26 JUNE 1920, Page 7

RUNNING- HER UNDER - DI FADERS of Mr. Kipling's . story

Captains .Courageous 11_ will remember his vivid description of the foundering of a fishing schooner whose crew- ran her under:" The schooner was homeward-bound because a gale was predicted, but the weather, though-becoming worse, wasnot yet very, bad when she set. her :-.homeward- course before the wind. The mischief as observed from •the decks. of the ' We're- Here t (the schooner which plays the principal part in .the story) was that the skipper of, the homeward_bound schooner carried.. on anyhow. i■Tominally and ostensibly he was more cautious than, the others ; he was fleeing to escape the gale. But actually he was .appallingly careless ; it was his character and habit to be so ; he did not trouble to- shorten sail ; he had-not attended to the seams of his vessel though . they had 'been steadily " spewing oakum " ; he had. not .handled This pimps ; and the result was .that the schooner. had gradually lost her buoyancy. Suddenly he "ran .her under" a sea ; she could not rise,. and_ she dis- appeared: This is very much the kind of -thing which is threatening to happen in our own political .affeirs. We are optimistic enough. to think that before it -is • too late the nation will awake, as it has .always. awoken- in the past; and will:save itself-from the-peril.. But-the risk-which is-being accepted through heedlessness, through carrying- -on any- how, and not attending to our oakum and our pumps,. is terribly great. Itis the duty of. everyone-who sees the-risk and measures the peril • to • hold: up a warning hand-.

Nominally we are making peace,• not making- war. - We are supposed -to be in process- of rehabilitating • the. world and. replacing - its depleted supplies. Actually we.• are,- cam-, nutting ourselves--gaily -to- -military adventures in--various directions where we may not be able to extricate ourselves, for years, and are putting :our mopes- -at :the foot ,-of :bills which have yet to . be . filled, in: We must. go steadily-, we mat, keep-a .careful look out we must reduce - sail.. Almost- wherever we look the, sea: is ming ,andis• y. nastier appearance: inn spite of the fact that...Mr; Lloyd George declares-that ,Europeis coming. out .of-the whirlpool. Of Ireland.: we "need aay little now, for the facts are as familier.as.they are painfnl. We have no doubt ourselves that, difficult though the restoration of order in . Ireland- is, order really' can • be -restored. if . only the Government will remember the essential fact that.

orderliness is the foendation and antecedent of all reform,. and that. the preliminary restoration of order has nothing whatever -to do .with.pelitica The two things should never be mixed, up ; the Government will only find themselves in. fresktroubles if_ they regard respect for law and order as .a thing,-to be purchased, as a matter of negotiation., Although,Mi. Lloycl.George's warning to Mr. J. H. Thomas waain: the main cogent and admirable, it ended with an expression of a willingness to deal which inspired us. with sonic, misgiving. We trust that Mr. Lloyd George will not again prove to be never so weak,.as when- he. appears to be most strong. It is the bare and unavoidable: duty of the Government to protect those who are threatened- with assassination and spoliation in.Ireland, and no sophis- tries about " avoiding provocation " and " granting. a truce " will relieve the Government of • that. duty. Quite apart from the discredit of.. allowing, :Ireland to continua in her present state the expense of governing " in..thia way, and of maintaining a large -number of troops there, is a very heavy item in our superfluous,national..biU. Turning from Ireland, we note that the tribes. in Mew: potanna are promising more trouble and that the expense of maintaining our garrison there has already mounted DSO thirty-five millions a year. Mr. Lloyd- George. says. in effect that there is no way out, but .that we . must go on - In Syria Feisul is making ready to .fight the French, and it may well be that • the trouble will extend to Palestine, where the cost of our troops .is. already estimated at six millions a year.. The Government have chosen this un-. fortunate moment to embitter the feelings .of Mohammedans and .Christians by appointing. a Jew, Sir Herbert Samuel, to administer Palestine. It will be useless, as „one of our correapondentsjustly points out, to tell Moslems and Christians that Sir Herbert. Samuel will be fair and just. No doubt he will want to- be particularly fair because he is_ so: ikely to be accused of .partisanship. Moreover, he has been trained in-the habits and code of- -British politics: But all that will -count for - nothing. The only thing the Moslems and Christians will .remember. is that.they have always feared -a Jewish domination and they will believe that a Jew has- beenplanted there tahring it about. When ardent Zionists begin to pour. into, Palestine. it will be said that Sir Herbert Samuel encouraged -them to come to swamp their rivals. There seems to be no escape. from this trouble. The fatal. error was to appoint -a Jew. In Persia there is _a prospect.. of an active anti-British_ movement, whether it be inspired. by the 'Russian ,Bolsheviks. or not. In Russia both -the Polish General Pilsudski and. General Wrangel are deeply involved in .their anti-Soviet campaigns, and for our -part, having read, with attention..all, the state- ments that-have. been made en the subject in Parliament, we are still at a loss to know. to .what _extent _the British Government are helping them. When we look at the .Turkish imbroglio the _events seem all. the more startling -because they are. less. familiar than the,Ruesian .affair, and indeed upon the public sense rather suddenly. The onep,:ckeay in which to-deal with Turkey -was to deal.. with her q • ly. who •have had dealings with the Turks.know that. in....uneasential .matters it,m.a,y be-wise to be patient. and indalgent,,bat that in an essential-matter. you have to strike promptly, and. you have to- strike, hard. In, the: hope that America would come . in the Supreme Council kept .putting off the settlement with Turkey. They preferred.todeal.with. a bad situation with the. help, of America, than., with..a manageable situation alone. In the meantime Turkey recovered a. little of her strength . and . certainly a. great. deal of. her defiance. Muetapha, liemars forces have . driven the. French. garrisons out of the greater part of Cilicia. They occupy an. impor- tant aecticar of the Baghda.d.Railway and are now besieging the port of Mersina. They hold all Turkish Armenia and are co-operating with the_Bolaheviksin_the Caucasus and Northern Persia. MustaphadiemaLis also endeavouring to stir .up the nontads_of) the Syrian .Desert-against us. The War Office last week reported, the- existence of a Turkish propagandist, centre. at Jezireh-ibn-Omar on. the. Upper. Tigris,.a hundred miles or so above Mosul, where these plots are concerted. Many of . our ships . are in the Sea • of Mannora. and in the Black Sea with the dangerous Straits behind: them—the _Straits which might at any time be sown with mines. after a successful rebel 'rising. Already Mils- tapha Kenialis i threatening.the Dardanelles. The solution of the. Supreme Council n this very risky matter is to turn over the main responsibility for dealing with the Turks to the Greeks.

We thoroughly appreciate the courage and _generosity • of M. Venizeloe, who, of course, wants to act helpfully by the Allies as well as to advance the interests of his own country. But we would ask 'the- Government to look - steadily at this gamble before they go further with it. If • we read the reports correctly, the Turks are regularly disposing_ themselves-in Asia Minor, and the support which the Royal Navy gives to the Greeks commits us at the outset to participation. Assuming, as we do, that M. Venizelos hopes to beat the. Turks with little expense to the Allies, we ask nevertheless, What is to happen if any-. thing goes wrong in the campaign ? Could we then re- pudiate responsibility ? We would even ask further, What is likely to happen in the event of the Greeks enjoying a resounding success against their ancient enemy ? We may be sure they will not lack enthusiasm in such a cause, but the cost to Greece will be great. She is a poor country, and it is virtually certain that whatever M. Venizelos may say—and it must be remembered that he will not enjoy eternal political life—a strong party will arise in Greece demanding that what will be called " the sacrifices of Greece in the interests of the world " shall be duly com- pensated. All Greeks have a sentimental and historic attraction to Constantinople, and if Greece should reduce Turkey to impotence nothing would be more likely than that Greece would demand Constantinople. Has Mr.

Lloyd George thought this out ? What would be his answer to a Greek claim to the perpetual possession of Constantinople ? If, on the other hand, the Greeks should fail against Turkey, nothing but appalling unsettlement, and new and great expenses for Great Britain as a Power deeply committed in the Near East, would be the result.

In entrusting Greece with British authority we are asking her to carry Caesar and his fortunes." We should have to go to the rescue if Greece failed, if only to stop exter- mination, wherever extermination could demonstrably be prevented. The British force at Constantinople is, we believe, estimated to cost four millions a year. Goodness knows what we may be committed to if the fortunes of the Greeks take a wrong turn. Of course we may have luck, and above all an access of alarm, which is already overdue, may frighten the British people into exacting extreme caution from the Government. Again, many of our difficulties in various parts of the world may solve themselves more quickly and less expensively than we at present dare to lope. But in that case the Government would deserve no credit, for they are carrying on in such a way as to risk running the ship under. If all, or even many, of our numerous commitments should require us simultaneously to find more money and more men, disaster would be certain. There would be such a call for man power alone, in that case, that the Government would have once more, even in a time of nominal peace, to resort to conscription. We implore the Government to look far enough ahead to think of such a thing. What would the Reservist say who were asked to go and fight in Persia, or Asia Minor, or Thrace, or Palestine, or the Caucasus, or Mesopotamia ? We know what he would answer, or at least we know what it would be in his heart to answer, and it is the business of the Government while there is yet time to see to it that no impossible question is put to our soldiers and no further crippling taxation is put upon our industries—all through want of foresight. We simply cannot afford unnecessary adventures, and those who are out for adventure should be silenced in the Cabinet. The ship will reach port if she is handled properly, but if she is handled in an unseamanlike manner she will certainly be run under.