AFRICA AND THE WAR
By STRATEGICUS
T did not require the visit of General Smuts to England to draw I attention to Africa as a potential zone of active operations. That continent has played an unforgettable part in the most successful
fighting the British Army has yet carried out. It was there that General Wavell wrote a memorable chapter in the history of minor warfare ; there, too, that he completely defeated two great enemy armies and cleared an empire more than ten times the size of England and Wales. It was there that an Imperial army destroyed two-thirds of the troops and five-sixths of the armour of General Rommel ; and if this commander subsequently inflicted a somewhat similar loss on the Eighth Army and took his force to within 6o miles of Alexandria, where it still stands, this makes the African theatre more rather than less important.
Africa, then, has been the scene of our greatest triumphs—they were triumphs, whatever the sequel—and also of our least expected defeat. We hold a very gravely straitened grip on the Eastern Mediterranean, and we should suffer a loss that it would be difficult to exaggerate if that last purchase were to be wrenched from our hands. Yet we can hardly fail to recognise that the enemy's im- mediate design is to capture the Nile delta and thus by a land victory crush our sea-pbwer in that inland sea. It seems highly probable that the attempt will be made by some form of converging attack, though whether the northern arm of the pincers operation can be set in motion during the present season is doubtful. It is nevertheless certain that the type of assault made upon the Russian command of the Black Sea will be repeated against the much more formidable and threatening British base in the eastern Mediterranean. The enemy has captured Novorossisk and has recently made serious headway against the defence of Tuapse. But it is pertinent to note that in spite of his advance he has as yet made little impression upon the Black Sea squadron's control of the Black Sea. The heroic resistance of Stalingrad, now more gravely imperilled than ever, no doubt prevents the further strengthening of the forces in the western Caucasus.
The attack on Malta, which has caused the enemy such heavy loss, is a pointed reminder that the enemy is determined to make every effort to meet and surpass Allied reinforcements. The Mediterranean crossing is, moreover, so much shorter than the Allied' route that, with abundant air-cover, enemy reinforcements are steadily being transported to Tripolitania. By sea and by air- transport troops are reaching Rommel more abundantly than we can face with equanimity, and the appearance of U-boats off the west coast of Africa has laid the Allied supply-lines open to risk in a most sensitive area.
Down this stretch of coast run the shipping-lanes that convey the heavier supplies to the Near East, to Russia, and to India. From the United States another service of supply runs through the Gulf of Guinea. There is thus in this area one gf the great nodal points in the Allied communications, and it is in this light that we should read the news of the arrival of United States troops in Liberia. They have been landing for some time now in the Allied territory in, and north of, the gateway to French Equatorial Africa ; and their more direct role is to establish and protect the land bases from which aircraft tan take the offensive against the U-boats. These pests have apparently been operating from Vichy-France territories adjacent to the Gulf of Guinea ; and, now, over a very considerable stretch of territory, land-based Allied aircraft are avail- able to cover the transport which plies between the north and south and the west and east.
It is one of the encouraging signs of the development of Allied :.-o-operation that the route between America and Britain can be given the cover of land-based aircraft throughout the whole of its extent. From America on one side and Britain on the other, from Greenland and Iceland in between, the aircraft of one or other nationality can give the best protection that is known. It is at :east reassuring that now we are also placing communications in die forefront of our offensive strategy ; and it must have been with some secret pride that the main architect of the independent air force learned the news of the brilliant raid upon Le CreuSot which destroyed the factories which furnish not only munitions for Germany but also many of its locomotives. So persistent have been the Royal Air Force attacks upon locomotives and rolling-stock that great numbers of locomotives have been requisitioned from Belgium, and the Dutch have been formally warned off the railways at night.
The memorandum of General Smuts which led to amalgamation of the separate air forces, full of memorable sentences, is also remarkable for its penetration into the development of aircraft. " Aircraft is destined to work," he said, " an even more far-reaching change in land warfare." Only now, twenty-five years later, are we beginning to see how significantly that forecast has been fulfilled. "Man-power in its war-use will more and more tend to become subsidiary and ancillary to the full development and use of mechanical power" is another of his inspired statements ; and it is the realisation that this type of mind is so rare and at the same time so essential to a strategy of victory that causes his return to our war-councils to be hailed with so much satisfaction. It is for this reason also that his statements about the role of Africa in the war are to be taken so seriously.
It is not in the purely defensive position in Africa that we are primarily interested. It is not too much to say that if there is any part of the globe where we should be able to take the offensive with a real chance of success it is Egypt ; and it is clear from the state- ment made by General Smuts on Wednesday week that it is not the negative, still less the entirely defensive, role of Africa ' that fills the foreground of his thoughts. Protection from land-based aircraft can be assured down practically the whole of the west coast from the neighbourhood of French West Africa. Such cover is assured in the south and over practically the whole of the east coast. The gap which formerly existed has now been closed by the opera- tions in Madagascar. If Malta can be described as an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier," a title she most richly deserves, this function is discharged by a very great part of Africa. Vital communications are, therefore, protected, with the exception of the gap from the Channel to West Africa ; and it is mainly the speed with which supplies and reinforcements can be transferred that concerns us.
But South Africa is already supplying considerable war-material as well as a number of units of the finest soldiers in the world. It is the use of our force that forms our only anxiety. The problem of the Imperial command is to seize upon that optimum moment when the Allied force is at its maximum relative strength as compared with that of Rommel. In the end this must always be a matter of judgement ; but can one imagine how waiting will advantage the British command? The Egyptian sector is strategically one with the Russian, and the enemy forces available in the African must grow as major operations die down in Russia. In the matter of air-support the transfer may be swifter than we are accustomed to think. The Luftwaffe has cultivated mobility to a much greater extent than the R.A.F. Stalingrad is still immobilising aircraft that might be so easily and so rapidly transferred to Egypt, but we have no knowledge of how soon they may be released.
It is clear that the bottle-neck above the Qattara Depression restricts operations in both directions, though not so much as had been suggested before Rommel's last advance. But the daring raid upon Jalo, Benghazi and Barce suggests that there may be a southern flank to Libya that can be made to restore manoeuvre to the fighting in Egypt. At the time the raid was made the Italians said it was launched from Kufra, and it would be absurd to think that the gateway into French Equatorial Africa is not being used for ground as well as air units. In fine, the Eighth Army has a chance of striking a blow that may have the most far-reaching effect upon the war. The problem of exploiting the advance across Western Libya has hitherto been that of supply. Looking at the prospect now that some avenues across the Chad territory have been well-worn, does it seem insuperable?
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