THE UNREST IN FRANCE.
WE do not see why the unrest just now prevailing in Paris should be held by English Correspondents to " threaten the Republic." The unrest is sufficiently real, but it proceeds from three causes, all remediable, and all remediable without the proclamation of any Monarchy. The first and probably the most influential, is financial depression. The economists are frightened at the prospect of endless expendi- ture on public works, to be made with borrowed money, and under a hope of speedy returns which M. Leon Say declares to be fallacious. The fear of these borrowings, with some other causes, depresses Rentee, and so appears to deplete all solid fortunes, while it embarrasses all firms accustomed to keep their reserves in Rentes. This cause of depression, which would be felt at any time, is aggravated by the condition of trade, which has been impoverished by bad harvests, and by the long crisis in the speculative market, which involves half the thrifty people in France, and is not over yet, nor will be, till the great speculative firms consent to " make a loss " on a great scale, by parting at low prices with the unsaleable Bonds with which they have burdened themselves. They must do it at last, and when they do, there will be a crash which will clear the air, and compel the Government to 44 postpone "—that is, to abandon—M, de Freycinet's gigantic scheme, as one too heavy even for France. A retrogressive step of that kind will, of course, injure individual reputations,—will, for instance, make M. de Freycinet impossible ; but it will not shake the Republic, which has behind it always this grand source of financial strength, that the electors own the Debt, and will not endure the smallest risk of danger to their dividends. The statesmen must pay them, or perish, and must therefore, whether they will or no, enforce the necessary economy. They can do that, as the electors will be with them, as easily under a Republic as under a Monarchy, per- haps more easily,—and they will.
The second cause of the unrest is the absence of an Execu- tive with power to initiate anything, or, to speak plainly, to maintain itself for six months together. M. Duclerc says openly he shall bring forward no Bill of importance, for if he does, he shall be defeated ; and ho is evidently reluctant.. even to propose considerable financial changes. Every one knows, moreover, that even if he remains passive, he is not safe ; that at a signal from M. Gambetta, he would be overthrown ; and that without that signal, a Bill proposed by a private Member might be carried by a fortuitous concourse of groups, and compel a resignation. There is no successor possible who will be stronger, except M. Gambetta himself, and he will be resisted by all the fractions which dread either a strong Government, or him. This situation is, undoubtedly, a disas- trous one, for it deprives the external policy of France of all dig- nity, and reduces her internal policy to a series of make-shifts. Nobody can carry even a plan for reducing the Unfunded Debt, which has become dangerously large, and be sure that it will be adhered to for a single Parliament. None of the Departmental Chiefs are firm in their seats, all are inclined to use patronage to secure transient support, and all are tempted, we greatly fear, to "make hay," if not for themselves, at least for their groups, " while the sun shines." All that is bad, how bad we probably do not sufficiently realise, —we greatly fear that even external politics are affected by fear of results upon individual fortunes ;—but is it obnoxious to the masses of France, or even percept- ible to them ? To all appearance, they approve of weak Governments, choose out no special man, not even Gam- betta,and are content, so long as the Chamber governs and i order is maintained. They are not asking for rapid legislation, or a stable Executive; and if they were, they would have them. Nothing in the situation threatens order, and if the masses are growing impatient, and desire more fixity in the Government, the power of realising their wishes is in their own bands. They have only to signify that they wish for M. . Gambetta, or M. Brisson, or any one else in France, and he will be Premier at once. If there is one thing certain in France at present, it is that the electors can control, and do control, the representatives, even against their own wishes ; and that it is fear of their opinion which takes the heart out of successive Governments. If order is secure and the electors
content, where is a revolution to come from, unless it be from the city mobs, which are afraid of the Army ; or from the soldiers, who are greatly divided, who have no candidate, and who have given no sign of earnest discontent ? The system may be as bad as possible, and we certainly shall not defend it ; but till it irritates either the people or the Army, it does not endanger the Republic, and if it irritates either, the means of alteration lie ready at the leaders' hands.
And, finally, the third cause is the irritation, the just irrita- tion, of all who sympathise either with the Catholic Church, or with true religious liberty. They have a serious grievance, or series of grievances ; but the undeniable existence of reli- gious persecution is not the question at issue, but rather how far the people of France are wounded by it. That is a point upon which, as we believe, the most experienced can give no opinion. No man living seems able to say or even to think with clearness how far the average French peasant wishes to go in his struggle with the Cure,—whether he desires to insult him, to fetter him, or only to make him conscious that he must adopt a policy of conciliation. But there is one thing that can be said with certainty, that if the electors think their representatives are going too far, they can, and will, make them understand that fact, without loss of time. They are not going to throw over the Republic, which is, in fact, their own regime, for want of reugh speaking to their mandatories, who, again, on this, as on all other subjects, will trim their sails only too readily to the popular breeze. We have seen in all recent affairs, and especially in the Egyptian negotiations, how instantly responsive to public sentiment the Chamber is, and there is nothing in the Deputies to make them hold out on Clerical matters against their own constituents. They may be, probably are, more hostile to the Church than their constituents, being more affected by what in France is called " the scientific spirit," but they certainly are not false enough to the Republic to allow it to be endangered for the delight of annoying the Clerical Order. If there is reaction in the Clerical direction—and there are signs of it—Republican De- puties will yield, as M. Andrieux has done, or be dismissed, not fight till their own electors rise upon them. Indeed, even if the worst came to the worst, and France utterly con- demned the present regime, we doubt if she would not seek a remedy rather in new men, than in a return to any alterna- tive form of government. This generation has had enough of the Bonapartes, and in spite of the fresh liveliness of the Legitimists, their head is still the Count de Chambord, who either is unwilling to reign, or is hopelessly unable to
perceive what France really seeks. It is the unexpected which always happens in Paris ; but if there is to be a change, we should look for it rather in the American direction, a con- centration of executive power in the hands of the President, who cannot be overthrown by votes, than in any kind either of revolt or restoration.
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