THE CRISIS IN MAN-POWER. T HE failure to send large enough
drafts to the Army at the front, as well as to send drafts early enough for adequate training, has created a more anxious situation than most people recognize. The subject is dealt with fully by Colonel C. ti, Court Repington in the Morning Post of Thursday. Before we look into the figures which he gives, we should like to say something about Colonel Repington himself. He is an industrious and practised student of war, and whether he be right or wrong—and we hope that he is a little too pessimistic on this occasion—he is probably more entitled to a hearing from the nation than any other military critic. As the public have learnt, he resigned his position as Military Correspondent of the Times a few days ago. As to the cause of his leaving the Times, we know nothing but what was published in the Times itself on Wednesday. It was then stated that Colonel Repington had given as his reasons for resignation the failure of the Government to make a far more drastic comb- out, and the support given by the Times to the Government's Man-Power policy, which Colonel Repington judged unsatis- factory. The Times expressly repudiated the suggestion that Colonel Repington's resignation was the consequence of " some intrigue of the Times against Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson." It should be noticed here that the Times has not joined in the virulent abuse of the Army leaders. We take all this to mean that Colonel Repington felt that he must have a position of greater freedom to tell the truth as he sees it, and his decision to cut his connexion with the most powerful daily newspaper is honourable and creditable to him in every way. We are personally able to assert, more- over, that he is a man with that sort of open-mindedness which is not always associated with the military temper. When the Spectator was advocating the formation of the National Reserve, and was getting only too little encourage- ment from many professional soldiers, Colonel Repington was one of the first to recognize that it would be madness for the country to disregard this hitherto untapped reservoir of military strength. He backed the proposal with great force and ability, and we think we do not exaggerate in saying that the rogress of the idea owed more to his support than to that ofost any other writer on the subject. atm " have some things to say to the British public," writes Colonel Repington in his article, " and I am going to say them without mincing matters, because they concern the safety of our armies and the success of our cause." We shall try now as briefly as possible to summarize what Colonel Repington tells us. The Germans have accumulated one hundred and sixty-five divisions in the West, and have already more divisions on the Western Front than all the Allies combined, if the. Italian front be excluded. These hundred and sixty- five divisions are being increased at the rate of seven to fifteen divisions a month. Ultimately there are likely to be two hundred or-two hundred and twenty divisiOns. The Germans alone may have in the end a superiority of some fifty divisions ; but of course they may attack us before their superiority is so great, in order to forestall the arrival of more Allied troops and the American troops. The employment of some Austrian contingents is also to be expected. News has come of the appearance of Austrian troops in Belgium. Owing to the collapse of Russia, the Germans will be able to equip this great army with a very heavy mass of artillery. There are the most vital and urgent reasons, therefore, for putting every Englishman who is properly available into ihe field. Colonel Repington points his demand by adding : " I want to tell the people of England, and particularly those Ministerial poltroons who bleat about our losses, that our total casualties since the war began are but little higher than the number of the French dead."
In describing the causes which have led to the insufficient supply of drafts, Colonel Repington gives the first place to the dispersion of our forces represented by what he thinks were the unnecessary adventures at the Dardanelles and Salonika and in Palestine and Mesopotamia. His second reason is the failure of our War Cabinets, and particularly of the present Cabinet, to maintain the strength of our armies in the field, and to prolong the Kitchener policy of continually reinforcing them with fresh divisions. " I re and Sir Douglas Haig's recent statements that his drafts did not reach him in time to be properly trained, and that he had to fight 131 German divisions with half that number, as the most damning indict- ment of the War Cabinet that any man could have made." Colonel Repington goes on to support the opinion we have several times expressed, that Sir Douglas Haig's heavy losses were due to the change of plan which was imposed upon him by the Government in the spring of last year, as well as to the fact that he did not receive his drafts early, enough to train them properly. By far the greater part of unexpectedly heavy casualty-lists is caused by want of cohesion in a hard- pressed line, and this cohesion, which means safety and low casualties, can come only by very thorough training. For Ministers to spout into the air vague but very injurious talk about casualties in these circumstances is to be cruelly unfair to men and officers alike. Colonel Repington says that he was informed by a member of the War Cabinet that last October the Government would ask for half-a-million more men, but the promise was not kept. As for the proposals now before us, Colonel Repington says that, owing to the loss of men twice severely wounded and the withdrawal of men for shipyards, about 300,000 men will be needed, to begin with, " to restore our establishments," quite apart from casualties and sickness in 1918. Altogether, he con- siders that unless a provision of 1,200,000 is made for 1918 and the deficit of 300,000 is also made good, we shall not have done our duty by our armies. It is late now to solve the problem, but it is not too late. Still, the past record is bad. " Our governors continued to regard the war as one of limited liability, and not as a matter of life or death, and for that fundamental error the War Cabinet, and they alone, are to blame."
Colonel Repington, assuming that Sir Auckland Geddes will be able to comb out, as he expects, from 420,000 to 450,000 men, concludes that not more then 100,000 can be sent into the Army when the expansion of the Navy and the Air Forces has been provided for. After examining other sets of figures, he states his final balance-sheet as follows :—
LIABILITIES. Men. AssaTs. Men.
Deficits and deduc- Combed out 100,000 tions $00,000 Youths of 19 240,000 To replace waste .... 1,200,000 From Home Defence 50,000
Returned wounded 240,000 Total 1,500,000
030,000
BALANCE DEBIT 870,000 M.gg Colonel Repington ends by making certain constructive proposals of his own : that 100,000 men should be withdrawn from distant expeditions ; that the comb-out should be increased by 320,000 men ; that conscription should be applied to Ireland, whence 200,000 men might be expected ; and lastly, that as a special measure for the year 1918 only, youths between eighteen and nineteen should be sent to the front. This last class would yield about 240,000.
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