THE SUPPLY MUDDLE
MONG the wider problems of the war which Mr. Churchill will doubtless discuss when he makes his state- nt to Parliament, there is one that has long been staring in the face, but has assumed a new character through the ension of the conflict to the Far East. It is the old question supply, but one that has to be attacked from new angles ng to increased demands for equipment, the recent shutting of some vital sources of materials, and the need of co- mating our efforts with those of new Allies. The nation deeply moved by the continued reverses in Malaya, which earns are once again due to the shortage of aeroplanes and er essential equipment ; and is galled to hear bitter com- nts of neglect from the people of Australia. It learns from nisters here and our apologists overseas that in facing the nifold burdens of supplying the war in Libya and on the antic, of helping Russia and of sending equipment to Jaya, the effort in the Far East has been limited by the essity of maintaining the earlier commitments. The argu- e is intelligible enough, but it points to one irresistible clusion.. If our production is not enough to meet all these ds, then by some means it must be increased, and that edily. If it were the case that our present production were Hy the highest possible, then the outlook would be black eed. But Ministers have assured us that it is capable of at augmentation with a greater national effort ; and in- strialists that it could be vastly increased with the same ort more scientifically directed.
roduction is now the major problem of the war. It is re urgent than that of man-power for the fighting services. is the prerequisite condition of their combatant strength. have learnt by this time that the prime heed is not for antities of trained men—presumably we already have them— t for aeroplanes, tanks, guns, ammunition and lorries, and ps in which to carry them. On these things, in sufficient amity and of the right quality, depends the ability of our n to turn reverses into victory. The Government, of course, acutely aware of this necessity. Hence its constant call for re men and more women for the factories, and its repeated hortations to the people to work harder and produce more. already we have nearly reached the point when the available plies of labour have been absorbed. The matter which insistently demands attention is the right use of the labour eady engaged, the better use of the machine, the avoidance of se starts and consequent stoppages, an even flow of materials, petent ordering—in fact, production according to plan. ubtless this is not solely a question of sound methods of uction or sound ordering by the supply-departments. The er justly point out that at each new stage in the experience the war the fighting services demand new kinds of equip- s to replace those that have been on order, with the result manufacture is apt to be switched off from one course to other. This is to some extent inevitable, and inherent in the ture of war ; but it is a reasonable request that the fight- services, too, should endeavour to introduce plan o their demands, and should be looking far ahead to future , and thereby ease so far as may be the problems of OT Yet the main responsibility for the inadequacy of output of be shifted in this way. From all sides come repre- tations that the supply departments—the Ministries of PPly and Aircraft Production, the Admiralty, and the Board Trade—are competing with one another for the same pro- cts• and that they fail to make adequate use of thousands small firms through ignorance of their technical capacity. There is both too little centralisation and too much. There is no master-plan to co-ordinate all the needs and apportion priorities and make decisions. On the other hand, there has been failure to mobilise practical managing experience for each trade and each locality. It is impossible to ignore the great body of industrial opinion which asserts that the system is faulty, and that the faults prevent an expansion which, under a better business system, could be quickly accomplished.
The first thing that ought to be done is to prevent competi- tion and overlapping by the setting up of a single authority with over-riding powers for the whole field Of production. President Roosevelt has recognised at once the necessity of a unified command in supply, and has already appointed a man of proved capacity in the management of big business—Mr. Donald Nelson. This is what ought to be done here. A strong man is needed at the top capable of making decisions between the competing departments, and passing the orders through a single central organisation. Full control of Government pur- chases should be in the hands of a Production Board, under a Minister of Production having a seat in the War Cabinet, and responsible only to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Its task would be to survey the whole field of war requirements in conjunction with Allies and Dominions, to plan a programme of total production for this country, allot the material and the labour, and control the system of placing orders. It must have absolute power to direct and compel.
But that alone would not be enough. At a meeting of in- dustrialists which was held last week convincing evidence was produced which showed the wastage resulting from bad order- ing and through failure to use the technical knowledge and experience of managers in the various localities. One amazing example was given of an undertaking employing a thousand men, anxious to get firm orders which would keep it in con- tinuous production of the machines it is specially qualified to make. It has found no official to whom it could expiain its problems, and none empowered to give it the orders which would keep it properly employed ; with the result that, though all its people have been working as hard as they are able, its output is not more than a third of what it could be. This is one among many examples. It was pointed out that one half of the engineering firms in the country employ fewer than 5o persons each, and a quarter fewer than ro people each. How, it was asked, can this multiplicity of firms be satisfactorily em- ployed except through the services of the technical managements of the regions or districts who know all about the trades locally, and all about those engaged in them? It was strongly urged that, while control at the centre should be unified and simpli- fied, there should be a decentralisation of control involving the devolution of executive authority to Regional Boards and District Committees, composed of men selected for their practi- cal knowledge by representatives of the local industries.
Means must be found for curbing the spasmodic, competitive and often—it is to be feared—ill-informed zeal of the various departments, and putting the supreme authority in the hands of one body charged with the duty of planning, smoothing the flow of materials, and placing its orders for the Government as a whole. And means must be found of enlisting the practical experience of qualified managers, not by detaching them from their working environment, but by using them as regional organisers. Supply now is in the forefront of the war-effort. The manufacturing plant and ability of the country are not being used to capacity. The workers, however zealous, are not being given a chance to pull their whole weight. Nothing is more urgent than the appointment of a Minister of Produc- tion, with the power and the ability to produce order out of the present chaos. If we ask where such a man is to be found the answer is not easy. But one name will occur to many people. It is that of Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, a man who com- bines conspicuous business capacity with political acumen. The post which he holds in the Middle East is an important one, but none, under the Prime Minister, is more impor than that which would give its holder the power to inj efficiency into the organisation of supply. Until this proble is firmly and courageously handled we cannot give the soldi sailors and airmen fighting in many scenes of war the equi ment necessary for victory.
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