26 FEBRUARY 1927, Page 12

Correspondence

A LETTER FROM PEKING. [To the Editor of the SPECTATOR.] SIR,--Since the British Concession at Hankow was " jumped " by the mob nearly a month ago nothing particular has occurred either north or south of the Yangtze. The absence of any outstanding event does, of course, not mean that it has been a quiet period. The Bolshevist-Nationalist drive has continued unabated with riots in Shanghai, boycotts, footings and expulsions at the smaller river ports and a state of menace and unrest generally which has brought the British, and other foreigners, flocking from up-country to take refuge where there is naval protection.

The interlude, moreover, is pregnant with great develop- ments. We are awaiting, on one hand, the arrival of the three brigades forming the Shanghai Defence Force and, on the other, the outcome of the British Government's newly announced decision to go ahead at once with their offer to accept profound modification of our treaty status.

The offer is no longer conditional on the setting up of a responsible all-China Government (a condition which made previous declarations worthless in Chinese eyes), but is apparently to be of immediate effect and dependent only on the British in China being assured of what one may call ordinary civilized treatment. It is made to China as a whole, but as China is not a whole, its implementation (to use the word of the moment) can only be brought about by separate arrangements with North and South. Left to themselves North and South, even if fighting each other, would very probably come to an ad hoc union to negotiate a recovery of national sovereign rights, but the Bolshevist foot is firmly wedged between them and prevents anything of the sort. So it is that while Mr. O'Malley holds his conversations with Eugene Chen at Hankow, independent pourparlcrs have to be conducted with the North to give effect to the policy.

The prospects are clouded both at Hankow and Peking. In the Yangtze negotiations the voice is the voice of Mr. Eugene Chen, an up-to-date capable diplomat with a perfect compre- hension of the real facts of the case ; the hands are the hands of Borodin, of whom it is sufficient to say that his biography has lately appeared in the English Press and that he is ex hypothesi opposed to any amicable settlement. As yet there is nothing to allow us to judge whether the Nationalists will shake themselves free enough from the Bolshevist leading- strings to repudiate the " war to the death " which their leaders have declared against us.

There are serious difficulties of a different nature in dealing with the North, that is, the Peking Government under Chang Tso-lin's control. The Northern leaders are realists. They say plainly : " We are fighting the South, you are attacked by the South and are prepared to resist ; we are allies in the same cause and we look to you for support." We are simply not understood when we explain that we are not enemies of the Southerners, have genuine sympathy for unbolshcvized nationalism, and are only making a stand against sheer robbery and murder. There is an insuperable difference of language—not in the literal sense, but in regard to the meaning which we and the Chinese attach to the spoken and written word. The " O'Malley Memorandum," for instance, was to us a sincere and highly important document-committing the British Government to a definite step forward. To the mass of Chinese readers (including probably most of the Northern rulers) it conveyed no such impression and, except for the practical clause concerning the Customs surtax; was regarded as a pretty flower•of speech only differing in degree from the stereotyped protestations of undying devotion to their country's service that every tuchun issues before launching an attack - on his neighbour. This different valuation of the meaning of language, coupled with- the difference between English and Chinese sense of perspective, makes diplomatic intercourse with China quite another affair to what it is between Western nations. The logic. which you can apply there you cannot apply here—and it is probable that the perfectly rational forecasts in which writers at home are indulging will, for this reason, prove very wide of the mark,

Britannia—armed like Justitia with a sword (strictly defensive) in one hand and a pair of scales in the other—prepared to defend her own people by force if necessary, but prepared at the same time to mete out voluntary justice to Chinese national aspirations is a reasonable and logical figure to Ilk., but is certainly not the picture as seen by Chinese eyes.

To-day the long doubt concerning America's attitude bag been partially cleared up by the publication of the Kellogg statement. It would now appear that the Americans have marked out for themselves much the same path as we, though treading perhaps a little more delicately in regard to defensive measures. Though there is no hint in the Note of standing shoulder to shoulder with us, the similarity of policy must tend to keep us in line. As for the Japanese policy, we are in our usual state of being " kept guessing."

The war between North and South has been for many weeks quiescent. There are repeated rumours that we shall soon see a secession to the side of the North of a group of non- Cantonese generals commanding a large part of the Southern armies, which are, of course, not truly Cantonese, but a con. glomerate force snowballed together during the march from Canton to the Yangtze. Such an event would appear by no means impossible and might, if it came about, entirely alter the face of external affairs. This, however, is a contingent} upon which the British Government have, rightly no doubt, decided not to wait.

Conditions in Peking remain outwardly normal and show as yet no signs of being affected by the strained relations existing on and south of the Yangtze. How long the inunu. nity will last if our efforts to come to a settlement do not quickly succeed is, of course, another question.-4 am, Sir, &c.,

YOUR PEKING CORRESPONDENT.

January 29th.