THE NEW FRANCE.
ALL through the week the result of the French elections has been making itself felt. - In France itself and in Europe in general the realization has been growing that M. Poincare and his policy are indeed things of the past. In France that -great body of mainly non-political opinion—the professional classes, the officials, and, as a matter of fact, the journalists— are all slowly accommodating themselves to the fact that the great post-War period of reaction is at an end. Every day is making it clearer that nothing can stop the formation of a Ministry of the Left. No device of M. Millerand, no subtle party combination, no last moment manifesto by M. Poincare will stave off, the inevit- able hour. True, there is yet a fortnight in which some such " coup " might be attempted, but it is every day beComing clear that public opinion would not tolerate it for a ' moment. The forces of progress and of democracy have got their heads above water, and it is inconceivable that they -can be once more submerged. No, a Ministry of the Left will be formed. But of what character ? At once this question raises the innumerable difficulties with which the leaders of the new majority are faced.
The electoral agreement between the parties of the Left, and especially between the two largest—the Radicals and the' Radical-Socialists on the one hand, and the Socialists on the other—not to present rival lists of candidates in the constituencies, was by far the most :important factor in the defeat of the Bloc National. The turnover of votes from Right to Left was incon- siderable when compared to the turnover in representa- tion. This, of course, simply means that the French electorate has never been reactionary, but was not properly represented in the late Chamber because all the parties of the Left committed suicide in 1919 by 'competing against each other.
But the Cartel des Gauches was not easy to form even in the constituencies. We, in England, are perhaps a little inclined to regard the French Left as more united than it is. After all, the difference between the Radicals and Radical-Socialists and the Socialists is very deep— perhaps almost as great, in some ways, as that between the English Liberal and Labour Parties. For, if the Radical-Socialists are more progressive than our Liberals, the French Socialists are representatives (perhaps, indeed, it is curious to reflect, theaunly surviving repre- sentatives) of the main stock of that classic European Marxian Socialism which is the most rigid political creed on earth. And now the great question has come before the French Socialists. Shall they take office ? See how much hangs on this decision. If they do, if is probable that M. Herriot, of the Radical-Socialists, would be enabled to form a Ministry completely of the Left, excluding the thirty-four Independent Radicals, who are probably Poincarists in foreign policy. Such a Ministry, if it could be formed, might transform the whole European position. Working closely with Mr. MacDonald, it might open a new and happier era. If, on the other hand, the Socialists will not take office, it is - probable that a -" Ministry of Concentration" rather than one of the Left will have to be formed, possibly again under M. Herriot, or conceivably under M. Briand or M. Painleve. Such a ministry could not he expected to do more than modify the Poincare Thus it would seem that every argument points to Socialist collaboration.
But the difficulties are very great. The Socialist Conference will meet in the first days of June, and the decision will be taken there. It will be the task of the leaders to persuade a majority to allow some form of close collaboration with the Radical-Socialists. But to do so will be to break with every tradition of the party. The Socialists have always, for instance, ritualistically voted against every Budget, of whatever Government. But in the present Chamber their votes will be essential to pass any measures, financial or otherwise, that a Government of the Left may introduce. If the Socialists abstained the Bloc National would still have an over- whelming majority.
So the Socialists are faced with the question which, sooner or later, must face the Socialist party in every country : Are they evolutionists willing to co-operate in an Administration pledged to carry out not their full programme, but yet one infinitely nearer to it than that of any other possible Government, or are they a revo- lutionary party of class, unwilling to take any hand in the present organization of Society ? There seems little doubt that the French Socialists will choose the former of these alternatives and will, to some extent at any rate, co-operate with the new Government. Just what that extent will be must, of course, be a matter for hard bargaining. L'Ere Nouvelk, the organ of the Entente des Gauches, daily calls upon them to abandon an insular attitude :— " §i le Cartel des Cauches ne fut qu'uno formation electoral°, il a deja fait banqueroute. Et la dosillusion doe dernocrates sera cruelle."
Obviously Socialist help must be bought by the Radical-Socialists at a price. It is interesting to speculate on what the Socialist conditions will be, but impossible to foretell. However, it is perhaps significant that L'Ere Nouvelle joins with its appeals to the Socialists the most violent attacks on M. Millerand, and reiterates demands for his resignation. Indeed, all the papers of the Left are furious at the idea which has been published in the Nationalist Press that M. Millerand might make conditions before calling on M. Herriot or another to form an Administration. It is considered that this would be grossly unconstitutional. Exception also is taken to a speech of M. Millerand's at Evreux, in which he appealed to the nation to support the Bloc National :— " II faut que M. Millerand s'en aillo de l'Elysee. . . C'est un chef de parti, et non un chef d'Etat. . . . M. Poincare a observtS lee regles du jeu parlemontaire. II a perdu In partie. 11 paie. C'est bien. C'est du fair play. M. Millerand, pris la main sous la table, en train de 'faire' ses cartes, plastronne, et veut dieter sa loi ! . . . Quo M. Millerand suivo la loi corn mune : ii se mela a in bataille ! II n'a plus qualite et autoritAS pour demeurer l'aibitre des groupes parlementaires, puisqu'il eat aujourdhui un vaincu."
The comments of L'Ere Nouvelle arc mild compared with the telegram of the Mayor of Mains to M. Millerand, which the Quotidien quotes. The Mayor simply addresses these words to the President : "Impatiently awaiting your resignation in order to illuminate." Evidently life and colour, at any rate, have returned to French politics ! But behind all this outcry against M. Millerand is the question of Socialist co-operation. M. Herriot May well feel that Socialist votes are -well worth the sacrifice of M. Millerand, yet how precisely he intends to dislodge the President is not apparent.
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