TRIPOLI.
AT uncertain intervals, but always with a savour of alarm, the word " Tripoli " appears in telegrams and letters dealing with what is called the " balance of power " in the Mediterranean. France is supposed to covet this long strip of coast—a thousand miles if we include Barca,—and Italy, through the voices of her accredited friends, declares that rather than see it fall under the sway of France, she will declare war. Lively Italian imaginations see encroachments upon its borders, and armies assembled ready to spring forward on a futile pretext or none ; and impulsive Frenchmen fancy they see naval and military preparations in King Humbert's dominions with intent to descend upon and seize at least the principal _port. Tripoli has not yet quite succeeded in attaining to the dignity of a " question," but it seems to be always on the verge of becoming one, and even of reaching the " burning" stage, despite the cold douches thrown upon the sparkles which flicker ever and anon. Meantime, and it is rather a significant fact, the fervid, unofficial disputants on both sides seem to forget utterly that Tripoli is part of the Turkish Empire, garrisoned by an Ottoman army said to be considerable numerically, and ruled, through a Governor, direct from Stamboul ; in short, that it is the last tract of Africa under the Sultan's domination. None would talk so lightly of taking it, or preventing some one else from taking it, were the ancient land owned by any other lord, not even if he styled his Government a, protectorate. But the Sultan's African provinces ever depended by a fragile chain, and this one, if it were strong enough, would probably assert its virtual independence. So far as the outer world is concerned, Tripoli is an obscure country. It is an extensive coast-belt of sand and rock, interspersed with oases and fertile vales, with no really good harbour on the west, and one, possibly excellent, on the east, where the cliffs of Barca recede and form a fair bay. The coveted, if it be coveted, port of Tripoli is not accessible to large ships, nor is that of Benghazi ; and all the inlets and roadsteads have a tendency to silt up. What is the charm which Tripoli exercises on the political imagination ? It is sparsely inhabited ; it does not produce much ; its climate is severe, because the temperature alternates between comparative extremes of heat and cold. The charm must be supposed to lie in two things,—first, that the land is something to obtain ; but mainly because Tripoli is one of the chief entrances into the interior of Northern Africa. It has magnificent possibilities to the south ; and, indeed, the lordship, by a great stretch of imagination, is assumed to extend far into the Sahara. At any rate, the North-Eastern regions are more easily permeable from Tripoli than elsewhere. Through it are the roads to Fezzan and Bornu, fertile patches in the awful waste of stones and sand ; and from them streams or rivulets of commerce flow down to the coast ports, and the traders going back to the South carry with them the !products and goods of Europe. It used to be, and probably .still is, one great route of the infamous slave-traders from ithe remote and still unknown inland districts to profitable markets beyond the limits of Tripoli itself ; and black Adaves, male and female, were, with ostrich-feathers, the -.distinguishing features of Tripolitan commerce. Tripoli, :therefore, is regarded as valuable because it is a portal of Africa, as well as because it is a line of coast on a sea --.where, from immemorial time, nations have striven for ,empire. Moreover, it is a neighbour of Egypt, and although the desert tracts are repulsive, it is conceivable that, from Barca, at least, communications might be formed with the valley of the Nile.
It is not difficult to understand why the Italians should look with jealousy upon the further extension of French influence and power in the Mediterranean. They have long held Algeria, and have recently to all intents and pur- poses, except in name, annexed Tunis. The Africa of the Romans has passed from the sway of Rome to that of Paris, and possession has carried with it the means of developing great naval stations on the Malta channel within eighty miles of Sicily. It was to anticipate or antagonise Italy that the French Government seized on Tunis. " From the day when Italy ceased to be what has been impertinently called a geographical expression, and became a living and active reality," said M. Waddington in 1882, " the question of Tunis imposed itself on us with a new force." So Tunis was taken. It is true that the added, " we must go no farther ;" yet ever since, Italy, then directly aimed at, has suspected that the counsel so emphatically tendered to France would not be accepted, but would be overborne either by ambition, -or what is called the stress of events. They do not think there is much restraining force in the pithy remark made /by Marshal Canrobert when M. Waddington had dilated ..on the duty of pushing French interests in the Mediter- ranean. Napoleon, he cried, endeavoured, and failed, to make that sea a French lake ; adding, " and if he had succeeded, whatpurpose would this lake have served, when the hordes of Attila were on the plateau of Romain- ville ?" Italy is sensitive because she has such a long and accessible coast-line, and therefore feels the weight of a potential war-port at Biserta, over against Sicily, as well as an actual war-port at Toulon. Her moral influence would be wounded were France to make herself the heir .of the Ottoman in Tripoli and Barca ; and she would, ,besides, lose a possible field of colonisation close at hand, which might come to supersede the distant, attractive, but alien shores of the Plate. M. Waddington's language :shows that he regarded Italy as a competitor for territory and influence in the Mediterranean, which she is and must be ; and that fact justifies the depth of Italian anxiety.
It is this very suspicion on both sides which may be productive of mischief, and render a Tripoli question, if it arose, a danger to peace. At present, each Power watches the other and neither moves ; but that reserved and prudent frame of mind may give way if exposed to temptation. Italy, it is asserted, will not attempt to swallow Tripoli by a sudden dash,—that would be war with France, who, in her turn, knows that if she crossed the Tunisian border, war would ensue with Italy, and possibly with another Power. So that, for the time, and perhaps for a long time, the matter will remain in suspense, at the mercy of moderation and events. It should, however, be observed that whereas France, if she takes Tripoli, will take it in order to employ there her capital and find places for her enterprising professionals and politicians, Italy, should she go thither, would do so with the object of securing an outlet for her population. France would occupy and exploit ; Italy would colonise ; and there is no valid reason, if Northern Africa is held to be open, why Italy should be shut out, and the whole coast monopolised by French merchants and placemen. Either power, however, to whose lot the country may fall, will have cut out for itself a piece of hard work, since the fanatical Moslem element is very strong beyond the stony stretches which separate the shore zone from the desert. That would not be an obstacle which either would count or flinch from dealing with ; but it might make occupation, and even colonisation, expensive, for a series of frontier wars would certainly ensue. English concern in the problem cannot be wholly left out of account, not merely because the Tripoli State, like Tunis, flanks the trade route to the Suez Canal, but because Malta depends largely on Africa for provisions, and her industrious sons also have some interest in the Mediterranean and the countries bathed by its waters. The main point, however, is,—Shall Italy be exposed to increased naval and military perils, and excluded from a more or less promising field for genuine and useful colonisation which is almost within sight of her Sicilian headlands ? That is what will be at stake for her whenever the future of Tripoli falls under the arbitrage of diplomacy or arms.
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