THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS..
THE purpose of Professor Strong's book is to consider " whether consciousness can be so conceived that its evolutionary origin shall be possible," and so to lay the foundations of an evolu- tionary psychology. The central theory through which such a conception is sought is, if we have grasped it correctly, somewhat as follows. Consciousness implies on the one hand a sensation, and on the other hand an object presented. Further data are, however, also necessary : (a) the Body, an existence related in space to the object, and related to the sensation either as its concomitant or as including it In its substance ; (5) the Same Organs, through the medium of which the sensation is called forth by the object; and (c) the Motor Apparatus, through whioll the body reacts towards the object. "The mere assemblage of the conditions above enumerated constitutes a function by • Th. Origin Coonselountsea By MHOS AWHem UW0.3 Macmillan and o. 0.21. neU which the organism intends the object, and even when the object is not really there, has an essence given to it." How this theory is arrived at and applied ; how the other two principal objections to the evolutionary origin of consciousness—the unity of the mind, and the ultimate quality of certain sensations—are stated and answered, we must refer those interested to the volume itself to discover. The points at issue are extremely abstract, and a discussion of them would appeal to the specialist alone. It is perhaps for this reason that Professor Strong has adopted sys- tematically the most technical diction we remember ever to have encountered ; wo can hardly think of any abstraction in the terminology of metaphysics which he has not used ; and he has enriched its already copious vocabulary with some discoveries of his own. Technical language to a technical audience makes for brevity and accuracy of limitation ; yet we cannot but think that a too exclusive use of abstract terms produces an indefinable sense of unreality in the reader's mind ; it awakens in him furtive and unworthy suspicions that he is getting words rather than thought. We are not quite convinced, either, that Pro- fessor Strong has always considered his opponents' case ade- quately. E.g., ho brushes aside the case for complete (philo- sophic) scepticism on the grounds that if material objects are not real we ought not to treat them as real by using them, and ought therefore (if we had any sense of consistency) to die decently, as loyal professors of disbelief. It appears to us that it is possible logically to consider all things as unreal and yet to prefer one to another—to consider repletion as much en illusion as starvation and yet to have more than a passing fondness for a good dinner. Dr. Strong's argument is, in fact, only a variant on Dr. Johnson's famous refutation of Berkeley, and, we fear, not quite so vigorously expressed.
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