TOPICS OF THE DAY.
ABDURRAIIMAN KHAN.
THE political sky grows brighter in Cabul, so much brighter as to throw out the blackness of the prospect in Canda- har into painful relief. None of the details are as yet accu- rately known, but it is manifest from the result that Lord Ripon has been negotiating in Eastern Afghanistan with patience, skill, and success. He evidently decided that Abdur- rahman Khan, as the only Pretender not involved in the late struggles, and popular in the provinces to which British in- fluence does not reach, would be the preferable candidate for the vacant throne. As against any candidate except Yakoob Khan, he was obviously in the right, Moosa Khan being a mere child, and Hashim unpopular with Sirdars whose assistance is indispensable, and Yakoob himself was weighted by one heavy disability. Like most Afghans, he is vindictive ; he is accused of having threatened Sirdars for whom the British extorted an amnesty, and he is suspected of harbouring hatreds which he would gratify at. the earliest possible moment, to the discredit of British promises of protection. Abdurrahman, therefore, was preferred, and after tedious negotiations, which threatened at one time to break down in consequence of differences about Candahar, an agreement was arranged, and Abdurrahman was in- vited to visit Cabul as Ameer of Afghanistan. It remained, how- ever, to secure to him a quiet occupation of the throne, at least for a period sufficient to enable the British army to retire, and this was effected with great skill. The hatred of the Afghans is towards the British as Europeans, Infidels, and invaders, rather than towards any special descendant of Dost Mahommed ; and once aware that the British would retire if Abdurrahman were elected, the friends of Yakoob Khan unanimously accepted him. Mahmoud Jan, the soldier who reduced us to such straits in Sherpore, and who expected to be Regent under Moosa Khan ; the Moollah Mooshk-i-Alan, the head of the fanatical party ; and Asmutoollah Kban, the unsubdued chief of the Ghilzais, or second most powerful of the eastern clans, all agreed to the selection, threw over Yakoob Khan, and started to pay their devoirs to the new Ameer at Charikar, in Kohistan. With their defection Yakoob Khan's chance faded away, and even his moral claim, which, as against us, is irre- sistible, became, as against his cousin, materially diminished, Abdurrahman, who is, be it remembered, the legitimate head of the dynasty, according to European, though not according to Asiatic ideas, having acquired a new title from what is vir- tually a popular election. Mahmoud Jan and the rest have steadily fought the British, and are not so far under their influence as to obey a Pretender they cordially dislike ; while behind them stand all the more formidable fighting men,- Ghilzais, Kohistanees, and Pathans of the Khyber. With such support and British favour, Abdurrahman can rule ; and his public acknowledgment as Ameer, which took place on Thursday, was a wise act. All the accounts of his per- sonal character yet received are favourable. He is described on all hands as a reasonable man with whom it is possible to do business, as acquainted with politics, and as free from personal rancours ; while his past history shows him a good soldier, and his present enterprise a man both of courage and decision. He may rule Afghanistan fairly well, especially if he can organise a guard strong enough to resist attack from any single clan ; and at all events, with his accession any excuse for stationing British troops in Eastern Afghanistan ends. Preparations are therefore making for departure. The sick have been sent home, the European cavalry are on their way, and all is reported ready for the stupid piece of vandalism, the blowing- up of the defences of the capital, with which it is our custom to ingratiate ourselves with the peoples we restore to freedom. The Army will, it is stated, have evacuated Afghanistan before September, to the immense relief of all who compose it,—of the European privates, who are harassed and uncomfortable ; of the Sepoys, who are discontented almost to mutiny, and who suffer, through some unexplained cause, believed to be a peculiarity of climate, from morbid de- pression ; and of the European officers, who, besides the annoy- ances incidental to any campaign, have to get through much inglorious work, and undergo the permanent risk of individual assassinations. It is not pleasant, even to the bravest officer, to know that of any three men he sees two would stab him if they got a chance ; and one may make the attempt, chance or none.
The prospect of escaping from the Afghan imbroglio,
and of confining the consequent waste of treasure to twenty millions, is, however, broken by the intelligence from Can- dahar. On Saturday a telegram was received in London which shows that if we are to remain there at all, we must completely garrison the country, for our friendship destroys, any native ruler. Ayoub Khan, in advancing from Herat, did! not depend upon his ability to defeat the Wali, Shere Ali, but on the reluctance of his opponent's troops to fight for the Infidels' nominee, and the result proved that he was right_ The moment the Heratees arrived within striking distance of the Wali's force, the latter's infantry—that is, his whole army, except his personal guard of cavalry, who were probably bound to him by clan ties,—seized his guns and set off to join the enemy. General Burrows, of course, sent cavalry in pur- suit, who " dispersed the mutineers,"—that is, compelled them to join Ayoub in detachments and small parties, instead of in regiments ; but he was obliged to fall back thirty miles, and the incident has a most serious political meaning. So detested' are the British even in Candahar, where they are supposed to- be popular, and probably are popular with the powerless trading classes, that the native ruler is paralysed by their favour, and would, if they withdrew, be at once handed over by his own soldiers to any enemy unconnected with Europeans. If the British garrison were withdrawn, the fighting men in. the province and city would at once proclaim Abdurrahman, the body of the people would obey as usual, and the British would be compelled either to acquiesce, or to reconquer the province by an army which the Ameer might be compelled by opinion to resist in arms. We are, in fact, if we remain, com- pelled to guarantee Shere Ali not only against external attack, but against revolution among his own soldiery and subjects. We must support him in any tyranny he chooses to per- petrate, subdue any revolt, even if thoroughly justified, and guard him besides with at least 5,000 men from any external attack. In return, we receive a right to keep a cantonment in Candahar on the watch till the Russians or somebody else invade India through Afghani- stan, a contingency about as probable as a German invasion of Great Britain through Ireland. We obtain nothing else, for the revenue will go to the Wali ; there is no trade worth pro- tecting, and the Candaharees will not enter the Indian native regiments. At the same time, as Candahar is the best pro- vince of Afghanistan, we make of Abdurrahman and his suc- cessors inevitable enemies, whose first preoccupation must be to regain their territory. Considering the distance of Can- dahar from India, the fact that the Beloochees hold our com- munications always at their mercy, and the extreme dislike of the Sepoys to service beyond the Passes, the position must be regarded as nearly hopeless, and justifiable only until we. can persuade the Wali to come to an agreement with his natural superior, the Ameer of Afghanistan. Under such an agreement, we might, after allowing Shere All money enough to keep up a personal guard, retire, and once more quit the mountains and the Afghan sea of intrigue„ insurrection, and assassinations. The Government would, no doubt, in that complete retirement acknowledge that it had failed ; but then failure was inevitable, and is the admitted central fact of the position. We have expended twenty mil- lions and have lost hundreds of valuable lives in an endeavour to fight Russia without declaring war on her, and the total result is that the name of the Afghan Ameer is Abdurrahman, instead of Shere Ali. The Russians are no further off, the Afghans are no more friendly, and we have no new strength in India, either for defence or attack ; indeed we are slightly weaker, for, in consequence of the waste beyond the Hills, we must either reduce the Army or we must increase taxation, and with it the possible discontent of the body of the people.
Previous page
