Rearmament : A Labour View
SIR DAVID KELLY has accurately described the policy of Soviet Russia when he says that it " pursues a constant, unchanging, long-term strategy of hostility to the non- Communist world coupled with varying short-term tactics to suit changing circumstances." That is why M. Gromyko can say, in England that he would like to see a strengthening of the understanding between the British people and the people of the Soviet Union at the same time as Moscow is launching, through a thousand propaganda channels, an especially virulent attack on our American allies, culminating in a statement in Pravda that the " cannibalistic American imperialists are planning to exterminate 150,000,000 people in Eastern Europe." It follows from this that it is hopeless to think of establishing genuine friendly relations with Soviet Russia for a very long time to come. The utmost we can expect is an uneasy accom- modation or armistice based on the possession of power. If the Soviet Government can be made to realise that the Western world is too strong to be attacked with impunity, then a bargain might be struck and actual aggression averted. Now it is well known that the Soviet Government is keeping under arms at the present time a force of 175 divisions (not counting the armies of the satellite States). These divisions are reasonably well trained and pretty well equipped. They number about 2,500,000 men, and according to high military authorities these numbers could be doubled in about thirty days. There are also more than 500,000 men in the air force. It is the presence of this formidable array which is forcing the peaceful Western democracies to rearm in order to defend themselves.
It is in this light that the position of Germany must be examined. The crude proposition that Germany should be rearmed is highly unpopular with Labour audiences and per- haps with all audiences in this country and in France. Memories are not short enough for that to be otherwise. And the fact is that the only country which proposes that Germany should be permitted to have a national army and a national air force— and this presupposes the creation of a great German staff—is Soviet Russia. She also proposes that " all former servicemen of the German Army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, save for those who are serving terms on convictions for crimes which they committed, must be granted civil and political rights, on a par with all other German citizens for taking part in the building of a peace-loving, democratic Germany." The Allies, on the other hand, do not want Germany to have a great German staff and a national army commanded by former Nazis. Dr. Adenauer has rejected the notion as being out of date, and supports a European army as being the more modern conception. What the Allies are proposing is that West Germany should make a contribution to this European army in which the German contingent will be under international command. And, although many of us would have preferred to do without German help altogether, military authorities agree that the successful defence of Western Europe demands this aid. Neither Britain, France nor the U.S.A. is in a position CO provide the twelve extra divisions Germany is to supply. And the policy of the Parliamentary Labour Party is to support a German contribution to the defence of Europe subject to the Attlee conditions. The Attlee conditions are three in number. The first is that the rearmament of the countries belonging to the Atlantic Treaty must precede that of Germany; the second is that the German units should be integrated in the defence force in such a way as to preclude the emergence of a German military menace; the third is that the German people themselves must be in favour of the plan. The first two of the conditions present no difficulty. The rearmament of the Atlantic Powers is already proceeding, whereas that of Germany has not yet begun, and when it starts it will proceed in accordance with the plans for the time-phase build-up of all the N.A.T.O. forces; and the second condition is implicit in the designs for a European army, accepted by Dr. Adenauer. The third condition—which has been interpreted as meaning that the German people must be consulted by means of a general election—is likely before long to become academic. Ratification of the defence agreements by the Federal Parliament at Bonn is not expected before mid- November, and by that time it should have been made clear to the whole German people that all hope of securing from the Soviet Government any democratic concession which might make the unity of Germany possible must be abandoned.
There are members of the Labour Party who still think it possible to come to some agreement with the Soviet Govern- ment which might render a German contribution to defence unnecessary. I believe such members to be profoundly mistaken. It is impossible to bring about German unity without free elections in East Germany, and for the Soviet Government to grant these would mean that it is prepared to throw over the " People's Government." At present Moscow is not pre- pared to take that step, and I am convinced that she has no intention of accepting a settlement on Germany except on her own terms. She will therefore come to a conference for the sole purpose of attempting to postpone the Allies' plans for their own defence.
Her last Note, in which she proposes that the discussion of free elections for Germany should be the last item of the agenda instead of the first, is a clear indication that she has not changed her policy of obstruction, which, in the case of the Austrian discussions, has already prolonged diplomatic negotiations for five years. Of course, if a reasonable basis can be found for a conference, this country is bound to take part in it, but I have no hope that anything constructive will come out of it, and certainly it must not be allowed to delay the plans of the Allies for integrating Germany into the Western defence system.
There are a few members of the Labour Party—I do not think they are many—who do not want Western Germany to be brought intcythe Western defensive system on any terms. They are now openly hoping that no German contingents can be embodied until the autumn of 1953, as they contend that, once Western Germany joins the European army, Germany will become another Korea. But South Korea was invaded because North Korea had a strong army and South Korea had not. The policy thus advocated would reproduce in Germany the very conditions that made the invasion of Korea possible. I do not, of course, impugn the patriotism of these members. but I do feel that the logical outcome of their policy will be, not to achieve peace, but to ensure that, should war come, the West will be defeated or, at any rate, insufficiently defended. Between such a policy, especially when combined, as it often is, with attacks on America, and the policy of the Communists, there seems to me to be no perceptible difference.
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