BOOKS.

MR. SIDGWICK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY.*

MR. SIDGWICICS name has become a full guarantee that the subject on which he undertakes to write will be one on which he has brought to bear all the powers of a singularly mature and reflective intellect. That he not only knows a great deal about every subject on which he writes, but that he also knows a great deal more than he writes, is the prevailing impression he leaves on the mind of any observant reader. And it is even possible to suspect that, of the two portions of his knowledge, that which he knows and writes, and that which he knows but does not write, the latter is not always the least valuable.' For we cannot but think that Mr. Sidgwick's dread of dogmatism has almost become a fanaticism ; and hence whatever he writes is so crowded with " qualifications " and "limitations," that his conclusions have much difficulty in making themselves heard amid the clamour of their subordinate exceptions. Essentially critical in his habit of mind, Mr. Sidgwick has been so accus- tomed to see difficulties almost everywhere, that he seems ill at ease, and even appears to us to be least successful, in any place where he does not find them. To dogmatism he objects— dogmatically. But in nearly everything else he hesitates in a way and to an extent that does but scant justice to his extensive resources of knowledge and vigorous as well as patient insight.

The exact position and aim of a work like this must, how- ever, always be kept in mind, to correct any feeling at all akin to disappointment that we may be tempted to indulge in. His primary aim has been, according to his own account, to "eliminate unnecessary controversy." Hence, while the work makes no claim to originality, it is, on the other hand, "not precisely an elementary treatise." In the truth of the latter portion of this description we rest content. No one who fairly faces the task of mastering this book will call it elemen- tary. Not only is the subject handled with an exhaustive thoroughness that must tax any reader—of which no sensible reader would complain—but the difficulties of Mr. Sidgwick's style are sometimes enormous ; and these two causes combine to render this work almost as tough as the introduction to Hume's works by the late Professor Green, perhaps the most difficult piece of reading this century has produced. But in elim- inating unnecessary controversy, we cannot think Mr. Sidgwick has had all the success he so well deserves. We will here- after examine in detail some of the attempts made "to clear our conceptions,"—the phrase that with Mr. Sidgwick fre- quently introduces one of those investigations which, by their length, intricacy, and minuteness, tax to the utmost whatever clearness of conception his reader may have had to start with.

But we venture to doubt whether our author's habit of mind is favourable to success in this task. Had Mr. Sidgwick found the fabled travellers disputing as to the green or blue colour of the chameleon, we do not think it would have occurred to him to seek for the animal, and decide who was right. He would have pointed out that between green and blue there is, after all, only the difference of a tint—not very much to quarrel about—and that, moreover, between a greenish-blue and a bluish-green the line is very difficult to draw. Now, this kind of treatment may be a good dialectical exercise, but we

cannot think that it is calculated to produce in any science

an advance at all in proportion to the ingenuity and industry displayed. The field may thus be cleared of lumber and the atmosphere of heat, for the benefit of other workers; but Mr.

Sidgwick is so able and excellent a worker, that we feel a sort of grudge that he should be to some extent wasted on preparatory work. And though, in the presence of work of such high class we feel that our word " wasted " is really far too strong. we are perforce obliged to use it for the conveyance of the impression which parts of this book have left upon us.

But in some ways we can be even grateful that this mode of treatment should have been adopted, for the pains taken to

• The Principles of Political Economy. By Henry Bidgwick, London: Macmillan and Co. 1853.

clear the field have given us some very choice digressions from the line of strict economics. Thus, at the commencement of the chapter on the Definition of Value, we have some fruit- ful and important remarks on the true worth of the in- vestigation of definitions generally. Mr. Sidgwick points out there that the reward of search for accurate definitions is not the definitions themselves when found, but the knowledge of the thing implied in the finding of its definition. "While we are apparently aiming at definitions of terms, our attention should be really fixed on distinctions and relations of fact." In a word, it is not the finding but the seeking that is of value.

And the real function of definition should be not to find a meaning for a word, but to apply a word consistently to a definitely realized set of attributes. This, of course, is no new theory, but it is both admirably stated and judiciously placed.

Judged, however, by its actual results, we are not able to con- gratulate ourselves on the very great success of this book in re- moving many difficulties of our own; and in some few instances we even find ourselves called upon to accept, by way of "clearer conceptions," conclusions which we regard as less true than those arrived at in the writings of other economists. Thus, when we are invited to consider the two meanings of the word value, as in the phrases "value in use" and "value in exchange," we conceive ourselves to be distinctly pointed in a wrong direction. The passion for reconcilement of differences which seems to be the moving motive of Most of Mr. Sidgwick's work, induces him to try to find a single meaning for the word value which shall suit both these phrases. Mr. Sidgwick analyses thus :—

" What do we mean when we speak of a man setting value on, or attaching value to, things to which the idea of exchange is inapplicable, —whether this inapplicability be due to circumstances isolating the man, as, for instance, if we think of Robinson Crusoe on his island ; or to the fact that no one else would buy the things, as in the case of old letters and other memorials, knowledge of various kinds, &c. ? We do not, I think, mean exactly that the things are useful to him ; though no doubt they are in a certain sense useful,—that is, they satisfy or prevent some desire which is, or would be, felt in the absence of them. But we mean that the man would, if necessary, give some- thing to gain or keep them."

The italics are not ours, and they seem to us to emphasize an error,—another form of precisely the same error as that of Mill, who, in treating of value, has allowed himself to put the measure for the thing measured. If a foreigner asked an Englishman what was the meaning of the word "yard," the reply,—" My walking-stick is a yard," would obviously be true only in a very peculiar and limited sense ; but it would be exactly as true as to say, with Mill, that the value of a thing means "the quantity of some other thing, or of things in general, which it exchanges for." And we cannot think that Mr. Sidgwick in any way strengthens Mill's definition by merely introducing the notion of a something which would be given, "if necessary," rather than part with the valued commodity ; even though the nature of the something is left "quite indefinite." This Robinson-Crusoe aspect of value has been treated, we think, far more satisfactorily by an

economist in whose disparagement Mr. Sidgwick makes his nearest approach to dogmatism. Professor Bonamy Price, in his Practical Political Economy, says,—" Of the first

kind [unsaleable but valuable articles] was Robinson Crusoe's gun, which beyond all doubt he valued greatly." We do not thins Mr. Sidgwick's investigation would have suffered in either gracefulness or accuracy, if he had acknowledged and more closely followed his predecessor's work in this particular instance, and had adopted, with a " qualification " be would have so well known how to introduce, the view of value held by Professor Price. He would then have told us that as a rule value is essentially subjective in the me, not commercial in the market, whether that market be actual or only potential. Pro- fessor Price holds that value "expresses a feeling, a sense of attach- ment, of affection for a thing, a caring for it, a desire to possess it, an intention more or less strong to retain it in possession." And we do not think that Mr. Sidgwick's position can stand for a moment against the effects of the investigation needed to complete the above explanation of Professor Price. For we may remark, that though to value a thing is very generally to desire its possession, it is not so always. We may value things which we no longer desire to possess. Two friends may each make us a present of the same book, at different times. One of the two copies is now a superfluity on our shelves, we no longer desire its possession ; but yet, being a present, we value it far too much to sell it ; we value it so much, that we shall probably give it away. This is no mere paradox; the exception is small, but real and important. The feeling of Value is not only independent of Exchange, it may be even hostile to the idea of exchange. Thus we obtain that the value of a thing is that feeling of esteem which we entertain for it, which very usually,. but not always, prompts us to desire to obtain or retain its possession ; and which, when so prompting us, is capable of measurement, within certain limits, by the quantitative incidents of exchange. We therefore hold that in reducing the idea of value to a central notion of giving something, Mr. Sidgwick has contributed rather to obscure than to enlighten this much debated point.

But though we are thus unable to follow Mr. Sidgwick's account of what Value is, we are glad to acknowledge the great ability and service of his investigation of its measurement. That real measure of value for different places and different times, which Mill declares impossible, and which Jevons thought could never be extricated from the maze of alternative considera- tions involved in the very nature of the problem, Mr. Sidgwick claims to have reduced to terms of" habitual consumption." To find out whether (e.g) gold is cheaper or dearer now than twenty years ago, each man would have to answer the question for himself by reference to the amount a given quantity of gold would purchase, then and now, of the articles which he habitually consumes. This would answer the question for the individual ; to answer it as a whole, the separate results would have to be cal- culated for all the individuals of the community, since the articles of habitual consumption would be different in different classes of that community. Thus, though Mill's statement of the im- possibility of an absolute measure of value is shown to be theoretically too positively enunciated, yet for all practical pur- poses it remains as clearly true as ever; the more so, since habits of consumption are themselves liable to alter.

We are gratified to find that Mr. Sidgwick, when he comes to. consider the nature of Wealth, is inclined to include under it services as well as material utilities. The hard and fast line that economists have too long drawn between these kinds of wealth has always in our idea been fruitful of needless and unphilosophical distinctions, and of perplexity where all should be plain. Mr. Sidgwick justly says," There would seea. to be a certain absurdity in saying that people are poorer be- cause they cure their diseases by medical advice instead of drugs, improve their minds by hearing lectures instead of reading books, guard their property by policemen instead of man-traps and spring-guns, or amuse themselves by hearing songs instead of looking at pictures." With the accept- ance of this view the distinction between productive and unproductive labour must, of course, fall, and another absurdity is done away with. Against this distinc- tion we have long declared war. It makes a productive labourer of a man who bores and fashions a piece of wood and, drills holes in it, and leaves unproductive the artist, without whom the flute so fashioned either remains a drilled stick, silent. and tuneless, or, noisy but tuneless, becomes an instrument of torture. We find, therefore, with some disappointment, that Mr. Sidgwick after all considers himself bound to include material' wealth alone under the term "Wealth," and in thus using language at variance with his own inclinations is almost driven. into some small incongruities. For instance, we are told, on page 96,—" The 'produce,' therefore, of which we are to examine the variations must be conceived as something of which material wealth is the chief but not the sole constituent." Now, surely " produce " and " production " should be strictly correlative- terms ; yet we find on the next page,—" The production of a community, then, in our present view of it, may be defined as the adaptation, by the aggregate of its labour, of external matter,. organic or inorganic, to the satisfaction of the aggregate of its wants." We do not see quite how these two sentences can be fully reconciled, even when the term " production " has been expressly extended so as to include the distributors as well as the actual makers of the commodities. For the one expressly' includes what the other by implication excludes ; and thus, since. produce may be other than material, whilst production is con- fined to external matter, we are landed in the anomaly that there can be produce of which there has been no production.. This is one case where words have been introduced into a defini- tion with a view to its amplification, but really with the effect of unduly limiting it. Another similar case appears to us to be- found in the definition of labour itself, which Mr. Sidgwick gives us thus :—" I include under the term labour all kinds of voluntary exertion, intellectual as well as muscular, which contributes directly or indirectly to the increase of produce, as above defined." Surely there are here several words too many. Why is labour to include only voluntary exertion P The word

"voluntary " is in itself mysterious, and may, we admit, mean almost anything. But we should be surprised to find Mr. Sidgwick allowing to it a meaning that would render it applicable to the lash-exacted toil of a slave ; and yet surely a slave "labours." And again, the voluntary exertion is to

increase produce. But produce need not be material, whilst production must ; so we have then some labour which is not production, but which increases produce. We submit that a shorter definition of labour not open to these objections could be found, thus,—" Labour is human exertion for a human end ;"

and even here we confess to a doubt whether something might not be gained by the omission of the word "human."

Even at the risk of appearing to confine ourselves too exclusively to the early portion of the work, we must notice another of Mr. Sidgwick's gallant attempts to obtain greater clearness in the elementary conceptions of economics,—namely, his investigation of Capital. There are passages in this chapter of such immense grammatical difficulty, that we have some diffidence in approaching the examination of its conclusions.

But so far as we understand Mr. Sidgwick—and we have done our very best to understand aright—we find, with reference to capital, positions taken which we cannot share. The final account of what capital is, Mr. Sidgwick gives in these words :—

" It would seem, then, that the term 'capital,' as scientifically used, is not so much adapted to distinguish one portion of accumulated wealth from the rest, as rather to express an aspect which all such wealth presents—so far as it is produced end used with due regard to economy—up to the very moment of consumption ; as being, namely, the intermediate results of labour employed for future utilities, which in some way or other are greater in proportion to the labour required for enjoying them, through the prolongation of the interval between the labour and the enjoyment." (p. 139.) Now, we have it here laid down that " capital " is the name applied to one aspect of all accumulated wealth. This accumu-

lation is explained on a previous page, thus :—" What is really accumulated is mainly the results of labour in the form of what we may call generally instruments to make labour more efficient.

including under the notion of instruments all buildings used in production, and all improvements of land." Thus what has been commonly known as circulating capital is abolished alto- gether; and the articles consumed by labourers are expressly excluded from the category of capital, when it is laid down that not all the results of labour that are used to produce profit are to be called capital, but only such as would not exist in their present form, or not be used in their present manner except as a means to some further result. This is a treatment which has some obvious advantages ; but it is difficult to consistently maintain. We are not, therefore, surprised that Mr. Sidgwick, speaking of the food, clothing, &c., consumed by labourers,

says :—" There must always be a certain stock of such com- modities, finished, but undistributed, which forms a part of the capital of manufacturers and traders; still, it is not this part of

their capital that admits of being, in any important sense of the word, accumulated." Here, then, is wealth, incapable of accu- mulation in any important sense, which is to be called capital, a name which is, nevertheless, explained as applicable only to actually accumulated wealth. And when, in addition to this

difficulty, we have to find for ourselves a clear meaning-for the sentence about future utilities being in some way or other

greater in proportion to the labour required for enjoying them, we confess ourselves not much aided to a clearer vision of what capital actually is.

But we must here leave the consideration of the attempts made to add precision and clearness to the elementary concep- tions of the materials, so to speak, of the science. Those efforts are always admirable, in their fearless thoroughness and their keen acumen ; and though we have pointed out where they seem to us to have failed, we have done so with a very full appreciation of the difficulties that have been faced, and of the equal capacity and honesty of intellect which Mr. Sidgwick has brought to bear on them. So earnest a seeker after truth will, we are sure, desire nothing better than a rigid examination of his positions ; and if we have pointed out positions that seem weak to us, it is in the full belief that Mr. Sidgwick, should we have convinced him of the necessity, will be able to strengthen them.

Of the later investigations we must speak far too briefly for our own wishes. The subject of Rent is handled, as might be expected of a Cambridge economist, from Ricardo's point of view entirely ,—for the emendations introduced into the historical

portion of Ricardo's doctrine leave untouched its main position. The two forms under which the Ricardo theory is commonly stated, the hierarchy of fertilities and the successive doses of capital, are skilfully blended into one, and the theory itself is about as well stated as it is possible to state it. But we must confess that we should have gladly seen some reply to the criticisms of those who more or less impugn this theory. It has become quite a fashion with a large school of economists to go about saying that the Ricardo theory is "simply a fact," and refusing to it any real discussion at all. This de- parture from the truly scientific attitude receives sanction from Mr. Sidgwick, when he says of the statical theory of the actual determination of rent that it is "as incontrovertible as any part of pure economic theory can be." To say this with- out deigning any answer to the criticisms made on it by Thorold Rogers, and Bonamy Price—criticisms that come from different quarters, but are both formidable—is to make an error in a direction in which Mr. Sidgwick rarely errs. The main diffi- culty of the theory Mr. Sidgwick takes in his stride when he determines the normal rent of a farm as, "the surplus which the price of its produce would be expected to afford to a farmer of ordinary ability and industry, after subtracting the farmer's wages of management, together with interest at the ordinary rate on the capital employed by him upon the land." Now, what is this ordinary rate, and how does it come to be ordinary P And what regulates the farmer's wages of management P These questions are not difficult to answer; but we submit the Ricardo theory needs enlarging in order to answer them.

We have freely expressed our dissent from our author, and it remains to express also our great admiration. Many of the in- vestigations in this volume are excellent; some most brilliant. Many other points that we admire we should like to mention, and on many others to break a lance. But we must take leave of this book now, with the expression of a hope that in many future editions it may grow to be even a yet worthier exposition of the economic views of this profound and vigorous thinker.