A GREAT DANGER.

ENGLISHMEN who love and admire America and desire to maintain our friendship with her unim- paired—in spite of all appearances, they are the vast majority of the British people—cannot help feeling at this moment acute anxiety and alarm at the way in which we are drifting towards the danger of a collision with the United States. The force of circumstances may at any moment undo all the good done since the Treaty signed at Ghent one hundred years ago. When we say this we are not alarmed about any special incident or any visible rock ahead. No doubt we shall get over the commercial intrigue under which the ' Dacia' has bees bought and set sailing as a test case. Again, even if President Wilson is able to convince his countrymen that there is nothing unfriendly in the United States first providing our enemies with a million or two of ready cash, and then employing the former German mercantile marine to supply the commercial needs of our enemies under the protection of the American national flag, it is very possible that the good sense of the diplomats and naval officers of the two countries will be able to accomplish a miracle and prevent a regrettable incident on the high seas. What we are much more concerned about than these specific plans for bending the neutrality of America in such a way that it will bring material aid to Germany is the want of the understanding of the situation, both military and moral, which is shown by the American Government and by large sections of the American people. We are quite sure that the bulk of them, even if owing to distance and want of knowledge they seem callous about the sufferings of Belgium, or careless as to the results which must flow from the triumph of German militarism, do not at heart wish ill to this country, or desire to take advantage of the peril in which she stands, or, again, wish to bring her in ruin to the ground. We entirely acquit America of any desire first to humble us, and then to take our place in the world. On the contrary, we are very ready to believe that the majority of Americans are at heart on the side of the parent stock, and not only do not wish us ill, but would very much prefer to seeuswin if wecan do so without making things uncomfortable for them. Unfortunately, however, they do not realize what is the temper of the British people at the present moment. They do not understand that, instead of our being less inclined to stand up to them now than we were in peace time, we are ten times more likely to prove combative, or, as they would say, unreasonable. They think that because we are in a tight place they can ask things from us which they would not have staked. In

ce pea, and that we must yield to necessity. Yet, in reality, exactly the contrary is true.

Rightly or wrongly, we are certain that this is the case. Take the attitude of the Spectator as an example. We have always felt in peace time that in squabbles

with America anything was better than to make bad blood between the two countries, and we have al ways been anxious to show the utmost consideration to America—to yield wherever possible to her demands. We are free to confess that this cannot now be our attitude.

The temper of stern determination, which is the only temper compatible with success in war, prevents ns, and must inevitably prevent us, from adopting the old easygoing methods. Strive as we will, we can- not help feeling deeply, and resenting deeply, the indif- ference, or indeed callousness, towards Great Britain and her case shown by the Government of the United States. Here is the danger. Their attitude is one of calmness, of friendly calmness if you will, but of calmness. They expect what they would call a reasonable give and take, prudent concessions, and a just appreciation of their own difficulties. They do not in the least realize that it is foolish to ask a man engaged in a death struggle to remember that when one is in a tight place it is wise to make conces- sions to one's neighbours. They do not understand that in war time businesslike views of this kind do not appeal to us in the least. We can only ask them in this connexion what Socrates asked his Judges: "Do you think we are made of stone or oak ? " We shall think nothing of the risks we run, but, fixing our minds on our one object—the destruction of German military power—hold on to our purpose with the utmost tenacity and with no thought of exterior consequences. " That is madness." Possibly ; but it is a madness which at any rate exists and cannot be ignored.

Curiously enough, only fifty years ago just the same difficulty presented itself, but with the parts reversed. We as nearly as possible quarrelled irrevocably with the Americans during their Civil War because, with the calm- ness and impartiality which sit so lightly on neutrals, we confronted with cold logic the burning ardour of men who were fighting for their country's very existence. When the incident of the capture of Slidell and Meson occurred, the Americans wanted to throw all considerations of prudence to the winds. Though their internal diffi- culties were at the maximum, they were fully determined to fight with this country on a punctilio in which they were hopelessly in the wrong. Here our statesmen were as much at fault as the American statesmen of to-day. For the most part they pooh-poohed the possibility of America adding a war with Great Britain and France to her internal troubles. Therefore we considered the time perfectly safe for us to press for what we honestly looked upon as our just rights. America could not be so mad as to fight us. But America was perfectly capable of such madness, and it was only owing to the profound wisdom and statesmanship of President Lincoln and Lord Lyons, coupled with the good fortune that the Queen and Prince Albert were able to restrain our statesmen here from writing insulting and high-handed despatches, that the two countries were not plunged into war. Though Lord John Russell was not only a friend to America, but, on the merits, was with the North and against slavery, he had so little understanding of the temper of the North that he was prepared to say things " officially " which must almost certainly have produced war. Happily the Queen and the Prince Consort insisted upon his pro- vocative words being modified in such a way as not to sting an excited and indignant people into action. We can see now that an appeal to arms would have been, from an American point of view, extraordinarily foolish and

ill-

timed, and yet it very nearly took place.

Unhappily the analogy we have drawn is in one par- ticular by no means perfect. There is no one at this moment in America in a position to play the part played by Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort. There is no one capable at the eleventh hour of preventing President Wilson and Mr. Bryan from sending despatches which would fire the only portion of the world yet unburnt. America has no brakesman at hand. Again, we must admit that there is no one here who could fill the role filled by President Lincoln. Both countries lack the restraining hand.

All these are dangers, but there is a worse danger behind. It is the growing soreness and disappointment felt by the British people in regard to the attitude of the American Government. We realize, and are deeply grateful for, the splendid stand which individual

Americans and a great many American newpapers have taken with regard to the merits of the war. Indeed, it is

not too much to say that men like Mr. Beck. whose book we hope to notice next week, have put our case better than any of our own writers have put it. When, however, tht attitude of the American Government is considered, it it

impossible to deny that it causes deep resentment here, even amongst those who, like ourselves, were so pro-

American in their sympathies that six months ago the satirists were inclined to tell them that they imagined America could do no wrong.

We can only compare the feeling that now exists in England to the feeling of bitterness and disappointment which Lowell expressed so poignantly in his famous ballad of " Jonathan to John." Every word of it stings like a whip on our ears. The Americans of the North felt very sore at the time of the Civil War because they had counted so confidently upon English public opinion being against slavery at all costs. Yet they saw many men of light and leading here going wrong and helping the cause of slavery, though at the same time professing to be dead against slave-owning.

Just in the same way the British people thought the American Government would be certain to be against the treaty-breakers and against the men who have harried Belgium. Yet they suddenly find America officially playing the German game, and in effect trying to prevent our bringing Germany to her knees and driving her out of Belgium. The disappointment is the greater because we, like the Americans fifty years ago, fancy that our own flesh and blood across the water are influenced by the thought of profit, just as Englishmen were believed to be influenced by the thought of profit in the case of the Civil War. Bagehot pointed out that the City was on the side of the South, not because it really cared for the Southern cause, but because it wanted cotton, and trade with the South generally, and found that the North interfered with its profits. So now America wants to make profits out of copper, and the American Government comes out on the side of Germany, and in effect claims the right to provide Germany with the means of hold- ing down Belgium and killing English soldiers, and freely to supply the material required for bombs to slay non- combatants. Can it be wondered at that, even though it may be unreasonable, and though, of course, we ought to see the American case and so forth, we feel cut to the heart that America seems to reckon up the matter in cold dollars and cents rather than in terms of flesh and blood and of human suffering ?

Has America quite forgotten a fact about the war of the North and South which is often forgotten here ? The close blockade of the Southern States practically allowed no cotton to come into England, and at that time there was nowhere else in the world where cotton was procurable. The result was absolute starvation for Lancashire. Parliament had to vote two or three millions to prevent the men, women, and children there dying of famine. In these circumstances one would have expected that the cotton operatives would have been on the side of the South and against the Federals, as being the people who were taking the bread out of their mouths. Yet so great was the Lancashiremen's hatred of slavery that, though they were literally dying of hunger owing to the war against slavery, they would not hear anything against the North. All the popular public meetings were in favour of Lincoln and against the South. They realized that their getting cotton would mean a victory for slavery, and so acquiesced in their own ruin. It was very splendid, and ought to be remembered by those Americans who are inclined at this moment to think chiefly of how the war affects their commerce, and not of the merits of the struggle.

Once again, there is danger in the present situation. If the Washington Government think our difficulties will make us more compliant than in peace time, they are very much mistaken. Wo would endure harsh treatment from them in peace time far more easily than we can endure it now. That is foolish, perhaps, but it is a fact.