CAN WAVELL SAVE SINGAPORE ?
By STRATEG ICUS N some ways the position in the Far East resembles that of aerodrome-defence: the central nervous system has been
• ealed, but the body and limbs which it must direct are 11 hidden. The main effect of thz. Japanese intervention has en to restore to the Axis the initiative it had lost in the est . It has done this by securing a local and temporary pre- nderance of force in the Western Pacific. How great is this eponderance and how long it can be expected to last are the o facts that most concern us, and they are the least known. general, it seems that it may not be as temporary as we ped. This is at least a fair inference from the confidence ith which Japan is not only developing the main lines of her iginal action, but also striking out in fresh directions.
General Wavell is now at his headquarters, after a careful mination of the position in Malaya, and his deputy is with m. Admiral Hart has been in the same area for a longer period. n the other side there have taken place discussions between the xis Powers, and presumably some common strategy has been olved. If this means anything, it must imply some attempt v Germany to disengage sufficient force from the battle-areas the West to develop a converging strategy with the Japanese ; d yet the outlook does not appear very favourable for any venture beyond those that are at present occupying the atten- on of the enemy troops. So much at least is suggested by the ontinuing pressure of the Allies on the Russian front and on e borders of Cyrenaica. And yet, when full allowance is made r the stand in the Mojaisk area and Rommel's defence about 1 Agheila, some other move cannot be ruled out. Certainly is a culpable - misuse of terms to speak of a " rot" in the rman army. When one has taken full account of the appeal r warm clothing and given full weight to the condition which eh an abject appeal implies, it is difficult to imagine that even e mere suggestion of any such state as a "rot " exists.
The German army has lost terribly, in some ways even irre- arably ; but it remains a fighting force of tremendous power. y army which can face the conditions of the Russian winter
d at the same time hold on to a number of cardinal positions nder the heavy pressure exercised by the Russian troops, rected by generals who have shown their mettle and their skill such sustained attacks as the two Moscow offensives as well during Russia's magnificent recoil, must be accounted among
e most formidable factors in the military situation. This must admitted ; and the more the detail of the picture is filled in, e more compelling does the conclusion appeaF. But, if it be dmitted, and if it be taken with the Axis discussions of last tek, it seems that some attempt to assist Japan from the West ay be nearer the launching than seems altogether practicable. In the Far East, the Malayan offensive is not the only rection in which Japan is attempting to extrude from the estern Pacific every trace of European influence. It is obvious at she must fight against time ; but the apparently wild blows he is striking in so many directions appear to be a sufficiently ogical method of extending the period of her initiative. The antic is a vast area ; but the main bases from which the Allies ght hope to exercise their naval power lie in a comparatively oneentrated space. Singapore stands by itself as a naval base ; ut Japan has been endeavouring to reduce its usefulness not rily from the Malayan side, but also from the Netherlands East ndi,:s. There have been various landings in Borneo, which in me places lies only 30o miles away. There have been attempts secure a foothold even nearer, in Sumatra. Tarakan has been en ; and there have been landings at Minahasa in the Celebes. e intention here appears to be to secure a foothold from 'hich Surabaya, the main naval base of the Netherlands East es, can be threatened, as well as Amboina, the second naval se. This has already been bombarded from the air and may be ought under a more immediate threat.
There is very little purpose in speculating further on what Japan may do. It is sufficiently clear that she is attempting to root out every Allied base or make it useless, and in that way render it impossible for the Allies to find any strong centre from which to operate. The course of the battle in the Philippines has been followed by everyone, and there again the main motive pre- vails. It also governed the operations against Hong Kong. It is because her strategy is so obvious that the Allies tend to watch the development with growing impatience. Every step forward in her course involves a protraction of the campaign, which after over six weeks has shown no trace of a recoil. Indeed, the United States Admiral in Hawaii is said to have declared that it is diffi- cult to think any nation will again venture the whole of its naval strength in a battle; and that seems to place the possibility of any revolutionary change farther off than ever.
In Malaya the position continues to deteriorate ; and the most discouraging feature of the operations is the difficulty of account- ing for the failure to increase the British forces to the strength required to check the Japanese decisively. In men this force appears to be no more than about five divisions ; and after six weeks it might have been thought that the Imperial contingent could have been made up to that strength. It is clear that material as well as men is wanted, and- particularly aeroplanes ; and it cannot be too often insisted that, with the new calls from Russia, Britain and the United States are again driven to a con- dition of relative shortage. But once more the numbers involved are not great ; and although it is evident that reinforcements have been sent to Malaya they are still insufficient to bring the enemy to a complete halt ; and that is only an essential preliminary to driving him back. We can see, moreover, that the Japanese kill two birds with one stone when they strike at places so far apart as Singapore and Surabaya. They are fighting on interior lines and have therefore the advantage. We have never yet discovered the secret of complete mobility in air-power and, failing that, these divergent attacks tend to induce us to scatter the com- paratively small number of aeroplanes available in the Far East.
The positions along the lower Muar river on the west, on the south and east of the railway junction of Gemas in the centre, and about the lower Endau in the east, appeared to promise the chance of a firm stand. The Australians administered a striking check to the enemy in the centre ; but since Sunday the western end of the line appears to have been withdrawn by almost a quarter of the distance to Singapore. This is the first occasion in this war that the British flank has been turned from the sea, and it is all the more difficult to understand for that reason. It is also baffling, because there can be little hope that any line will stand if this process can be continued. It can be recognised that the position is not yet beyond hope ; for, if the enemy can be held at even 75-miles distance on land and controlled in the air, the use of Singapore as a base is not impaired ; but it is clear that there is not much ground that can still be given without gravely prejudicing its usefulness. What in fact General Wavell needs is not the stout heart and versatile skill which have marked his service, so much as numbers and material. In Eritrea and in Libya he could bluff his way over a long period of much greater inferiority ; but that was when he had only Italians to deal with. The Japanese are a very different race, and there is no hope of holding them off unless there is some sort of parity between the numbers and equipment of the opposing forces.
Towards the end of last week there appeared to be signs that the tide was beginning to turn. There was evidence of stronger air-support, though its limits can be gathered from the liberties the enemy supply-columns were taking. This would have meant disaster for them in Libya, where the advancing troops have had the experience of seeing the actual damage done by the air- squadrons. If there had been sufficient aircraft to take advan- tage of the packed roads in the neighbourhood of Gemas. the Japanese advance would have suffered a distinct check. Some damage was done, and no doubt there has been more since that time. The sinking of transports and other shipping, some of it close to Tokyo, has now begun to grow. There are, in fine, signs of a greater force at work and the suggestions of skilful direction. But the difficulties of the situation can be gathered from the new Japanese attack in Burma.
It is perhaps the political situation that explains the failure to move from Burma against the Japanese supply-line that runs across the Kra Peninsula so near the frontier. But now the enemy has moved from the east at one place that looks across to the Andaman Islands only 30o miles distant, and at another not much more than too miles from Rangoon. The most obvious explanation of these moves is the further use of interior lines to effect a diversion. The growing strength in the tip of the Malayan peninsula must be checked if possible, and the incursion into Burma promises to achieve this more easily and expeditiously than any other threat. But it seems unlikely that General Wavell has not thought of the Burma position, where an Allied offensive might find a better springboard than any- where else. He now has his hands full ; but this need not disturb us if only they hold adequate resources.
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