AIR-POWER AND SEA-POWER
S1R,—The following statements, published in The Spectator in January, 1936, are, I think, worth repeating today: First, from an article, quoting the official report on some bombing trials made by the U.S.A. " It will be difficult, if not impossible, to build any type of naval craft of sufficient strength to withstand the destructive force that can be obtained with the largest bombs that aeroplanes may be able to carry from shore bases or sheltered har- bours." . . - " The Commission concludes that in coast defence opera- tions aeroplanes possess important tactical and strategical qualifications, and that in adequate numbers they may prove a decisive factor in such operations." And the final paragraph from the aiticle: " The question of battleships and bombs is of vital importance to the British Empire, and public opinion would be all in favour of some really conclusive tests carried out in a strictly impartial manner." . . . " The results of any such tests should be made public so that the taxpayer, as well as the Government, can judge whether the proportion of our Defence Estimates allotted to the Senior and the Junior Services re- spectively is such as to give the maximum amount of defence for the minimum expenditure. Second, by a naval correspondent: "In fact it may be said that a coastline adequately defended by aircraft is in- vulnerable to an attempt at landing. . . . On the other hand, it may be admitted that a naval base within easy air-range of an enemy would be untenable."
For the cost, in time and money, of the 'Prince of Watts and the 'Repulse ' we might have provided a system of air-defence for our territory in the Far East which would have made a successful Japanese invasion impossible.—Yours faithfully,
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