had already control of the northern part of the line to Tagenrog and, as far -as Lozovaya, of the main line to the Crimea. Now their offensive is threatening the third of the main lines to the south at Krasnograd.
It has been very difficult to gather the strength and scope of the offensive ; but now it seems to be clear that something of both can be inferred from the information that the attack is taking place over the front between Volchansk and Krasnograd. The arc of the advance runs through Chugyev and its length is a hundred miles. There have been reports that it extends another 40 miles or so as far as Belgorod. An offensive of that extent cannot be described as a minor affair, and it may be assumed that very considerable forces have been engaged. It is known also that the Russians have advanced in some places as far as 40 miles. Correspondents report that Kharkov is in flames ; but, whether that is true or not, it is certain that the Russians cannot be far away. At Chugyev they were only 23 miles to the east ; and, crossing the Donetz at that point, it is known that they have advanced several miles.
We cannot complain, and it is not unusual, that the Russian command should give us so little news of the details of the opera- tions. At the time no one knew how near the Germans were to Moscow last year. The fact that they could see the city with their field-glasses was not disclosed at the time ; and perhaps it is just as well. But this reticence has its disadvantages. Krasnograd lies on the Poltava-Kiev railway, and it would be of intense interest to know how far the advance has penetrated along that important railway line. If we look no farther than Poltava the position would be radically changed. Even the capture of Krasnograd would make a significant difference. At the moment it is impossible to mcntion a single place which Russia has reoccupied, though we know that there are many. What we certainly know is the damage she is doing to the German concentrations. She has destroyed a large number of tanks, and the completeness of the surprise gained is suggested by the number of guns captured.
The roads over which she is advancing are strewn with the wreckage of transport, tanks, guns and all sorts of supplies ; and this raises the question of how so complete a surprise was contrived. Marshal Timoshenko must have had the offensive prepared for some time before he struck, and then he presumably waited for the first dry spell to give him a reasonable chance of getting in the first blow. He evidently forestalled the Germans completely ; and it is a notable fact that before he launched his offensive there was no sign of any concentration on the other side of the line that would suggest preparation for resuming the advance. He has, therefore, a short period before the Germans can bring up adequate reserves to cope with the initial break-through. Up to the present moment, they have not succeeded in stopping the advance, though they have checked its pace. This was in any case to be expected. As soon as a battle is joined it begins to lose its design as well as its impetus ; and the Germans have shown themselves remarkably stubborn in defence. The counter-attack against the sector of the front readjusted at the end of January was so clearly indicated that Timoshenko must have anticipated it.
If one may trust the reports, it seems clear that he concentrated upon the Kharkov front a great air-superiority and made great play with his dive-bombers. He is also said to be using numbers of the heaviest types of tanks and much artillery ; it is upon the latter rather than the former that one must rely for the reduction of the elaborate defensive works with which the Germans have studded their posi- tions. He is quite rightly avoiding frontal attacks upon such posi- tions. Heavy shell is the best answer to concrete, and the Russians
showed on the Karelian isthmus that they have a technique for deal- ing with pill,boxes.
It is tempting, and indeed it is inevitable, that one should specu- late about the development of the offensive. But here all the sign- posts have been removed. The advance has gone well so far. The strength of nearly four divisions has apparently been destroyed already, and a very great amount of material and supplies has either been destroyed or captured. The Russians have launched the spring campaign, and it is their and our hope that they may throw the German plans completely out of gear.
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