BARON DE MALORTIE ON EGYPT.*
Tun political student will find this eminently readable book an admirable guide to a comprehension of the existing situation in, Egypt. The author has spared no pains in the conscientious execution of a difficult task, and has worked up materials collected far and wide with his own experiences into a most valuable record of a phase of the Eastern Question that threatens for a long time to come to rivet the attention of Europe rather upon the banks of the Nile, than upon the shores of the. Bosphorus. It is no mere collection and collation of facts and opinions that is here laid before the reader. M. do Malortie shows himself to be a keen observer of men and events, and his pages are as helpful to those who would resolve the futur e as to those who would understand the past of modern Egypt. He has resided many years in Egypt, at different periods, and enjoyed the intimacy of nearly all the prominent personages who have figured on the stage of Egyptian politics during that• time. Well acquainted with our own tongue, and familiar with most of the European languages spoken in the diplomatic• society of Cairo, he was enabled to make the best use of the position he occupied. In a word, he has been behind the scenes,. and able to view events in their inchoate state, trace them to personal influences, and appreciate their beariug both upon the people at large, and upon the small, but influential political circles, native and foreign, that are gathered in the Cairene focus.. The title of the volume correctly indicates its aim and scope. " Whatever may have been the shortcomings," says the author in his preface, " of the native rulers, they are trifling, compared with the blunders of their patrons; nay, I go so far as to say that, with few exceptions, they have been invariably the result of foreign meddling and advice." The assertion is, as M. de Malortie admits, a " sweeping " one. With the first part of it we are disposed to agree, the ls.tter portion is more difficult of acceptance. The policy inaugurated by Mehemet Ali was not due to foreign advice, and of the blunders committed in carrying it out the greatest was the readiness with which the schemes of flattering speculators and adventurers were listened to by the successive occupants of the Khedivial throne. Mehemet Ali looked upon Egypt as a big estate, to be made as important and produc- tive as possible, in the shortest time and by any means. But for the human element in his property he had little thought or care,. save as furnishing the requisite machinery ; and he used it, and in his ignorant haste abused it, accordingly. His successors (Tewfik must be excepted) have followed in his footsteps, but with less ability and more callous indifference to human suffer- ing, while their principal aim has been such sensuous per- sonal enjoyment as European civilisation affords. Of the reigns of Mehemet Ali and Ismail a very full account, from the point of view of their foreign policy, is given ; and to the latter of these potentates, at all events, more praise is accorded than the annals of his reign warrant. No Oriental ruler has hitherto got beyond envy of the material puissance of Western civilisation, and Ismail, no less than his adoptive grandfather, admired the arts and crafts rather than the culture of Europe. The result has not been altogether evil ; the Fellaheen have undoubtedly advanced in well-being and increased in numbers, while the de- velopment of the material resources of the country has been ren- dered possible by the creation of a network of railways and canals. But, considered as an unit of a political entity, the Fellah is pretty much where he was under the Mameluke oligarchy, the servant of many masters, with hardly more than an inarticulate hope, scarcely amounting to a desire, for freedom and justice. That desire must exist in him, in a more or loss efficient degree,. ere any real progress towards a durable autonomy is possible ; and it is difficult to see how, in view of the past- history and present condition of Egypt, it can attain sufficient strength,. save under some sort of protectorate generous enough or wise enough not to abuse the trust.
* Egypt: Native Roloro and Foreign interference. By Baron de Malortio, Author of "Diplomatic, Sketches," &o. London : Ridgway. 1882. European interference may be said. to date from about 1840, when England prevented Mehemet All from liberating Egypt and Syria from the Ottoman yoke and consolidating the two countries into an empire which would have been powerful enough to assert and maintain its independence, and thus to put an end to the peculiar system of international intrigue that seems destined to keep alive the Eastern Question, for the amusement of endless generations of diplomats. M. de Malortie dismisses the viceroyalty of Abbas with a word or two of contemptuous mention, and has but little to say concerning that of his successor, Said. It was, however, under Said that the foreigner began to eat out the heart of Egypt. The shame- ful history of the Suez-Canal concession well illustrates the -carelessness and prodigality of the man who inaugurated the practice of foreign loans, and himself, in less than a decade and mainly for personal purposes, accumulated a debt of ten millions. The concession, says M. de Malortie, was given "to that great charmer, M. de Lesseps," who got Said " to sign it without ever having read it, as I was assured by one of his own Ministers," The story seems hardly improbable, if the following anecdote (the book is full of anecdotes, as instructive as interesting) is true :—A M. Bravais, the original, we believe, of Daudet's " Nabab," " complained one day that a certain estimate in Italian Ure had been taken too low. ' Well,' said the Viceroy, 4 put it in English liures,' and it was done." No wonder adven- turers flocked to the Court of such a ruler. On the whole, despite the favourable opinions of many writers of different nationalities which M. de Malortie has collected, in his abundant and valuable notes, we are unable to see much real greatness in the character of Mehemet Ali, and none at all in that of Ismail. The policy of both was a policy of spicier, mere increase of personal position and wealth, utterly regardless of the great human interests which even an Oriental despot know.s perfectly well it is his duty to watch over and foster. No warning seems to lave been given to Ismail by the European Powers of the ruin to which he was hurrying. When the crash came, they pounced upon Egypt as upon a prey, and insisted upon a liquidation which, as M. de Malortie truly observes, was " not only an 'iniquity, but a political blunder." If Ismail's reign was disas- trous to Egypt, it was shameful to European diplomacy, as M. do Malortie's account of it, which the historical student will find most profitable reading, abundantly proves.
The fourth chapter presents an impartial view, taken on the spot, of the effect of the Anglo-French tutelage carried to its highest point under the sham administration of Tewfik. This unlucky prince, who had to "satisfy his own people, the Control, the other Powers, and the Porte," could do little more than complain of the Control to his Ministers, and of his Ministers to the Control. Politically, the Control was wholly had ; administratively, it effected considerable good ; such is M. de Malortie's requiem over the defunct institution. A glimpse, however, that is given of the Control in its relations to native officials is not a pleasant one. M. de Blignieres is said not to have been an " indulgent colleague " to native Ministers, and to have been " too much given to biting sarcasm." just so ; the European official is commonly the last man in the world to take into proper consideration the fact that an Oriental by race cannot possess the mental furniture of a European. A -story in the current Temple Bar is worth reading in this con- nection. Mr. de Leon, a former United States Consul in Alex- andria, wished to introduce the telephone into Egypt. He applied to the Native Ministry, who said that Egypt did not -care about the telephone. Nothing disconcerted, the ex-consul -went to the Control, and with the assistance of the English 'Controller, who persuaded his French colleague to abstain from .opposition, procured an acceptance of his scheme, subject to certain modifications. Surely the Control was not meant to help speculators to obtain valuable rights, involving more or Less interference with interiors (to which Orientals have a special objection), against the will and wish of the Native Government, and for the benefit and convenience of foreigners.
M. de Malortie rather shows how Arabi's success was possible than explains the causes of the rapidity with which ,a mere military pronauciamiento was tacitly accepted by the nation. That the Arabist movement was not originally of a nationalist character is certain, and perhaps the whole explanation of its apparent assumption of that character is that it became clothed with it through the Oriental tendency to acquiesce in accom- plished facts. A series of successful intrigues placed Arabi in u position where he could take advantage of the mutual jealousy and distrust of England and France to seize the reins of power which Tewfik had never really held, and in Oriental countries he who wields the power of the State is commonly regarded as lawfully possessed of it.
Some prevalent-delusions are promptly disposed of by M. de Malortie. The subjection of foreigners to such taxation as they are now exempt from, is shown to be financially a small matter. Probably it would not add more than a few thousands a year to the revenue. The immense majority of foreign residents are clerks, shopkeepers, and artisans. Nearly everything they con- sume is imported, and in the long-run they probably pay as much, in proportion to income, in the shape of customs duties as the native in the form of taxes, the distinction between the land-tax, which is to some extent rent, and an ordinary impost being taken into consideration. The burden, again in a financial sense, of the thirteen hundred foreign officials is not great. " I make bold to say," says our author, "that the £379,000 paid in salaries to Europeans (the majority of whom have less than £10 a month) have been earned over and over in the course of the year."
M. de Malortie's conclusions are in the main identical with those at which our Government is supposed to have arrived. Some, however, are peculiar to himself. He would stop all con- cessions to foreigners not accepting the jurisdiction of Egyptian Courts. For the public service, he recommends the adoption of the system of competitive examination. The Press should be made free. Immigration, he thinks, might be encouraged, but it is doubtful whether this would not increase the tendency, already sufficiently great, to oust the natives from the land. The Chamber of Notables should be reorgauised as a consulta- tive assembly, four-fifths of the members to be elected, and one- fifth nominated by the Khedive for life. But he does not say who are to be the electors, the most important of all the points that have to be determined, if the Government of Egypt is to be re-established upon a really representative basis. Such an Assembly would no more restrict itself to mere consultative func- tions than the Control has done ; sooner or later, the power would pass to it, and upon its composition and the mode of election of its members the future of Egypt practically depends.
The copious notes and the appendices form a prominent fea- ture of the volume, fall of interesting personal experiences, and citing facts and opinions from the crowd of authorities on an exhaustive study of which M. de Malortie has based his book, which, though the work of a foreigner (naturalised, we believe, in this country), is written throughout in singularly clear and correct English.
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