The Premier and India
The Prime Minister's reply on Tuesday to a question regard- ing the proposals put forward by the Indian Moderates at any rate closed no doors, though Mr. Churchill observed, a little discouragingly, that he doubted whether it was advantageous to India to raise far-reaching constitutional issues at this time. The answer to that is that the issues were raised long ago and they cannot be laid. The choice is between the very reasonable plan advanced by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and his friends and other plans much less acceptable backed by less reasonable sponsors. There appears, judging from Press messages from India, to be ground for thinking that acceptance of the Moderates' plan— not necessarily, of course, in every detail—would be hailed even by a considerable section of Congress members as sufficient concession to their own views to justify them in supporting the war-effort wholeheartedly. If that is so, it is of immense im- portance. Such a development, so far from not being advan- tageous, would be of incalculable advantage not only to India but to the whole Far Eastern campaign. There are certain demands the Prime Minister cannot meet. He cannot promise India Dominion status at a fixed date—two years after the end of the war or any other—in the absence of any guarantee that India's internal differences will be composed by that date. The Sapru proposals, which leave the fundamental constitutional question aside altogetherfor the moment, raise no such difficulties. Rejection of the proposals would as inevitably worsen the Indian situation as a cordial acceptance of them would improve it. It is of the essence of statesmanship to seize opportunities.
