Operation Jubilee

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL has written that 'Dieppe occupies a place of its own in the story of war, and the grim casualty figures must not class it a failure.' Such an opinion, by so eminent an authority, about a raid in which the attackers were totally repulsed, after losing two-thirds of their numbers, cannot fail to excite the curiosity of historians.

Mr. Maguire's book is the shortest of the three and is written chiefly from the soldier's point of view. Indeed, the author has little to say about the naval and air aspects of the raid, and is not much concerned with its place in the general strategy of the war. In contrast, his de- scription of the Commando actions and of the main Canadian landings is excellent. Although he recognises the complexity of the naval prob- lems, he suggests that all the landings could have been made simultaneously, and relies on the experience at Overlord in support of his argument. But he overlooks the eighteen months of intensive training between Dieppe and Over- lord, and the fact that the final approach to the Normandy beaches was made in daylight.

M. Mordal writes in an easy style which holds the reader's attention throughout. His is a more ambitious book, because he tries to relate the events of the raid to the fighting in the Dieppe area in 1940 and again in 1944. This may not be a profitable exercise, but his attempt to fit the raid into the general strategy of the war is most interesting. In the course of a review of the sea and air position between the summer of 1940 and 1942, he cannot resist the temptation to describe the raid on St. Nazaire. Although he recognises that its success was due to surprise, he fails to mention that surprise was achieved by the approach over mud flats at extraordinary spring tides. This was the key to the operation. Unfortunately, the Dieppe plan offered scope for nothing comparable.

The actual operation at Dieppe is carefully described from beginning to end, without bur- dening the reader with excessive detail. There is sonic new, but I should think rather dubious, material about the radar information said to have been available to the Germans. There are also excellent descriptions of how it all seemed to the French population.

Mr. Robertson's book is longer and far more detailed. It is written for the Canadian public to show that the Canadian generals shared responsibility for the plan, and that its failure Was not caused by loss of surprise, but was partly the result of employing inexperienced troops. 'The Shame' was apparently the decision to make a frontal assault, and the choice of troops• with- out battle experience. 'The Glory' was the con- 'duct of these men in face of desperate danger. It is a courageous book. Unfortunately, the author's style and lurid descriptions of horrors and atrocities are not in the best of taste. Neither is it wise to ,adopt the technique of an historical ,novel when describing private meetings, at which .110 verbatim record was kept, while the principal ,characters are still alive. Inaccuracies are only to be expected, and they abound.

Yet, despite this, the book is not to be under- estimated. Mr. Robertson has done a lot of homework, and for those who want a very de- tailed description of the operation, supported by

accurate diagrams, this is the book. Moreover, despite his tendency, to draW upon a fertile

imagination, the author certainly conveys a true impression of the difficulties and frustrations suffered by Lord Mountbatten and his staff in getting anything done at all.

All three authors seem reluctant to accept the pfficial reasons for the operation, and become confused in speculating upon others. Originally the raid was merely to have been one of a series of cross-Channel operations of growing magni- tude. This was the policy for 1942, recommended by Mountbatten at the beginning of the year, and approved by the Prime Minister in March.

Dieppe was chosen as a possible target from the beginning, but the plan for the landings was pur- posely made consistent with what would have been appropriate had the operation been part of a full-scale invasion.

Each book takes a different view of the lessons and consequences of the raid. Mr. Robertson, after seeming to belittle the lessons, goes on to list them with some precision. M. Mordal wisely avoids technical detail, and gives a very fair assessment of the value of the experience gained and the use to which it was put. Yet he is mistaken in saying that I 'alone continued to the end preparing the great landings.' The same applied to Leigh-Mallory, who, in a more exalted position, remained to command the Allied Air Forces on D-Day. Moreover, Mountbatten was still Chief of Combined Operations when the invasion plan was approved in outline. Alone among historians, whether official or unofficial, Mr. Maguire denies that anything new was learned at all. True, he is chiefly thinking of the Army, but even here he is wrong. The integrated assault by daylight, which was adopted for Overlord, was first suggested by General Crocker in June, 1943, and was largely based on his study of Dieppe.

Yet Mr. Maguire goes to the heart of the matter in a single sentence: 'Operation Jubilee posed two questions: was it really necessary, and if so, could it not have been done in some other and less costly manner?' He rightly answers both in the affirmative. Without the

experience of Dieppe it is unlikely that Overlord would have taken place; and had it been at-

tempted it would surely have failed. For without Dieppe the immense training effort necessary for the Naval Assault Forces would never have been recognised, neither would the need for a totally new method of initial assault. On the other hand, the same experience could have been gained at far less cost had the original plan for landings on the flank been adopted.

The hazard of a frontal assault was well understood by the Air and Naval Force Com- manders, and also by Mountbatten, any of whom could have stopped the, raid. However, they went forward, because they firmly believed that the best hope of defeating Germany lay in an eventual cross-Channel invasion. The United States Government shared this view, holding, in the words of General Marshall, that on no other basis could the war against Germany be usefully pursued. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Dieppe Raid was that it took place at all, despite so many fears and hesita- tions. What effect its cancellation would have had on the course of the war is one of the might-have-beens of history.

These three books add something to our know- ledge and understanding of this great and moving event, and they remind the world of a glorious though tragic page in the story of the Canadian Army.

JOHN HUGHES-HALLETT