THE REVOLUTION IN BULGARIA.
THE very worst thing that could happen to Eastern Europe would be a cordial agreement between the Roman offs and the Hapsburgs. There could be but one basis for such an agreement, and that would be a partition of the Balkan penin- sula, as injurious to the world as the partition of Poland. In the present state of Russian and German opinion, the Roma: noffs have not the power of surrendering their reversionary title to Constantinople, or the Hapsburgs of giving up their claim to spread southwards to Salonica, the Russians holding that Constantinople is theirs on religious grounds, and the Germans that the trading wealth for which they sigh must come with entrance into Asiatic waters. Salonica in German hands would be, they think, the emporium of Asiatic Turkey. The only basis of agreement, therefore, would be a division tinder which Bosnia, Servia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Greece would fall to Austria, and Roumania, Bulgaria, East Roumelia, and Constantinople, to Russia. Such an agreement, it is known, has been discussed ; it has the approval of many Austrian and Russian statesmen, and it was, we believe, almost publicly endorsed by the Austrian Heir-Apparent. It would be a fatal blow to Eastern Europe. The South Slays would lose all chance of liberty, and of their natural development ; while Greece would become a German enclave, with her aspirations ended, and her people forced at every turn to consider the wishes of a Power which they regard as leaden. Their natural genius would be as completely stifled as that of Italy under Austrian domination. By sea and land equally, they would be at the mercy of Vienna. None of the new provinces, Russian or Austrian, could be leniently governed, for none would be con- tented, and all would be subjected to a terrible conscription ; while the chronic suspicion which divides Austria and Russia, and makes the whole East a field of intrigue, would only be accentuated. The frontiers of the two Empires would march for eleven hundred miles with no natural barrier between them, and life on the border would become life in a camp.
We are not sorry, therefore, to believe that the chance of agreement is at present very small, and watch the duel of intrigue now going on in the former territories of Turkey with no wish, except that it may continue until both Powers have so wearied out the population that the only arrangement con- sistent with freedom, a Federation of the Balkan, shall be the aspiration of Slav and Greek alike ; and the peoples of the peninsula, suffering from similar dangers and similar oppressions, shall begin to feel as if they were a nation with common interests to defend. Just now, the duel always going on has become momentarily visible, and the Russian Government is supposed to have scored a hit. For some time past, the advantages have all been upon the Austrian side. To begin with, the Hapsburgs obtained a European sanction to their occupation of Bosnia and Herze- govina, that is, to the richest potentially of all the territories in dispute. Then they acquired some hold over Montenegro, which has never been explained, but which undoubtedly led the Prince to restrain his subjects in the dispute about the right to raise conscripts in the Crivoschie. Again, they con- ciliated King Milano of Servia till they could rely on the neutrality, if not the obedience of that State ; and finally, they induced the Roumanian Government to sue for admission into the German-Austrian alliance, and Prince Alexander of Bulgaria to plan the removal of his Russian advisers, preparatory to the same step. Those were important advantages, but they were less solid than they seemed. The Hapsburgs are less hated in Roumania than the Romanoffs, who are considered there, since the Treaty of Berlin, both arro- gant and ungrateful, but everywhere else in Old Turkey they are either dreaded or detested. They could not take a pl6biscite anywhere. The Greeks fear them beyond reason, and the South Slays regard them as the instruments of two hostile castes. In Bosnia, in Servia, in both Bulgarias, in Macedonia, and in Greece successful Austrian advance is regarded with a horror far exceeding the nevertheless strong distaste for the advance of Russia. The Russian Foreign Office, which is not nearly so much afraid of popular movements as is sometimes fancied in the West, has taken advantage of this state of opinion, and is everywhere exhibiting itself in the character of protector of the rights of the mass of the community. In Servia, Russia favours the advocates of a new and far more democratic constitution ; and in Bulgaria, she demands the restoration of the suspended liberties of the people. Prince Alexander, when, two years ago, he assumed all powers, promised to use his powers to accelerate improvement in Bulgaria ; and had he kept his word would, we still believe, have been far more popular than the Liberals. He had, however, overrated his own capacity, and the discontent is so great that but for Russian support the Bulgarians would dismiss him, and either elect a totally new Prince, or call Prince Vogorides, the administrator of Eastern Roumelia, to the throne. The Russian Government, therefore, convinced that its influence was waning, and suspecting the Prince of readiness to cast in his lot with the German alliance, offered Prince Alexander the alternative of restoring the Con- stitution or facing his people alone,—that is, of a successful revolution. As he is unwilling to depart, and, it is said, strongly recommended both from Berlin and Vienna not to abdicate, he has yielded, and on the 19th inst. issued a proclamation recalling the Assembly, and appointing the Liberal Chief, M. Zankoff, once more Premier. The Liberals, who have recovered power, and who are very bitter against Prince Alexander for his coup d'aat, are, of course, grateful to St. Petersburg ; and, for the time, Austrian influence is defeated, and Russian is in the ascendant. Russia has no more " annexed " Bulgaria than she has annexed Montenegro, but she has broken the authority of the " Germanising " Prince, and has prevented a Balkan State from entering the German-Austrian alliance.
This victory is considered a grand counter-stroke, and in one way BO it is ; but, like the Austrian victories, it is pur- chased at a price, an extension of popular suspicion and dis- trust. The Bulgarians do not want to be Russian, any more than the Servians want to be Austrian. The Slays want to govern themselves in their own way, even if that way in- volves' as it certainly did in Bulgaria, temporary muddling. They distrust their Princes, and the Powers behind them, more and more, though they are conscious for the present that they cannot openly resist them. The feeling deepens, and becomes stronger with every new intrigue, until it may be taken as certain that if the people of the Balkans were free from the dread of military occupation, they would send Austrian and Russian away alike, dismiss their Princes, and organise themselves into a loosely coherent Federated Republic. To have created such a feeling is not a successful result of diplomacy and intrigue, and although the feeling is not, of course, as yet executive, it must in the end produce action.
The people are getting politically educated. They are all learning soldiership of a much stricter kind than their old militia training. They are all beginning to perceive that the Princes have other objects than the welfare of the people. And finally, they are all learning that from Bucharest to Athens every man in what was once European Turkey has common external interests, and may, if he pleases, help every other. All that tends towards common action, which we may live to see begin, just as we lived to see it in Italy, where the jealousies, rivalries, and differences among the States were at least as strong, and seemed even more insuperable. The Balkan States are not more overshadowed by their neighbours . than the Italian States were, and from the character of their people would find insurrection easier. Meanwhile, neither Austria nor Russia gains anything, for their strength is not increased by the extension of " influence " over distrusted Princes and populations which regard their efforts to advance only with apprehension. Either Power would gain more by securing the cordial adhesion of a single State, than it does by all its astute and tortuous diplomacy.
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