RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. T HE importance of the Russian request
for a naval station in the Mediterranean consists first of all in this. It is a coup which alters the prevailing impression as to the ideas of those who govern Russia. Hitherto, for the put four years at least, those who have watched the ever-increasing armaments of the Continent have com- forted themselves with the idea that, burdensome as they were, their object was defensive. Each State, it was said, suspects its neighbour, and therefore arms itself to the full limits of its power • but it does not, for all that, intend to run the risk of beginning the Great War. The Kings, in particular, are afraid of the magnitude of the stakes which will be on the table in the next European contest, and are therefore restraining rather than urging the eagerness of their military advisers. This was believed to be especially true of the Emperor of Russia, and was so widely acknowledged, that it was officially mentioned in our own Parliament as one of the many reasons against panic. The request for a, naval station in the Mediterranean is, however, entirely at variance with that view. No such station could be of value as one of Russia's defensive preparations against the Triple Alliance. Ger- many has no seaport on the Mediterranean, and though Austria and Italy have, neither of them can attack Russia by sea ; nor could a defeat of the Austrian Fleet in the Adriatic limit or even affect, as regards Russia, Austria's power of offensive action. She could pour her troops through Galicia, if she had not a ship in the world. Moreover, Russia has no peaceful interests to de- fend in the Mediterranean, no territories, no colony, no island even, about which she might be concerned in the event of war. Yet, in order to keep a Fleet in the Mediterranean, she alters her whole naval policy, incurs vast expense, and places herself in the hands of another equal Power in a way without a precedent in European history, or a precedent only in the secret records of the Bourbon Family Compact. No such step can possibly have been taken without anxious thought among the governing men of Russia, or without the direct and full consent of the Czar, who, in serious matters, is not a personage to be left on one side. That looks as if Alexander III. contemplated, or at least foresaw, open war, during which he was certain to be the avowed ally of France, and would be able to use his Mediterranean squadron with great effect,—such great effect as to make it worth his while tO risk vessels which may be greatly wanted in the Baltic. If any such ideas are passing through his mind, and the move is inconceivable without them, the war must be nearer, or at least more possible, than any of the optimists had dreamed. Sovereigns do not willingly provide for events which they consider very remote, or add heedlessly to the heavy burden of their own responsibilities ; and the Czar is not the man to have alarmed all Europe, or to have given all his enemies a kind of warning, unless he had clearly before him circum- stances in which the need of a Mediterranean Fleet might be imperative. Considering the vast power he wields, and the certainty that France will obey his first signal, that is not a consoling apercu into his often impenetrable mind.
Again, the request for a naval station indicates a belief, both in St. Petersburg and Paris, that the alliance is to last a long while, and will not be confined to any series of pending operations. Russia practically puts a Fleet into the power of France ; a thing which no State would do unless circumstances enabled it to look forward to a long period of close amity with the trusted Power. A naval station on foreign soil is an excessively difficult thing to manage, if only because the Sovereignty on ship-board does not include Sovereignty on shore ; and there are all manners of questions,—questions of slesertion, questions of riot, questions of naval discipline, which become at once almost inextricably complicated. The expense, too, is very great. A permanent station implies docks, houses for the machinery employed in refitting, a. little army of skilled workmen ; and no Government in its senses would accumulate such things, which cost half-millions, on foreign soil, for a few months or a. year or two. The Russians must be looking forward to years of close alliance with France, and that is, for much of Europe, a very serious prospect. It is especially serious. for Italy, which is always threatened by France, and which, if unprotected by the Triple Alliance, would be already overburdened with danger. She certainly does. not want a new and mighty Power on her flank, with an armed fleet at Ajaccio or Villafranca, within a few hours' striking-distance of her best ports, and able, when she has struck, to fly, if necessary, to waters in which there is no possibility of following her. The moral weight of Russia must be counted, as well as the number of her ironclads, and the troops which, with a station to protect her, she could introduce into the Medi- terranean. There must be great alarm in Rome, and some disposition, too, to consider whether Italy is not paying a, great price for her hostility to France, and whether other alliances might not pay her better,—one of the reasons, doubtless, why the French, who are morbidly bitter against Italy, exult so loudly in their friendship with the Northern Power. The Sultan, too, must be disturbed, for his great and permanent enemy will be on both sides of him, and Con- stantinople, if it is ever carried, will be carried by a coup de main. Nor is the effect on England herself inconsiderable. A Russian Fleet at Ajaccio may impede, and impede seriously,. her nearest route to India. It is true the line through the. Mediterranean is not her only route, and the length of the voyage round the Cape has been immensely reduced, and may be reduced still further ; but still, Madagascar is not in our hands, and the Cape route is long. Besides, we are for the present guardians of Egypt, and to defeat a French descent on Egypt, supported by Russia, which can assail us under the new arrangements at once by land and sea, would require a supreme exertion of strength. We could do it, we believe ; but still the effort would be a great one, and, except Madagascar, there would be little enough to compensate us for the outlay either of wealth or energy. We do not wish to exaggerate in the least but still the idea that in any quarrel with France we shall have Russia also always to contend with, is not a pleasant one. And that is, at all events, the possible meaning of• a French concession of a naval station to Russia in the Mediterranean.
We do not know that there is any remedy. The step. about to be taken, though so exceedingly unusual that it has been hardly contemplated by diplomatists, is not for-- bidden, and could not be forbidden, by any international law. The right of France within her own dominions is absolute ; she can welcome what ships she will, and under what conditions she pleases ; and if she gave- Cherbourg to Russia as a naval station, we could only interfere by declaring the arrangement a direct menace. justifying war. All we can do is to watch and strengthen our Fleet till it is adequate to meet the new circumstances ; and we dare say the Gladstonian Ministry may be trusted to do that nearly as well as the Ministry of Lord Salis- bury. They say in Parliament that they are supplying our weak point, and that the guns will be ready as soon as the ships are ; and we know of no reason for disbelieving them, or doubting that the store of fighting-material will be. kept up at any expense to actual fighting-point. The only disheartening circumstance in the outlook is the entire inattention of the democracy to this or any other Imperial danger. Their representatives, unless professional sailors,. hardly care to raise such questions in Parliament, aa:d never raise them before the constituencies. They are not. disloyal, and probably, if asked, would vote all necessary means; but they are indifferent, votes not being in question ; and their indifference necessarily reacts on a Ministry which wants to produce pleasant Budgets, and to avoid. decided steps in foreign affairs. A danger which they un- derstood would doubtless wake them ; but serious events may occur without startling them out of their exclusive attention to internal politics, and one of those serious events is, we believe, the decision of Russia to extend her sphere of active operations to the Mediterranean. Her design, whatever it be, can, we are confident, be met ; but the British people and their leaders must not remain too long apathetic.
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